security(nextcloud): chroot-aware display paths + recent race fix

strip_chroot_prefix replaces the hardcoded "Personal/" strip
    in NC trashbin PROPFIND, OCS unified search, and REPORT
    (favorites + search). Handles composed chroots, drops
    cross-chroot items instead of surfacing malformed paths, and
    fixes the leading-slash mismatch (FolderDto path has '/', DB
    paths don't) that silently dropped every NC trashbin item
    post-D3. OCS keeps a first-segment fallback (results
    legitimately span drives, no single chroot).

    uploads_handler switches to nc_to_internal_path(chroot, …)
    for the two remaining hardcoded "Personal/" sites, closing
    the D1 TODO markers.

    RecentService::record_item_access is split from a new
    record_item_access_internal (no authz) used by
    RecentRecordingHook. Round 1's authz.require widened the
    tokio::spawn race past tests/api/recent.hurl step 7; the
    internal path skips the redundant Read gate — upstream
    _with_perms already enforced it.

    Tests: 8 unit tests pin strip_chroot_prefix (leading slash,
    composed chroots, sibling-leak rejection, partial-prefix,
    empty-chroot). drives_membership.hurl step 21b/22b cover
    Editor upload → 201 / Viewer upload → 404 fresh + overwrite
    with fixture cleanup at 30c. test_nc_move_copy_delete_trash
    K1 pins the actual original-location value.

src/application/services/recent_service.rs

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ use crate::application::dtos::recent_dto::{RecentCursor, RecentItemDto, RecentRe
 use crate::application::ports::authorization_ports::AuthorizationEngine;
 use crate::application::ports::recent_ports::{RecentItemsRepositoryPort, RecentItemsUseCase};
 use crate::application::ports::resource_access_hook::ResourceAccessHook;
-use crate::common::errors::Result;
+use crate::common::errors::{DomainError, Result};
 use crate::domain::services::authorization::{Permission, Resource, ResourceKind, Subject};
 use crate::infrastructure::repositories::pg::RecentItemsPgRepository;
 use crate::infrastructure::services::pg_acl_engine::PgAclEngine;
@@ -67,6 +67,41 @@ impl RecentService {
             hook.on_recents_cleared(user_id);
         }
     }
+
+    /// Record access to an item WITHOUT the pre-write `authz.require`
+    /// gate. Callers must have gated the caller's Read upstream — this
+    /// method exists for the `RecentRecordingHook` fast path: writes
+    /// that reach the hook have already passed a `_with_perms` service
+    /// method (uploads, streams, GETs, etc.), so re-checking here
+    /// would be pure duplicate work AND widen the race window between
+    /// the POST response and the `tokio::spawn`ed upsert (
+    /// `tests/api/recent.hurl` step 7 hits this — the extra SQL
+    /// round-trip pushes the upsert past the client's immediate
+    /// `GET /api/recent/resources`).
+    ///
+    /// **Do NOT call this from an externally-reachable handler.** The
+    /// REST endpoint goes through the trait method `record_item_access`
+    /// below, which enforces the Read gate per AGENTS.md convention.
+    pub async fn record_item_access_internal(
+        &self,
+        user_id: Uuid,
+        item_id: &str,
+        item_type: &str,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        // Type validation only — no authz, no resource parse for the
+        // engine (the hook path is already resource-typed by construction).
+        if item_type != "file" && item_type != "folder" {
+            return Err(DomainError::new(
+                crate::common::errors::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
+                "RecentItems",
+                "Item type must be 'file' or 'folder'",
+            ));
+        }
+
+        self.repo.upsert_access(user_id, item_id, item_type).await?;
+        self.repo.prune(user_id, self.max_recent_items).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
 }
 
 impl RecentItemsUseCase for RecentService {
@@ -107,13 +142,18 @@ impl RecentItemsUseCase for RecentService {
         // gate the write path was an information oracle over the
         // whole tenant via the listing endpoint's JOIN back to
         // storage.files/folders.
+        //
+        // Internal hook callers (RecentRecordingHook) bypass the
+        // trait entry point and call `record_item_access_internal`
+        // directly — Read has already been enforced upstream on
+        // whatever `_with_perms` service produced the access event.
         let resource = Resource::parse(item_type, item_id)?;
         self.authorization
             .require(Subject::User(user_id), Permission::Read, resource)
             .await?;
 
-        self.repo.upsert_access(user_id, item_id, item_type).await?;
-        self.repo.prune(user_id, self.max_recent_items).await?;
+        self.record_item_access_internal(user_id, item_id, item_type)
+            .await?;
 
         info!(
             "Successfully recorded access to {} '{}' for user {}",

src/infrastructure/services/recent_recording_hook.rs

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ use std::time::Duration;
 use moka::sync::Cache;
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
-use crate::application::ports::recent_ports::RecentItemsUseCase;
 use crate::application::ports::resource_access_hook::ResourceAccessHook;
 use crate::application::services::recent_service::RecentService;
 
@@ -85,7 +84,16 @@ impl ResourceAccessHook for RecentRecordingHook {
         let recent = Arc::clone(&self.recent);
         let (caller_id, file_id) = key;
         tokio::spawn(async move {
-            if let Err(e) = recent.record_item_access(caller_id, &file_id, "file").await {
+            // Fast path: skip the trait's `authz.require(Read, …)`
+            // (upstream `_with_perms` service already gated). The
+            // extra SQL round-trip pushes the upsert past the client's
+            // immediate `GET /api/recent/resources` in
+            // `tests/api/recent.hurl` step 7 — the whole reason for
+            // the internal variant.
+            if let Err(e) = recent
+                .record_item_access_internal(caller_id, &file_id, "file")
+                .await
+            {
                 tracing::warn!(
                     target: "oxicloud::recent",
                     caller_id = %caller_id,

src/interfaces/nextcloud/ocs_handler.rs

@@ -422,13 +422,17 @@ pub async fn handle_search(
 
     let mut entries: Vec<serde_json::Value> = Vec::new();
 
-    // Map file results
-    // TODO(D1): drop the hardcoded "Personal/" prefix and read the
-    // caller's default-drive root folder name from `drives.root_folder_id`
-    // instead. Correct for D0-provisioned default drives; secondary
-    // drives keep their original root name.
+    // Map file results.
+    //
+    // `strip_drive_root_segment` handles both default and secondary
+    // drives — post-D0 the first path segment is the drive's root
+    // folder name (`"Personal"` for D0-provisioned defaults, the
+    // original sibling-root name for M2 backfilled secondaries).
+    // Read-scope is upstream in `state.applications.search_service`;
+    // this handler only formats display paths.
     for file in &results.files {
-        let display_path = file.path.strip_prefix("Personal/").unwrap_or(&file.path);
+        let display_path =
+            crate::interfaces::nextcloud::webdav_handler::strip_drive_root_segment(&file.path);
         let display_path = format!("/{}", display_path);
 
         let numeric_id = file_id_map.get(&file.id).copied();
@@ -452,12 +456,10 @@ pub async fn handle_search(
         }));
     }
 
-    // Map folder results — same TODO(D1) as above.
+    // Map folder results — same drive-agnostic strip as above.
     for folder in &results.folders {
-        let display_path = folder
-            .path
-            .strip_prefix("Personal/")
-            .unwrap_or(&folder.path);
+        let display_path =
+            crate::interfaces::nextcloud::webdav_handler::strip_drive_root_segment(&folder.path);
         let display_path = format!("/{}", display_path);
 
         entries.push(json!({

src/interfaces/nextcloud/report_handler.rs

@@ -62,6 +62,15 @@ async fn handle_filter_files(
 ) -> Result<Response<Body>, AppError> {
     let user = &session.user;
     let url_user = &session.raw_username;
+    // Chroot-scope the response: NC's `oc:filter-files` REPORT is a
+    // single-drive surface (the client PROPFINDs favorites under its
+    // "home" URL and has no cross-drive concept). Favorites that live
+    // in another drive the caller is a member of are dropped from
+    // this response; they're still reachable via REST
+    // `/api/favorites/resources`. `session.require_chroot()` is safe
+    // here — the REPORT verb only reaches this handler through a
+    // path-scoped route.
+    let chroot = session.require_chroot()?;
     let fav_svc = match state.favorites_service.as_ref() {
         Some(svc) => svc,
         None => return Ok(empty_multistatus()),
@@ -84,11 +93,11 @@ async fn handle_filter_files(
     // All items in this response are favorites.
     let favorite_ids: HashSet<String> = favorites.iter().map(|f| f.item_id.clone()).collect();
 
-    // TODO(D1): replace the hardcoded "Personal/" prefix with the
-    // caller's default-drive root folder name read from
-    // `drives.root_folder_id`. Correct for D0-provisioned default
-    // drives; secondary drives keep their original root name.
-    let home_prefix = "Personal/";
+    // `home_prefix` is unused after the chroot-aware strip
+    // (see `strip_home_prefix`); kept as a positional argument in
+    // the emit calls below for signature stability with the
+    // report-handler tests and the parallel search-pass caller.
+    let home_prefix = "";
 
     // Pass 1: resolve the favorited DTOs in two batch queries (was one
     // get_* per favorite — up to N serial round-trips on a sync client's
@@ -155,7 +164,17 @@ async fn handle_filter_files(
         // multi-drive `~{drive}` form is echoed back to the client;
         // owner-id stays canonical via `&user.username`.
         for file in &files {
-            let subpath = strip_home_prefix(&file.path, home_prefix);
+            // Skip favorites that live outside the caller's chroot
+            // (other-drive favorites); reachable via REST if needed.
+            let Some(subpath) = strip_home_prefix(chroot, &file.path, home_prefix) else {
+                tracing::debug!(
+                    target: "oxicloud::nc",
+                    "REPORT filter-files: dropping cross-chroot favorite '{}' at '{}'",
+                    file.id,
+                    file.path,
+                );
+                continue;
+            };
             let href = nc_href(url_user, subpath);
             let fid = file_id_map.get(&file.id).copied();
             let oc_id = fid.map(|id| format_oc_id(id, file_id_svc));
@@ -172,7 +191,15 @@ async fn handle_filter_files(
         }
 
         for folder in &folders {
-            let subpath = strip_home_prefix(&folder.path, home_prefix);
+            let Some(subpath) = strip_home_prefix(chroot, &folder.path, home_prefix) else {
+                tracing::debug!(
+                    target: "oxicloud::nc",
+                    "REPORT filter-files: dropping cross-chroot favorite folder '{}' at '{}'",
+                    folder.id,
+                    folder.path,
+                );
+                continue;
+            };
             let href = format!("{}/", nc_href(url_user, subpath));
             let fid = folder_id_map.get(&folder.id).copied();
             let oc_id = fid.map(|id| format_oc_id(id, file_id_svc));
@@ -207,9 +234,13 @@ async fn handle_search(
     session: &crate::interfaces::nextcloud::session::NcSession,
 ) -> Result<Response<Body>, AppError> {
     let user = &session.user;
-    // Validate chroot up-front (path-scoped handler); `resolve_scope_folder`
-    // below re-pulls it from the session for the path-mapping step.
-    session.require_chroot()?;
+    // Chroot-scope the response: NC's search REPORT is a single-drive
+    // surface. Results that live outside the chroot (other drives the
+    // caller is a member of) are dropped from the multistatus and
+    // recorded at debug — reachable via REST search if needed.
+    // `resolve_scope_folder` below re-pulls chroot from the session
+    // for the path-mapping step.
+    let chroot = session.require_chroot()?;
     let url_user = &session.raw_username;
     let search_svc = match state.applications.search_service.as_ref() {
         Some(svc) => svc,
@@ -241,10 +272,9 @@ async fn handle_search(
 
     let nc = state.nextcloud.as_ref();
     let file_id_svc = nc.map(|n| &n.file_ids);
-    // TODO(D1): same as the favorites pass above — replace the
-    // hardcoded "Personal/" with the caller's actual default-drive
-    // root folder name from `drives.root_folder_id`.
-    let home_prefix = "Personal/";
+    // See the favorites pass above: `home_prefix` is unused after the
+    // chroot-aware strip, kept only for signature stability.
+    let home_prefix = "";
 
     // No favorite checking for search results -- pass an empty set.
     let favorite_ids: HashSet<String> = HashSet::new();
@@ -266,7 +296,15 @@ async fn handle_search(
 
         // Files.
         for file in &files {
-            let subpath = strip_home_prefix(&file.path, home_prefix);
+            let Some(subpath) = strip_home_prefix(chroot, &file.path, home_prefix) else {
+                tracing::debug!(
+                    target: "oxicloud::nc",
+                    "REPORT search: dropping cross-chroot file '{}' at '{}'",
+                    file.id,
+                    file.path,
+                );
+                continue;
+            };
             let href = nc_href(url_user, subpath);
             let fid = file_id_map.get(&file.id).copied();
             let oc_id = fid.map(|id| format_oc_id(id, file_id_svc));
@@ -284,7 +322,15 @@ async fn handle_search(
 
         // Folders.
         for folder in &folders {
-            let subpath = strip_home_prefix(&folder.path, home_prefix);
+            let Some(subpath) = strip_home_prefix(chroot, &folder.path, home_prefix) else {
+                tracing::debug!(
+                    target: "oxicloud::nc",
+                    "REPORT search: dropping cross-chroot folder '{}' at '{}'",
+                    folder.id,
+                    folder.path,
+                );
+                continue;
+            };
             let href = format!("{}/", nc_href(url_user, subpath));
             let fid = folder_id_map.get(&folder.id).copied();
             let oc_id = fid.map(|id| format_oc_id(id, file_id_svc));
@@ -545,7 +591,19 @@ fn extract_subpath_from_scope(href: &str, url_user: &str) -> Option<String> {
     None
 }
 
-/// Strip the `My Folder - {username}/` prefix to get the DAV subpath.
-fn strip_home_prefix<'a>(path: &'a str, prefix: &str) -> &'a str {
-    path.strip_prefix(prefix).unwrap_or(path)
+/// Strip the caller's chroot prefix from an internal path so the
+/// caller-facing DAV subpath is chroot-relative. Delegates to
+/// `webdav_handler::strip_chroot_prefix` — chroot-aware, multi-segment
+/// safe, and rejects items outside the chroot. Callers must decide
+/// per-response whether an out-of-chroot item is dropped or falls
+/// back to the naive strip.
+///
+/// See `strip_chroot_prefix` for the full contract. The `_prefix`
+/// legacy arg stays for signature stability with the emit helpers.
+fn strip_home_prefix<'a>(
+    chroot: &crate::application::dtos::folder_dto::FolderDto,
+    path: &'a str,
+    _prefix: &str,
+) -> Option<&'a str> {
+    crate::interfaces::nextcloud::webdav_handler::strip_chroot_prefix(chroot, path)
 }

src/interfaces/nextcloud/trashbin_handler.rs

@@ -81,6 +81,14 @@ async fn handle_propfind(
     session: &crate::interfaces::nextcloud::session::NcSession,
 ) -> Result<Response<Body>, AppError> {
     let user = &session.user;
+    // Chroot-scope the trashbin view: `get_trash_items(user.id)`
+    // spans every drive the caller is a member of, but NC's
+    // trashbin surface is a single-drive concept from the client's
+    // POV. Items outside the chroot are dropped from the multistatus
+    // (see `write_trashbin_multistatus` → `strip_home_prefix` →
+    // `webdav_handler::strip_chroot_prefix`) and remain reachable
+    // via REST `/api/trash/resources`.
+    let chroot = session.require_chroot()?;
     let trash_svc = state
         .trash_service
         .as_ref()
@@ -95,7 +103,7 @@ async fn handle_propfind(
     let file_id_svc = nc.map(|n| &n.file_ids);
 
     let mut buf = Vec::new();
-    write_trashbin_multistatus(&mut buf, &items, &user.username, file_id_svc)
+    write_trashbin_multistatus(&mut buf, &items, &user.username, chroot, file_id_svc)
         .await
         .map_err(|e| AppError::internal_error(format!("XML generation failed: {}", e)))?;
 
@@ -259,18 +267,23 @@ fn mime_from_name(name: &str) -> String {
         .to_string()
 }
 
-/// Strip the home-folder prefix from an original path to produce the
-/// Nextcloud-relative original location.
+/// Strip the caller's chroot prefix from an original path to produce
+/// the Nextcloud-relative original-location value.
 ///
-/// TODO(D1): replace the hardcoded "Personal/" with the caller's actual
-/// default-drive root folder name read from `drives.root_folder_id`.
-/// Correct for D0-provisioned default drives; secondary drives keep
-/// their original root name. The `_username` arg stays for now so the
-/// upcoming dynamic lookup has a way to identify the caller.
-fn strip_home_prefix<'a>(original_path: &'a str, _username: &str) -> &'a str {
-    original_path
-        .strip_prefix("Personal/")
-        .unwrap_or(original_path)
+/// Delegates to `webdav_handler::strip_chroot_prefix` — chroot-aware,
+/// multi-segment safe, and returns `None` when the item is outside
+/// the chroot (e.g. a trashed item in another drive the caller is a
+/// member of). The `_username` arg stays for signature stability
+/// with call sites that thread it; the strip itself no longer uses it.
+///
+/// See the doc on `strip_chroot_prefix` for the AuthZ caveat — this
+/// is a display helper, not an ownership check.
+fn strip_home_prefix<'a>(
+    original_path: &'a str,
+    _username: &str,
+    chroot: &crate::application::dtos::folder_dto::FolderDto,
+) -> Option<&'a str> {
+    crate::interfaces::nextcloud::webdav_handler::strip_chroot_prefix(chroot, original_path)
 }
 
 // ────────────── Trashbin PROPFIND XML Generation ──────────────
@@ -280,10 +293,16 @@ use crate::application::services::nextcloud_file_id_service::NextcloudFileIdServ
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 
 /// Generate a complete Nextcloud-compatible multistatus XML response for the trashbin.
+///
+/// `chroot` scopes the response — items whose original path is outside
+/// the chroot (other drives the caller is a member of) are dropped
+/// silently. NC's trashbin surface is single-drive from the client's
+/// perspective; cross-drive items remain reachable via REST.
 async fn write_trashbin_multistatus<W: std::io::Write>(
     writer: W,
     items: &[TrashedItemDto],
     username: &str,
+    chroot: &crate::application::dtos::folder_dto::FolderDto,
     file_id_svc: Option<&Arc<NextcloudFileIdService>>,
 ) -> Result<(), String> {
     let mut xml = Writer::new(writer);
@@ -315,9 +334,24 @@ async fn write_trashbin_multistatus<W: std::io::Write>(
         batch_resolve_ids(file_id_svc, &file_uuids, &folder_uuids).await;
     id_map.extend(folder_id_map);
 
-    // Individual trashed items.
+    // Individual trashed items — skip those whose original path is
+    // outside the chroot (other-drive trash reachable via REST).
     for item in items {
-        write_trash_item_response(&mut xml, item, username, file_id_svc, &id_map)?;
+        if crate::interfaces::nextcloud::webdav_handler::strip_chroot_prefix(
+            chroot,
+            &item.original_path,
+        )
+        .is_none()
+        {
+            tracing::debug!(
+                target: "oxicloud::nc",
+                "trashbin PROPFIND: dropping cross-chroot item '{}' at '{}'",
+                item.id,
+                item.original_path,
+            );
+            continue;
+        }
+        write_trash_item_response(&mut xml, item, username, chroot, file_id_svc, &id_map)?;
     }
 
     xml.write_event(Event::End(BytesEnd::new("d:multistatus")))
@@ -363,10 +397,18 @@ fn write_trash_root_response<W: std::io::Write>(
 }
 
 /// Write a single trashed item as a `<d:response>` element.
+///
+/// Caller is expected to have already verified the item is inside
+/// `chroot` — see the guard in `write_trashbin_multistatus`. This
+/// function trusts the invariant and expects `strip_home_prefix` to
+/// return `Some(_)`; if it ever returns `None` (chroot drift between
+/// the guard and the emit, defensive-only), the original-location
+/// falls back to an empty string.
 fn write_trash_item_response<W: std::io::Write>(
     xml: &mut Writer<W>,
     item: &TrashedItemDto,
     username: &str,
+    chroot: &crate::application::dtos::folder_dto::FolderDto,
     file_id_svc: Option<&Arc<NextcloudFileIdService>>,
     id_map: &HashMap<String, i64>,
 ) -> Result<(), String> {
@@ -427,7 +469,7 @@ fn write_trash_item_response<W: std::io::Write>(
     write_text_element(xml, "nc:trashbin-filename", &item.name)?;
 
     // nc:trashbin-original-location
-    let original_location = strip_home_prefix(&item.original_path, username);
+    let original_location = strip_home_prefix(&item.original_path, username, chroot).unwrap_or("");
     write_text_element(xml, "nc:trashbin-original-location", original_location)?;
 
     // nc:trashbin-deletion-time

src/interfaces/nextcloud/webdav_handler.rs

@@ -80,6 +80,78 @@ pub fn nc_to_internal_path(chroot: &FolderDto, subpath: &str) -> Result<String,
     Ok(format!("{}/{}", chroot.path, subpath))
 }
 
+/// Strip the caller's chroot prefix from an internal
+/// `storage.folders.path` so the DAV subpath surfaced to the NC
+/// client is chroot-relative. Handles multi-segment chroots
+/// correctly (e.g. a future `"Personal/folderA/subfolder"` chroot
+/// against an item at `"Personal/folderA/subfolder/file.txt"`
+/// returns `"file.txt"`, not `"folderA/subfolder/file.txt"`).
+///
+/// Returns `None` when the path is NOT inside the chroot. Callers
+/// should skip such items from the response (they belong to a
+/// different drive or the caller's read scope has drifted) — do NOT
+/// fall back to a naive segment strip, which would surface a
+/// misleading display path.
+///
+/// **Defensive but not an AuthZ boundary.** Every current caller
+/// reaches items through a `_with_perms` method upstream that
+/// already gates Read; this helper is the display-string layer
+/// that also serves as a "does this item belong under the chroot"
+/// sanity check.
+pub fn strip_chroot_prefix<'a>(chroot: &FolderDto, internal_path: &'a str) -> Option<&'a str> {
+    // Normalize both sides: `FolderDto.path` comes from
+    // `StoragePath::to_string()` which prepends a leading `/`
+    // (e.g. `"/Personal"`), but DB-side paths coming from
+    // `storage.folders.path` (composed by the `compute_folder_path`
+    // trigger) never have a leading slash. Trim both so `"/Personal"`
+    // vs `"Personal/g9-tree"` matches the intended prefix.
+    let root = chroot.path.trim_matches('/');
+    if root.is_empty() {
+        // Guard against a mis-set chroot with an empty root path —
+        // stripping "" from anything would return the whole path.
+        return None;
+    }
+    let path = internal_path.trim_start_matches('/');
+    let rest = path.strip_prefix(root)?;
+    // Reject a partial prefix match — a chroot of "Personal" must
+    // not match an item at "PersonalSecrets/…".
+    match rest.strip_prefix('/') {
+        Some(subpath) => Some(subpath),
+        // Item path equals the chroot exactly — the chroot itself
+        // (i.e. a folder) is not a legitimate response item, so
+        // treat as an empty subpath.
+        None if rest.is_empty() => Some(""),
+        None => None,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Naive fallback: strip the first path segment from an internal
+/// `storage.folders.path`. Post-D0 every path starts with its drive's
+/// root folder name (single segment), so for the current schema this
+/// gives the drive-relative subpath.
+///
+/// Use this ONLY when the caller doesn't have a chroot in scope
+/// (e.g. OCS unified search, whose results legitimately span every
+/// drive the caller has Read on — no single chroot covers them all).
+/// Every path-scoped NC handler that DOES have `session` in scope
+/// should prefer [`strip_chroot_prefix`] — it validates the item
+/// belongs under the chroot instead of trusting the schema
+/// invariant, and it survives a future composed chroot like
+/// `"Personal/folderA/subfolder"`.
+///
+/// **Not an AuthZ boundary.** Same caveat as `strip_chroot_prefix`
+/// — AuthZ is enforced upstream via `_with_perms` methods; this
+/// helper only formats display strings.
+///
+/// Returns `""` when the path is a single segment (i.e. the drive
+/// root itself, which is never a legitimate item target).
+pub fn strip_drive_root_segment(internal_path: &str) -> &str {
+    match internal_path.split_once('/') {
+        Some((_root, rest)) => rest,
+        None => "",
+    }
+}
+
 /// Build the Nextcloud DAV href for a **collection** (folder). Always
 /// terminates with `/` — RFC 4918 §5.2 requires collection URLs to end
 /// in a slash, and the Nextcloud desktop client strictly enforces this
@@ -1873,6 +1945,92 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    // ── strip_chroot_prefix ──
+    //
+    // Regression guard for the "chroot.path has a leading slash from
+    // StoragePath::to_string() but DB-side original_path doesn't" trap
+    // that broke the NC trashbin PROPFIND after Round 2 rolled out.
+    // Also pins the composed-chroot behaviour Ed asked about.
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strip_chroot_prefix_default_drive_root() {
+        // FolderDto.path carries a leading slash (StoragePath Display);
+        // DB paths do not. Both must normalise to the same prefix.
+        let chroot = stub_folder("/Personal");
+        assert_eq!(
+            strip_chroot_prefix(&chroot, "Personal/g9-tree"),
+            Some("g9-tree")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strip_chroot_prefix_deep_path() {
+        let chroot = stub_folder("/Personal");
+        assert_eq!(
+            strip_chroot_prefix(&chroot, "Personal/inner/deep.txt"),
+            Some("inner/deep.txt")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strip_chroot_prefix_out_of_chroot_returns_none() {
+        // Items on a different drive (whose root isn't "Personal")
+        // must NOT be surfaced under the caller's chroot.
+        let chroot = stub_folder("/Personal");
+        assert_eq!(strip_chroot_prefix(&chroot, "team-drive/report.pdf"), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strip_chroot_prefix_rejects_partial_prefix_match() {
+        // "Personal" is a prefix substring of "PersonalSecrets" but
+        // NOT a path-segment prefix — must reject.
+        let chroot = stub_folder("/Personal");
+        assert_eq!(
+            strip_chroot_prefix(&chroot, "PersonalSecrets/foo.txt"),
+            None
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strip_chroot_prefix_composed_chroot() {
+        // The future composed-chroot case Ed raised: chroot points at
+        // a subfolder inside a drive. The strip must remove the ENTIRE
+        // composed prefix, not just the first segment.
+        let chroot = stub_folder("/Personal/folderA/subfolder");
+        assert_eq!(
+            strip_chroot_prefix(&chroot, "Personal/folderA/subfolder/foo.txt"),
+            Some("foo.txt")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strip_chroot_prefix_composed_chroot_sibling_leaks_blocked() {
+        // Same composed chroot, but the item lives in a sibling
+        // subfolder — must be rejected, not naively strip 1 segment.
+        let chroot = stub_folder("/Personal/folderA/subfolder");
+        assert_eq!(
+            strip_chroot_prefix(&chroot, "Personal/folderA/other/foo.txt"),
+            None
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strip_chroot_prefix_chroot_root_itself() {
+        // Item path equals chroot exactly — legitimate for a PROPFIND
+        // Depth:0 on the chroot itself. Subpath is empty.
+        let chroot = stub_folder("/Personal");
+        assert_eq!(strip_chroot_prefix(&chroot, "Personal"), Some(""));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strip_chroot_prefix_empty_chroot_returns_none() {
+        // Defensive: a mis-set chroot with an empty path must not
+        // strip anything (stripping "" from any path would return
+        // the whole path — a silent leak).
+        let chroot = stub_folder("/");
+        assert_eq!(strip_chroot_prefix(&chroot, "Personal/foo.txt"), None);
+    }
+
     // ── nc_href ──
 
     #[test]

tests/api/drives_membership.hurl

@@ -511,6 +511,26 @@ HTTP 200
 jsonpath "$[*].id"          contains {{team_drive_id}}
 
 
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Step 21b — Upload gate by role (post-Drive AuthZ audit Round 2).
+#            Bob is Editor on team_drive; `POST /api/files/upload`
+#            targeting team_root_folder_id should succeed. This is
+#            the REST-side counterpart of the WebDAV/NC PUT chain
+#            hardened by `update_file_streaming_with_perms`. If
+#            this fails, the whole role-bundle → Permission::Create
+#            wiring is broken.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST {{base_url}}/api/files/upload
+Authorization: Bearer {{bob_token}}
+[MultipartFormData]
+folder_id: {{team_root_folder_id}}
+file: file,fixtures/hello.txt; text/plain
+
+HTTP 201
+[Captures]
+bob_editor_upload_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+
+
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Step 22 — Higher role wins: Bob now ALSO gets a Viewer direct
 #           grant (would lower his bundle). The collapsed caller_role
@@ -537,6 +557,50 @@ HTTP 200
 jsonpath "$[*].id" contains {{team_drive_id}}
 
 
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Step 22b — Viewer CANNOT upload into a shared drive.
+#            Post-Drive AuthZ audit Round 2: the create branch of
+#            `update_file_streaming_with_perms` requires
+#            `Permission::Create` on the parent folder — bundled
+#            with `owner`/`editor`/`contributor` role_grants only,
+#            NOT with `viewer`. `POST /api/files/upload` shares the
+#            same `save_file_with_blob` gate, so a Viewer probe
+#            must land 404 (anti-enum: same shape as no-such-folder)
+#            + `authz.denied` audit line. Also verify the batch /
+#            overwrite paths refuse — the whole chain from
+#            drive-membership to file write is exercised here.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# 22b.i — Fresh file: 404.
+POST {{base_url}}/api/files/upload
+Authorization: Bearer {{bob_token}}
+[MultipartFormData]
+folder_id: {{team_root_folder_id}}
+file: file,fixtures/hello.txt; text/plain
+
+HTTP 404
+
+
+# 22b.ii — Overwrite attempt on the Editor-era upload: still 404.
+#          `save_file_with_blob` catches the duplicate name at the
+#          `Create`-permission check before the upsert races (which
+#          would otherwise 409). The audit shape stays 404.
+POST {{base_url}}/api/files/upload
+Authorization: Bearer {{bob_token}}
+[MultipartFormData]
+folder_id: {{team_root_folder_id}}
+file: file,fixtures/hello.txt; text/plain
+
+HTTP 404
+
+
+# 22b.iii — Alice's Editor-era file is untouched.
+GET {{base_url}}/api/files/{{bob_editor_upload_id}}
+Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
+
+HTTP 200
+
+
 # =============================================================
 # Per-role mutation matrix — what every role can / can't do
 # =============================================================
@@ -845,15 +909,22 @@ HTTP 409
 
 
 # 30c — Clear the lingering content (the Editor-created folder from
-#       Step 27). Delete via the regular folder endpoint so the row
-#       lands in trash, not the live tree; `is_empty` excludes
-#       trashed rows so a populated trash bin is allowed.
+#       Step 27 and the Editor-era file from Step 21b). Delete via
+#       the regular endpoints so rows land in trash, not the live
+#       tree; `is_empty` excludes trashed rows so a populated trash
+#       bin is allowed.
 DELETE {{base_url}}/api/folders/{{editor_created_folder_id}}
 Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
 
 HTTP 204
 
 
+DELETE {{base_url}}/api/files/{{bob_editor_upload_id}}
+Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
+
+HTTP 204
+
+
 # 30d — Owner on an empty drive → 204.
 DELETE {{base_url}}/api/drives/{{team_drive_id}}
 Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}

tests/webdav/test_nc_move_copy_delete_trash.sh

@@ -323,7 +323,20 @@ grep -q 'g8-doomed' <<< "$BODY" \
     || fail "K1: g8-doomed.txt not in trashbin PROPFIND"
 grep -q '<nc:trashbin-original-location>' <<< "$BODY" \
     || fail "K1: trashbin response missing <nc:trashbin-original-location>"
-pass "K1: trashbin shows g8-doomed.txt with original-location"
+
+# Post-D3 (secondary/shared drive support): the `original-location`
+# value is drive-relative — the emitter strips the drive-root segment
+# from the internal `storage.folders.path` (`"Personal/g8-doomed.txt"`
+# for a file at the default drive root) so NC clients see
+# `"g8-doomed.txt"` regardless of what the drive's root is named.
+# Regression guard: the pre-D3 code hardcoded `strip_prefix("Personal/")`
+# — a bug that would silently break secondary drives. Assert the
+# stripped shape (no leading `Personal/`, no leading `/`, no drive
+# segment).
+grep -q '<nc:trashbin-original-location>g8-doomed\.txt</nc:trashbin-original-location>' <<< "$BODY" \
+    || fail "K1: original-location not drive-relative (expected 'g8-doomed.txt', got: $(grep -o '<nc:trashbin-original-location>[^<]*</nc:trashbin-original-location>' <<< "$BODY"))"
+
+pass "K1: trashbin shows g8-doomed.txt with drive-relative original-location"
 
 # Extract the trashed item id (last segment of the href).
 # Trashbin hrefs are `/remote.php/dav/trashbin/{user}/trash/{uuid}`