feat(DPoP): add verification + X-Forwarded-Host X-Forwarded-Proto

This commit is contained in:
Edouard Vanbelle
2026-08-08 15:08:35 +02:00
parent 514bbc35ab
commit 2e6789e506
12 changed files with 879 additions and 21 deletions
+302
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
//! DPoP proof enforcement middleware (RFC 9449).
//!
//! Runs AFTER the auth middleware — reads the `CurrentUser`
//! extension to know the caller has an authenticated session, and
//! validates the `DPoP` header against the session's stored JWK
//! thumbprint (`session.dpop_jkt`).
//!
//! Mode dispatch (from `OXICLOUD_DPOP_MODE`):
//! * **Off** — pass-through, no work. Safe default.
//! * **Opportunistic** — verify when present, allow when absent.
//! Rollout mode: catches client bugs before enforcement.
//! * **Required** — bound sessions MUST present a valid proof.
//! Unbound sessions (`dpop_jkt IS NULL`) remain exempt (app
//! passwords, legacy).
//!
//! Failure response shape mirrors RFC 9449 §7.1:
//! * generic bad proof → `401` + `WWW-Authenticate: DPoP
//! error="invalid_dpop_proof"`
//! * nonce missing / stale (Gate 5b) → `401` +
//! `WWW-Authenticate: DPoP error="use_dpop_nonce"` +
//! `DPoP-Nonce: <fresh>` — client retries once, transparently.
//!
//! Body is JSON `{"error_type": "DpopVerificationFailed"}` in both
//! cases (anti-enumeration: same shape regardless of reason; the
//! audit line carries the machine-readable reason).
//!
//! Every response — success OR failure — also gets a `DPoP-Nonce`
//! header pointing at the currently-fresh server-issued nonce.
//! Clients cache it; the next request presents it and skips the
//! challenge round trip.
//!
//! Replay detection (jti-per-nonce) is Gate 6; not wired yet.
use axum::extract::{OriginalUri, Request, State};
use axum::http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode};
use axum::middleware::Next;
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
use std::sync::Arc;
use crate::common::config::DpopMode;
use crate::common::di::AppState;
use crate::infrastructure::services::dpop_verifier::{
DpopRequestContext, DpopVerifyError, verify as verify_proof,
};
use crate::interfaces::errors::AppError;
use crate::interfaces::middleware::auth::CurrentUser;
/// Resolve the request's external `(scheme, host)` — what the client
/// sees the URL as, which is what its DPoP proof's `htu` was built
/// from. Behind a reverse proxy, the internal request scheme +
/// authority differ from the external ones; without normalising here
/// the verifier fires `wrong_htu` on every request.
///
/// Priority chain (RFC 7239-adjacent — mirror what oxicloud audit
/// spans use for `client_ip`):
/// 1. `X-Forwarded-Proto` + `X-Forwarded-Host`
/// 2. `Host` header with scheme inferred from `is_https` request
/// 3. Fallback (`http` + `localhost`) — dev-only, unrepresentative
///
/// NB: no trust-boundary check here. If your deployment lets
/// arbitrary clients set `X-Forwarded-*`, they can already forge
/// audit-log IPs everywhere else — that's an operator responsibility
/// solved by the trusted-proxy config, not this helper.
fn external_scheme_host(headers: &HeaderMap) -> (String, String) {
let scheme = headers
.get("x-forwarded-proto")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|s| s.split(',').next().unwrap_or(s).trim().to_owned())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "http".to_owned());
let host = headers
.get("x-forwarded-host")
.or_else(|| headers.get("host"))
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|s| s.split(',').next().unwrap_or(s).trim().to_owned())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "localhost".to_owned());
(scheme, host)
}
/// Middleware entry point mounted on authenticated `/api/*` subtrees.
pub async fn require_dpop_layer(
State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
request: Request,
next: Next,
) -> Response {
let mode = state.core.config.auth.dpop_mode;
if mode == DpopMode::Off {
return next.run(request).await;
}
let nonce_service = state.dpop_nonce_service.clone();
// No authenticated user → pass through (upstream auth layer
// already handled or will handle the 401). We only concern
// ourselves with proof-carrying requests on authenticated paths.
let Some(_current_user) = request.extensions().get::<Arc<CurrentUser>>() else {
return next.run(request).await;
};
let dpop_header = request
.headers()
.get("DPoP")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(str::to_owned);
// GATE 5 SCOPE: session-level `dpop_jkt` lookup is deferred (see
// module docstring). For opportunistic mode:
// - proof present → verify with expected_jkt=None (accept any
// jkt shape; still catches malformed/bad-sig/wrong-htu bugs)
// - proof absent → pass through, no warning yet
// For required mode: same for now — Gate 9 flips to real
// per-session enforcement once session context is wired.
let Some(proof) = dpop_header else {
let response = next.run(request).await;
return stamp_current_nonce(response, &nonce_service);
};
// Build canonical htu — external scheme + host (`X-Forwarded-*`
// aware) + OriginalUri path (nest-strip-safe). Query stripped
// per RFC 9449 §4.2.
let (scheme, host) = external_scheme_host(request.headers());
let path = request
.extensions()
.get::<OriginalUri>()
.map(|u| u.0.path().to_owned())
.unwrap_or_else(|| request.uri().path().to_owned());
let htu = format!("{scheme}://{host}{path}");
let method = request.method().as_str().to_owned();
let now_secs = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
let ctx = DpopRequestContext {
htm: &method,
htu: &htu,
now_secs,
expected_jkt: None, // Session-level pin comes in a later gate
};
match verify_proof(&proof, &ctx) {
Ok(verified) => {
// Nonce validation: the verifier extracted the claim; if
// present, it MUST be in our live pool. Absent → OK on
// the bootstrap request, but the challenge below MUST
// still fire so the very next request carries a nonce.
match verified.nonce.as_deref() {
Some(n) if !nonce_service.is_valid(n) => {
tracing::info!(
target: "audit",
event = "dpop.verify_failed",
reason = "nonce_stale",
method = %method,
htu = %htu,
"👮🏻‍♂️ DPoP nonce stale — issuing challenge",
);
return nonce_challenge_response(&nonce_service);
}
None => {
// No nonce presented at all → challenge so the
// NEXT request carries one. The ±30s bootstrap
// window at the verifier means this one still
// succeeded, but we still want the client onto
// the nonce path immediately.
return nonce_challenge_response(&nonce_service);
}
_ => {}
}
let response = next.run(request).await;
stamp_current_nonce(response, &nonce_service)
}
Err(err) => {
tracing::info!(
target: "audit",
event = "dpop.verify_failed",
reason = err.reason(),
method = %method,
htu = %htu,
"👮🏻‍♂️ DPoP proof rejected",
);
dpop_verification_failed_response(err, &nonce_service)
}
}
}
/// Stamp the currently-fresh nonce onto the outgoing response so
/// the client sees it and caches it for its next request. Called
/// on EVERY successful passthrough — the client's fetch interceptor
/// keeps its cached nonce in sync automatically.
fn stamp_current_nonce(
mut response: Response,
nonce_service: &crate::infrastructure::services::dpop_nonce_service::DpopNonceService,
) -> Response {
let fresh = nonce_service.current_or_rotate();
if let Ok(hv) = HeaderValue::from_str(&fresh) {
response.headers_mut().insert("DPoP-Nonce", hv);
}
response
}
/// Build a `use_dpop_nonce` challenge response — 401 +
/// WWW-Authenticate + DPoP-Nonce carrying a fresh nonce. The SPA
/// fetch interceptor (Gate 4) auto-retries once with the new nonce
/// so users don't experience a visible failure.
fn nonce_challenge_response(
nonce_service: &crate::infrastructure::services::dpop_nonce_service::DpopNonceService,
) -> Response {
let mut resp = AppError::new(
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
"DPoP nonce required",
"DpopVerificationFailed",
)
.into_response();
resp.headers_mut().insert(
"WWW-Authenticate",
HeaderValue::from_static(r#"DPoP error="use_dpop_nonce""#),
);
let fresh = nonce_service.current_or_rotate();
if let Ok(hv) = HeaderValue::from_str(&fresh) {
resp.headers_mut().insert("DPoP-Nonce", hv);
}
resp
}
/// Build the standardised 401 response for a rejected DPoP proof.
/// Response shape: RFC 9449 §7.1 `WWW-Authenticate: DPoP error="…"`
/// plus OxiCloud's `error_type` JSON body so the SPA can key off it.
/// Also carries a fresh `DPoP-Nonce` so a client whose failure was
/// nonce-shaped (rare after this refactor, but future error paths
/// might need it) can retry immediately.
fn dpop_verification_failed_response(
err: DpopVerifyError,
nonce_service: &crate::infrastructure::services::dpop_nonce_service::DpopNonceService,
) -> Response {
let mut resp = AppError::new(
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
"DPoP proof verification failed",
"DpopVerificationFailed",
)
.into_response();
// Static: `WWW-Authenticate` schemes stay stable across errors.
// Only the audit `reason` field varies (already emitted).
let www_auth = HeaderValue::from_static(r#"DPoP error="invalid_dpop_proof""#);
resp.headers_mut().insert("WWW-Authenticate", www_auth);
let fresh = nonce_service.current_or_rotate();
if let Ok(hv) = HeaderValue::from_str(&fresh) {
resp.headers_mut().insert("DPoP-Nonce", hv);
}
// Silence unused-parameter lint — err is captured in the audit
// line at the callsite; this fn intentionally maps ALL failures
// to the same client-facing shape (anti-enumeration).
let _ = err;
resp
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use axum::http::HeaderMap;
#[test]
fn external_scheme_host_prefers_forwarded_headers() {
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("x-forwarded-proto", HeaderValue::from_static("https"));
h.insert("x-forwarded-host", HeaderValue::from_static("oxi.example"));
h.insert("host", HeaderValue::from_static("internal:8086"));
assert_eq!(
external_scheme_host(&h),
("https".to_owned(), "oxi.example".to_owned())
);
}
#[test]
fn external_scheme_host_falls_back_to_host_header() {
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("host", HeaderValue::from_static("localhost:5173"));
assert_eq!(
external_scheme_host(&h),
("http".to_owned(), "localhost:5173".to_owned())
);
}
#[test]
fn external_scheme_host_takes_leftmost_of_forwarded_chain() {
// Multiple hops → `X-Forwarded-*` becomes a comma-separated
// list. RFC 7239 says the leftmost is the original client.
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("x-forwarded-proto", HeaderValue::from_static("https, http"));
h.insert(
"x-forwarded-host",
HeaderValue::from_static("oxi.example, internal"),
);
assert_eq!(
external_scheme_host(&h),
("https".to_owned(), "oxi.example".to_owned())
);
}
#[test]
fn external_scheme_host_defaults_when_empty() {
let h = HeaderMap::new();
assert_eq!(
external_scheme_host(&h),
("http".to_owned(), "localhost".to_owned())
);
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
pub mod admin;
pub mod auth;
pub mod csrf;
pub mod dpop;
pub mod locale;
pub mod rate_limit;
pub mod server_status;