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Oxicloud/src/infrastructure/services/blobs_consistency_service.rs
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//! Fourth tenant of Part 2 (recoverable-run engine).
//!
//! Iterates `storage.blobs` — the content-addressable registry — and
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//! checks the reference-counting invariants `dedup_gc` relies on.
//!
//! **Database only.** It opens no backend and makes no network call;
//! `?storage=<name>` and `?deep=true` are both inert here.
//!
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//! Two per-row checks share the same walk — one page fetch already
//! has every column both need:
//!
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//! * `refcount_mismatch` (severity `inconsistent`, repairable) —
//! `storage.blobs.ref_count` disagrees with the actual reference
//! count computed from `storage.files.blob_hash` +
//! `storage.chunk_manifests.chunk_hashes[]`. Under-count means
//! dedup GC could prematurely reap a live blob; over-count means
//! a blob is being pinned longer than needed. Content-safe either
//! way (the storage.blobs row is fine, the counter is wrong).
//!
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//! * `blob_orphan_stalled` (severity `anomaly`, discovery-only) —
//! the row satisfies every reap predicate `dedup_gc` uses
//! (`ref_count <= 0`, no chunk-level referrer) AND has been sitting
//! past a comfortable margin (default `STALL_GRACE_SECS` = 24 h,
//! comfortably exceeding the GC's own 1 h grace). Signal that the
//! GC pipeline itself is stuck — the job stopped running, is
//! failing on the same hash every tick, or a ghost row keeps
//! pinning the same set. No `?repair=true` path: per
//! [[feedback_no_silent_auto_repair]], papering over the symptom
//! here would hide the root cause (a wedged worker, a hanging
//! backend delete, a ghost referrer being recreated) — the
//! operator diagnoses first, then runs
//! `POST /api/admin/jobs/dedup_gc/trigger?force=true` themselves.
//! The two checks are orthogonal in-loop: a row with drift is NOT
//! also flagged as stalled — the drift IS why the GC hasn't taken
//! it, so fixing the counter is the whole story.
//!
//! ### Why nothing physical lives here any more
//!
//! This tenant used to probe `BlobStorageBackend::blob_exists` once
//! per row for `blob_missing_from_backend`, and under `?deep=true`
//! read and re-hashed every blob for `blob_corrupted` /
//! `blob_unreadable`.
//!
//! All three moved to `backend_consistency`, which merge-joins the
//! backend's enumeration against this same table in one ordered pass.
//! It reports the same missing bytes, plus the backend-only orphans a
//! DB walk cannot see by construction, at one enumeration instead of
//! N round-trips — and a deep pass there re-hashes the matched pairs
//! it already holds. Keeping the probe here bought nothing and made
//! every scheduled sweep pay for it.
//!
//! What is left is the half that needs no backend at all: a counter,
//! and the two tables that determine what it should be.
//!
//! ### Elsewhere in the graph
//!
//! * **Physical existence, orphan bytes, bit-rot** —
//! `backend_consistency`.
//! * **File-side DB integrity** (parent folder, blob reference,
//! denormalised size) — `files_consistency`.
//! * **Manifest-level integrity** (`storage.chunk_manifests` rows
//! pointing at reaped chunks) — `files_consistency::chunk_missing`.
//! * **The OTHER refcount** (`chunk_manifests.ref_count`, which every
//! whole-Blob reference lands on) — `manifests_consistency`.
use std::sync::Arc;
use async_trait::async_trait;
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use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use sqlx::PgPool;
use crate::application::ports::blob_reference_ports::{BlobReferenceRegistry, RefLevel};
use crate::infrastructure::scheduler::{
JobRegistry, JobRunArgs, JobStore, JobStoreProvider, Mutates, RecoverableJobHandler,
RunOutcome, RunStatus, record_or_log,
};
use crate::infrastructure::services::blob_diagnostics::affected_files;
pub const BLOBS_CONSISTENCY_JOB_NAME: &str = "blobs_consistency";
/// Rows per batch. Blobs are numerous (millions on a busy install)
/// but per-row work is now a single indexed SQL ref-count comparison,
/// with no backend round-trip. 200 balances cancel-poll cadence
/// against round-trip amortisation.
const BATCH_SIZE: i64 = 200;
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/// Grace window for the `blob_orphan_stalled` check. Derived from
/// `dedup_gc`'s own grace so the two stay coupled at the source: if an
/// operator ever tunes GC's grace (e.g. long-network-upload profile),
/// the stall threshold auto-scales — no second knob to keep in sync.
///
/// The `× 24` multiplier says "we tolerate up to 24 missed sweep ticks
/// before crying stall". Discovery-only, so a false positive after a
/// long maintenance pause costs nothing (operator glances at the
/// finding, sees it clear on the next run, moves on).
const STALL_GRACE_SECS: i64 =
crate::infrastructure::services::dedup_service::DedupService::GC_ORPHAN_GRACE_SECS * 24;
pub struct BlobsConsistencyCheck {
pool: Arc<PgPool>,
/// The chunk-level page query, assembled once from the blob-reference
/// registry so this recompute and `dedup_gc` agree on what "referenced"
/// means. Built at construction rather than per page so the sweep runs a
/// fixed statement — same reasoning as `DedupService::manifest_reap_sql`.
/// See `docs/plan/derived-blobs.md`.
chunk_page_sql: String,
/// Per-row repair UPDATE, built from the SAME registry as
/// `chunk_page_sql` so detection and repair use identical formulas
/// by construction. A future `RefLevel::Chunk` ref source added to
/// the registry flows into both without a code change here.
///
/// Previously the repair query was inlined with a hardcoded
/// 2-term formula (accidentally matching detection today). Would
/// silently diverge the moment a new chunk-level ref source
/// landed — same class of latent bug the sibling
/// `manifests_consistency` service hit 2026-09-02. Preemptively
/// pulled from the registry here to keep the pair symmetric.
chunk_repair_sql: String,
}
/// The chunk-level page query, with `actual_ref_count` summed from the
/// registered reference sources.
///
/// `storage.blobs.ref_count` semantics — the invariant `dedup_service`
/// actually maintains:
///
/// ```text
/// ref_count = (number of chunk_manifests whose chunk_hashes[] contains
/// this hash)
/// + (number of files.blob_hash pointing at this hash on the
/// LEGACY whole-file path — files with NO manifest for their
/// blob_hash)
/// ```
///
/// Naively `COUNT(files) + COUNT(manifests referring)` double-counts
/// single-chunk CDC files: where a file's whole-file hash equals its lone
/// chunk's hash (anything under one CDC chunk), the file appears BOTH in
/// `files.blob_hash` and in the manifest's `chunk_hashes[]`. The
/// `NOT EXISTS` guard inside `FilesReferenceSource`'s chunk-level fragment
/// excludes CDC-path files from the legacy term so the two don't overlap.
///
/// The GIN index on `chunk_hashes` (migration
/// `20260628000000_delta_upload_gin_index`) keeps the `= ANY(chunk_hashes)`
/// probe cheap.
///
/// # Panics
///
/// If no source contributes at [`RefLevel::Chunk`] — a wiring bug that
/// would make every blob look unreferenced and flag the whole table as
/// `refcount_mismatch`.
fn chunk_page_sql(registry: &BlobReferenceRegistry) -> String {
let expected = registry.ref_count_expr(RefLevel::Chunk, "b.hash");
assert!(
expected != "0",
"no chunk-level blob reference source registered: every blob would \
appear unreferenced"
);
format!(
"SELECT
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b.hash AS hash,
b.size AS size,
b.ref_count AS ref_count,
b.orphaned_at AS orphaned_at,
({expected})::bigint AS actual_ref_count
FROM storage.blobs b
WHERE ($1::text IS NULL OR b.hash > $1)
ORDER BY b.hash
LIMIT $2"
)
}
/// Per-row corrective UPDATE for `storage.blobs.ref_count`, targeting
/// one blob by `hash`. Uses the SAME registry-derived expression as
/// [`chunk_page_sql`] so detection and repair agree on "actual" by
/// construction. A future `RefLevel::Chunk` ref source added to the
/// registry flows into both queries with no code change here.
///
/// The `<> (subquery)` guard makes the UPDATE a no-op when the value
/// is already correct — idempotent under concurrent-repair races and
/// under retry. The subquery re-reads inside the same statement, so a
/// concurrent write between page fetch and this UPDATE can't leave a
/// stale value.
fn chunk_repair_sql(registry: &BlobReferenceRegistry) -> String {
let expected = registry.ref_count_expr(RefLevel::Chunk, "b.hash");
format!(
"UPDATE storage.blobs b
SET ref_count = ({expected})::bigint
WHERE b.hash = $1
AND b.ref_count <> ({expected})::bigint"
)
}
impl BlobsConsistencyCheck {
pub fn new(pool: Arc<PgPool>, reference_registry: Arc<BlobReferenceRegistry>) -> Self {
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Self {
pool,
chunk_page_sql: chunk_page_sql(&reference_registry),
chunk_repair_sql: chunk_repair_sql(&reference_registry),
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}
}
pub async fn register_recoverable_job(
self: Arc<Self>,
registry: &JobRegistry,
provider: &Arc<dyn JobStoreProvider>,
) -> Arc<Self> {
registry
.register_recoverable_job(self.clone(), provider.clone(), None)
.await;
self
}
}
#[derive(Debug, sqlx::FromRow)]
struct BlobRow {
hash: String,
size: i64,
ref_count: i32,
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/// Wall-clock instant this row hit `ref_count = 0` and became
/// eligible for GC. `NULL` for pre-migration rows or write-paths
/// that never stamped it — those the GC treats as immediately
/// reap-able (see `dedup_service.rs` phase-2 predicate), so the
/// stall check ignores them too: without a stamp we cannot say
/// how long a row has been sitting.
orphaned_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
/// Real reference count derived from the actual references —
/// files' whole-file `blob_hash` PLUS every chunk hash across
/// `storage.chunk_manifests`. Compared to `ref_count` (the
/// stored counter) to detect drift.
actual_ref_count: i64,
}
#[async_trait]
impl RecoverableJobHandler for BlobsConsistencyCheck {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
BLOBS_CONSISTENCY_JOB_NAME
}
fn description(&self) -> &'static str {
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"Walks storage.blobs and checks two ref-counting invariants \
dedup_gc relies on. First: refcount_mismatch — the stored \
ref_count disagrees with the references that actually exist \
(under-count lets GC reap a live blob, over-count pins a dead \
one); repairable via ?repair=true. Second: blob_orphan_stalled \
— the row satisfies every reap predicate GC uses but is still \
present past 24× GC's grace, meaning the GC pipeline itself is \
stuck (worker crashed, backend delete hanging, ghost referrer \
being recreated); discovery-only, because a one-click repair \
would hide the root cause the operator needs to fix — after \
diagnosis, POST /api/admin/jobs/dedup_gc/trigger?force=true \
drains the backlog. Database only — cheap and safe to run at \
any time. Missing, orphaned or corrupted bytes are \
backend_consistency's job."
}
fn mutates(&self) -> Mutates {
Mutates::OnRepairOnly
}
fn repair_description(&self) -> Option<&'static str> {
Some(
"Rewrites drifted ref_count values to the recomputed truth. \
Does not delete blobs or resurrect missing bytes — an \
over-counted blob simply becomes eligible for the next \
dedup_gc sweep.",
)
}
/// Definitive count. `storage.blobs` PK scan is index-only;
/// even at millions of rows it's sub-second on modern PG.
async fn count_total(&self) -> Option<u64> {
let row: Result<(i64,), sqlx::Error> = sqlx::query_as("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM storage.blobs")
.fetch_one(self.pool.as_ref())
.await;
match row {
Ok((n,)) => Some(n.max(0) as u64),
Err(e) => {
tracing::debug!(
target: "oxicloud::consistency",
event = "blobs_consistency.count_total_failed",
error = %e,
"count_total failed — run will not surface a progress bar"
);
None
}
}
}
async fn run_resumable(
&self,
store: &dyn JobStore,
args: &JobRunArgs,
resume_cursor: Option<Vec<u8>>,
) -> RunOutcome {
// No backend is resolved here, and `?storage=<name>` is inert:
// this tenant reads nothing but the database. Everything physical
// — existence, orphan bytes, bit-rot — belongs to
// `backend_consistency`, which finds it in one enumeration pass
// instead of one probe per row.
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//
// Snapshot "is this a Fresh run?" BEFORE the resume_cursor
// match consumes it — otherwise the `is_none()` check later
// borrows a partially-moved value. Fresh = no cursor bytes
// at all; Resumed = cursor bytes present (possibly empty).
let is_fresh = resume_cursor.is_none();
// Cursor = the last-visited `hash` string, UTF-8-encoded. On
// resume, we walk `WHERE hash > $cursor` in ASC order. First
// batch: NULL cursor → start from the smallest hash.
let mut cursor: Option<String> = match resume_cursor {
None => None,
Some(bytes) if bytes.is_empty() => None,
Some(bytes) => match String::from_utf8(bytes) {
Ok(s) => Some(s),
Err(e) => {
return RunOutcome::Failed {
message: format!("invalid cursor: not valid UTF-8: {e}"),
};
}
},
};
// Per-run finding counter (feeds outer JobOutcome extras via
// stats.finding_count — actual persistence happens in
// `record_finding` on each emission).
let mut finding_count = 0u64;
// Only touched when `args.repair == true`. Symmetric with
// `manifests_consistency`; reported in completion log +
// `extra_stats` so operators see "found N, fixed M" in one line.
let mut repaired_count = 0u64;
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// Stall-check finding counter. Reported alongside
// `finding_count` (which covers refcount findings) so the
// completion line separates the two invariant classes.
let mut stalled_count = 0u64;
// `?deep=true` is not handled here. Re-reading and re-hashing
// bytes is backend work end to end, so it moved to
// `backend_consistency`, where the merge-join already holds the
// matched key pairs worth verifying. A deep flag on this tenant
// would be a flag with nothing to do.
// Repair mode persisted to `params.repair` so the admin run-detail
// view can display it. Fresh persists what the trigger asked for;
// Resume reads back so a paused repair scan stays a repair
// scan (a mid-scan crash mustn't silently downgrade to
// discovery-only for the remaining rows).
let repair = if is_fresh {
let v = if args.repair { "true" } else { "false" };
if let Err(e) = store.set_string_param("repair", v).await {
return RunOutcome::Failed {
message: format!("failed to persist repair flag to params: {e}"),
};
}
args.repair
} else {
match store.get_string_param("repair").await {
Ok(Some(v)) => v == "true",
Ok(None) => false,
Err(e) => {
return RunOutcome::Failed {
message: format!("read `repair` from params: {e}"),
};
}
}
};
if repair {
tracing::info!(
target: "oxicloud::consistency",
event = "blobs_consistency.repair_mode_active",
run_id = %store.run_id(),
"repair mode: refcount_mismatch findings will trigger corrective UPDATE"
);
}
loop {
// Cooperative cancel poll between batches.
match store.status().await {
Ok(RunStatus::CancelRequested) => {
tracing::info!(
target: "oxicloud::consistency",
event = "blobs_consistency.cancelled",
run_id = %store.run_id(),
finding_count = finding_count,
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stalled_count = stalled_count,
"blobs_consistency cancelled cooperatively, pausing"
);
return RunOutcome::Paused {
cursor: cursor
.as_ref()
.map(|s| s.as_bytes().to_vec())
.unwrap_or_default(),
};
}
Ok(_) => {}
Err(e) => {
return RunOutcome::Failed {
message: format!("status poll: {e}"),
};
}
}
// Fetch the next batch. `actual_ref_count` is summed from the
// registered reference sources — see `chunk_page_sql`, which
// documents the invariant and the single-chunk double-count trap.
let rows: Vec<BlobRow> = match sqlx::query_as(&self.chunk_page_sql)
.bind(cursor.as_deref())
.bind(BATCH_SIZE)
.fetch_all(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
{
Ok(r) => r,
Err(e) => {
return RunOutcome::Failed {
message: format!("batch fetch: {e}"),
};
}
};
if rows.is_empty() {
tracing::info!(
target: "oxicloud::consistency",
event = "blobs_consistency.completed",
run_id = %store.run_id(),
finding_count = finding_count,
repaired_count = repaired_count,
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stalled_count = stalled_count,
repair_requested = repair,
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"blobs_consistency completed with {} refcount finding(s), \
{} repaired, {} stalled",
finding_count,
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repaired_count,
stalled_count,
);
return RunOutcome::completed_with(serde_json::json!({
"repair_requested": repair,
"repaired_count": repaired_count,
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"stalled_count": stalled_count,
}));
}
// No grace window here any more. It existed to keep the
// physical probe from flagging a blob whose bytes had landed
// but whose row hadn't — a write-path race this tenant no
// longer looks at. The refcount comparison reads one
// consistent DB snapshot, so there is nothing to wait for.
for row in &rows {
if row.ref_count as i64 == row.actual_ref_count {
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// No drift. Check for stall — orthogonal condition,
// only meaningful when the counter is CORRECT: if
// drift existed, the drift IS the reason the GC
// hasn't taken this row, and firing stall on top
// would mislead the operator into hunting a
// GC-pipeline issue that isn't there. Fix the
// counter → the row becomes eligible on the next
// sweep. Only when counter == actual == 0 AND the
// row has been sitting past `STALL_GRACE_SECS` is
// this a genuine "the GC should have taken this
// and hasn't" signal.
if row.actual_ref_count == 0
&& let Some(orphaned_at) = row.orphaned_at
{
let stalled_secs = (Utc::now() - orphaned_at).num_seconds();
if stalled_secs > STALL_GRACE_SECS {
stalled_count += 1;
let affected = affected_files(self.pool.as_ref(), &row.hash).await;
let detail = serde_json::json!({
"hash": row.hash,
"size": row.size,
"ref_count": row.ref_count,
"orphaned_at": orphaned_at,
"stalled_for_secs": stalled_secs,
"stall_grace_secs": STALL_GRACE_SECS,
"affected_files": affected,
// Inline hint the admin UI can render
// on click. Not repaired here (see
// module doc) — after operator has
// diagnosed the root cause (worker
// wedged, backend hang, ghost row),
// this is the one-shot to drain the
// backlog.
"remediation_hint": "Investigate why dedup_gc has not reaped this row \
(worker running? advisory-lock contention? backend delete hanging? \
ghost chunk_manifests/storage.files row?), then \
POST /api/admin/jobs/dedup_gc/trigger?force=true to drain the backlog.",
});
record_or_log(
store,
BLOBS_CONSISTENCY_JOB_NAME,
// Stable machine-readable kind — the
// admin UI and log-aggregator queries
// key off this string. Do not rename.
"blob_orphan_stalled",
// "anomaly" — surprising state worth
// surfacing, no direct data impact.
// The bytes are safe; their persistence
// past grace means the reap pipeline
// needs attention.
"anomaly",
None, // hash isn't a UUID; identifier lives in detail
detail,
)
.await;
}
}
continue;
}
finding_count += 1;
let affected = affected_files(self.pool.as_ref(), &row.hash).await;
let detail = serde_json::json!({
"hash": row.hash,
"stored": row.ref_count,
"actual": row.actual_ref_count,
"delta": row.actual_ref_count - row.ref_count as i64,
"size": row.size,
"affected_files": affected,
});
// Repair pass — content-safe corrective UPDATE. Sets
// `stored` to the value the auditor formula would
// compute at UPDATE time (subquery matches
// `chunk_page_sql`'s `actual_ref_count`), so a
// concurrent write between our page fetch and this
// UPDATE can't leave a stale value — the subquery
// re-reads inside the same statement. The `<>`
// guard makes the UPDATE a no-op if the value is
// already correct, so this is idempotent under retry.
//
// `self.chunk_repair_sql` is built once at construction
// from the same `BlobReferenceRegistry` as the page
// query — detection and repair use identical formulas
// by construction. See `chunk_repair_sql`.
//
// Attempt repair FIRST, then record the finding with
// severity/kind reflecting the final state:
// * repair succeeded → severity "info", kind "refcount_repaired"
// * repair no-op → severity "info", kind "refcount_resolved"
// * repair failed → severity "inconsistent", kind "refcount_mismatch"
// * no repair requested → severity "inconsistent", kind "refcount_mismatch"
//
// Parallels the WARN-then-INFO sequence in logs: an
// unresolved drift raises attention ("inconsistent"),
// a repaired one records the fix at info level without
// inflating the "needs action" tally the outcome UI
// shows. The detail JSON still carries `stored/actual/
// delta/affected_files` so the audit trail is complete
// either way.
let (kind, severity) = if repair {
match sqlx::query(&self.chunk_repair_sql)
.bind(&row.hash)
.execute(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
{
Ok(res) if res.rows_affected() > 0 => {
repaired_count += 1;
tracing::info!(
target: "audit",
event = "blobs_consistency.repaired",
run_id = %store.run_id(),
hash = %row.hash,
stored_was = row.ref_count,
actual = row.actual_ref_count,
"🩹 blob ref_count repaired"
);
("refcount_repaired", "info")
}
Ok(_) => {
// Row not touched — either another
// concurrent repair fixed it first, or
// drift healed between page fetch and
// UPDATE. Current state correct — info.
("refcount_resolved", "info")
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "oxicloud::consistency",
event = "blobs_consistency.repair_failed",
run_id = %store.run_id(),
hash = %row.hash,
error = %e,
"blob ref_count repair UPDATE failed — finding stays"
);
("refcount_mismatch", "inconsistent")
}
}
} else {
("refcount_mismatch", "inconsistent")
};
record_or_log(
store,
BLOBS_CONSISTENCY_JOB_NAME,
kind,
severity,
None, // hash isn't a UUID; resource identifier lives in detail
detail,
)
.await;
}
// Advance cursor + checkpoint.
let last_hash = rows.last().map(|r| r.hash.clone()).expect("non-empty rows");
cursor = Some(last_hash.clone());
let batch_len = rows.len() as u64;
if let Err(e) = store.checkpoint(last_hash.into_bytes(), batch_len).await {
return RunOutcome::Failed {
message: format!("checkpoint: {e}"),
};
}
if (rows.len() as i64) < BATCH_SIZE {
tracing::info!(
target: "oxicloud::consistency",
event = "blobs_consistency.completed",
run_id = %store.run_id(),
finding_count = finding_count,
repaired_count = repaired_count,
repair_requested = repair,
"blobs_consistency completed with {} finding(s), {} repaired",
finding_count,
repaired_count
);
return RunOutcome::completed_with(serde_json::json!({
"repair_requested": repair,
"repaired_count": repaired_count,
}));
}
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn default_registry() -> BlobReferenceRegistry {
let pool = Arc::new(
sqlx::pool::PoolOptions::<sqlx::Postgres>::new()
.connect_lazy("postgres://invalid/invalid")
.expect("lazy pool never connects"),
);
crate::infrastructure::repositories::pg::blob_reference_sources::built_in_registry(pool)
}
/// Golden test for the chunk-level recompute. Pins the statement
/// byte-for-byte because it is assembled from the registry rather than
/// written as a literal — the reviewer should read the SQL here.
///
/// This expression must stay equal to what the query computed before the
/// registry existed: the legacy-files term guarded by `NOT EXISTS`, plus
/// the manifests-citing-this-chunk term. If a change makes those two
/// overlap, every single-chunk CDC file is counted twice and the whole
/// table reports `refcount_mismatch`.
#[tokio::test]
async fn chunk_page_statement_is_stable() {
let sql = chunk_page_sql(&default_registry());
let expected = r#"SELECT
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b.hash AS hash,
b.size AS size,
b.ref_count AS ref_count,
b.orphaned_at AS orphaned_at,
((SELECT COUNT(*) FROM storage.files cnt_f
WHERE cnt_f.blob_hash = b.hash
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM storage.chunk_manifests cnt_m
WHERE cnt_m.file_hash = cnt_f.blob_hash
))
+ (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM storage.chunk_manifests cnt_m
WHERE b.hash = ANY(cnt_m.chunk_hashes)))::bigint AS actual_ref_count
FROM storage.blobs b
WHERE ($1::text IS NULL OR b.hash > $1)
ORDER BY b.hash
LIMIT $2"#;
assert_eq!(sql, expected, "chunk page statement changed:\n{sql}");
}
/// With no chunk-level source every blob would look unreferenced and the
/// sweep would report the entire table as `refcount_mismatch`. Refuse to
/// build the statement instead.
#[test]
#[should_panic(expected = "no chunk-level blob reference source")]
fn empty_registry_refuses_to_build_page_statement() {
let _ = chunk_page_sql(&BlobReferenceRegistry::new());
}
/// Golden test — the repair statement is assembled from the same
/// registry as `chunk_page_sql`, so pin it byte-for-byte too. If
/// the registry ever changes what it produces at
/// `RefLevel::Chunk`, BOTH this test and
/// `chunk_page_statement_is_stable` above break together — an
/// operator using `?repair=true` shouldn't see the detection
/// formula report drift the repair formula can't clear.
///
/// Ships the two-term formula (`storage.files` legacy-path count +
/// `storage.chunk_manifests` chunk-membership count) twice — once
/// in SET, once in the `<>` guard. Both must stay identical so the
/// guard is meaningful.
#[tokio::test]
async fn chunk_repair_statement_is_stable() {
let sql = chunk_repair_sql(&default_registry());
let expected = r#"UPDATE storage.blobs b
SET ref_count = ((SELECT COUNT(*) FROM storage.files cnt_f
WHERE cnt_f.blob_hash = b.hash
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM storage.chunk_manifests cnt_m
WHERE cnt_m.file_hash = cnt_f.blob_hash
))
+ (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM storage.chunk_manifests cnt_m
WHERE b.hash = ANY(cnt_m.chunk_hashes)))::bigint
WHERE b.hash = $1
AND b.ref_count <> ((SELECT COUNT(*) FROM storage.files cnt_f
WHERE cnt_f.blob_hash = b.hash
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM storage.chunk_manifests cnt_m
WHERE cnt_m.file_hash = cnt_f.blob_hash
))
+ (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM storage.chunk_manifests cnt_m
WHERE b.hash = ANY(cnt_m.chunk_hashes)))::bigint"#;
assert_eq!(sql, expected, "chunk repair statement changed:\n{sql}");
}
}