diff --git a/.cargo/audit.toml b/.cargo/audit.toml index 8b2a030a..9e21fc99 100644 --- a/.cargo/audit.toml +++ b/.cargo/audit.toml @@ -64,6 +64,38 @@ ignore = [ "RUSTSEC-2026-0195", "RUSTSEC-2026-0194", + # azure_core 0.21.0 — "Legacy azure_core writes the authorization + # header value to logs" (RUSTSEC-2026-0275, 6.5 medium). Same + # unofficial archived SDK, same absent upgrade path as the other + # 0.21.0-chain advisories above: the advisory's "upgrade to + # >=0.22.0" applies to the official azure_core crate line, not to + # the archived 0.21.0 we're pinned on via the unofficial + # azure_storage_blobs SDK. Real fix is the official azure_core 1.0 / + # azure_storage_blob 1.0 SDK migration tracked separately (memory + # project_azure_sdk_migration_pending) — blocked upstream by the + # 1.0 SDK dropping shared-key auth. + # + # Exposure in this codebase is narrow. The advisory covers the + # HTTP client emitting the `Authorization` header value into log + # records; for our Azure backend usage that header value is + # `SharedKey :` — the shared key itself + # never appears, only a per-request HMAC signature bound to the + # request's `x-ms-date` and unusable outside the ~15 min clock-skew + # window. Reaching the log path further requires (a) an Azure + # backend actually being configured (S3 and local are the + # alternatives) and (b) the tracing subscriber emitting DEBUG + # records for the `azure_core` target — production defaults are + # INFO. Under both conditions the worst-case leak is replay of + # individual object operations within the skew window by an + # attacker who already has production log read access; the shared + # key cannot be derived. + # + # Un-ignore trigger: the official azure_core 1.0 migration lands — + # at which point this entry and the other azure_core 0.21.0-chain + # entries above (RUSTSEC-2026-0097, -2024-0384, -2026-0195, + # -2026-0194) all go away together. + "RUSTSEC-2026-0275", + # wasmtime 43.0.2 — "Stores can mix up type indices between engines" # (GHSA-hgjw-h833-99q9). Transitive via extism 1.30.0 (latest published; # extism `main` still pins wasmtime 43, no upgrade path). The advisory