Merge pull request #596 from swissiety/rfc-5789-http-patch

This commit is contained in:
Dionisio Pozo
2026-07-22 00:32:27 +02:00
committed by GitHub
20 changed files with 2921 additions and 133 deletions
-1
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
{"sessionId":"82cd2c6b-7874-4cfa-9d00-297f91d81b98","pid":2450899,"procStart":"26101142","acquiredAt":1781931933331}
+11
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@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ pub trait FileUploadUseCase: Send + Sync + 'static {
/// on the overwrite branch and `authz.require(caller, Create,
/// Folder|Drive(id))` on the new-file branch. Handlers just plumb
/// `caller_id` through — no protocol-layer authz.
///
/// `expected_hash`: forwarded to
/// `FileWritePort::update_file_content_with_blob` on the overwrite
/// branch for compare-and-swap; ignored on the new-file branch
/// (nothing to compare against). Pass `None` for plain PUT/WOPI/
/// chunked-upload last-write-wins semantics; pass the pre-write
/// snapshot's content hash for PATCH, where a concurrent write
/// during the (potentially slow) splice must be rejected rather
/// than silently clobbered.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
async fn update_file_streaming_with_perms(
&self,
path: &str,
@@ -107,6 +117,7 @@ pub trait FileUploadUseCase: Send + Sync + 'static {
content_type: &str,
modified_at: Option<i64>,
caller_id: Uuid,
expected_hash: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<FileDto, DomainError>;
}
+9
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@@ -299,6 +299,14 @@ pub trait FileWritePort: Send + Sync + 'static {
///
/// `caller_id` is stamped into `updated_by` alongside the
/// `updated_at` bump (§14 provenance).
///
/// `expected_hash`: when `Some`, makes this a true compare-and-swap —
/// the write only takes effect if the row's current `blob_hash`
/// still equals it, checked and applied atomically under the same
/// row lock (no gap between check and write for a concurrent writer
/// to land in). A mismatch returns `ErrorKind::PreconditionFailed`
/// and leaves the row untouched. `None` keeps the previous
/// blind-overwrite behaviour (PUT/WOPI/chunked-upload finalize).
async fn update_file_content_with_blob(
&self,
file_id: &str,
@@ -306,6 +314,7 @@ pub trait FileWritePort: Send + Sync + 'static {
size: u64,
modified_at: Option<i64>,
caller_id: Uuid,
expected_hash: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(String, i64), DomainError>;
/// Registers file metadata WITHOUT writing content to disk (write-behind).
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ impl FileUploadService {
let file = file_read.get_file(file_id).await?;
let (new_hash, updated_at) = self
.file_write
.update_file_content_with_blob(file_id, &blob.hash, blob.size, None, caller_id)
.update_file_content_with_blob(file_id, &blob.hash, blob.size, None, caller_id, None)
.await?;
// The file maps to a different blob now — stale cached content must
// never be served for the rest of its TTI window.
@@ -506,6 +506,7 @@ impl FileUploadUseCase for FileUploadService {
/// member and cross-tenant PUT. See
/// `docs/plan/authz_audit/nextcloud.md` and the sibling native
/// `/webdav/*` handler.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
async fn update_file_streaming_with_perms(
&self,
path: &str,
@@ -514,6 +515,7 @@ impl FileUploadUseCase for FileUploadService {
content_type: &str,
modified_at: Option<i64>,
caller_id: Uuid,
expected_hash: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<FileDto, DomainError> {
let Some(authz) = &self.authorization else {
return Err(DomainError::internal_error(
@@ -552,6 +554,7 @@ impl FileUploadUseCase for FileUploadService {
blob.size,
modified_at,
caller_id,
expected_hash,
)
.await?;
// Invalidate content cache — file content has changed.
@@ -589,6 +589,7 @@ impl FileWritePort for MockFileRepository {
_size: u64,
_modified_at: Option<i64>,
_caller_id: Uuid,
_expected_hash: Option<&str>,
) -> std::result::Result<(String, i64), DomainError> {
Ok((String::new(), 0))
}
+3
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@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ impl FileWritePort for StubFileWritePort {
_size: u64,
_modified_at: Option<i64>,
_caller_id: Uuid,
_expected_hash: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(String, i64), DomainError> {
Ok((String::new(), 0))
}
@@ -491,6 +492,7 @@ impl FileUploadUseCase for StubFileUploadUseCase {
Ok(FileDto::default())
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
async fn update_file_streaming_with_perms(
&self,
_path: &str,
@@ -499,6 +501,7 @@ impl FileUploadUseCase for StubFileUploadUseCase {
_content_type: &str,
_modified_at: Option<i64>,
_caller_id: Uuid,
_expected_hash: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<FileDto, DomainError> {
Ok(FileDto::default())
}
+18
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ pub enum ErrorKind {
/// `AlreadyExists` (which is a uniqueness violation) so audit
/// readers can tell them apart.
Conflict,
/// RFC 7232 precondition failure — a caller-supplied conditional
/// (If-Match, or an internal compare-and-swap standing in for one)
/// did not hold against the resource's current state. Maps to
/// HTTP 412. Distinct from `Conflict` (409): this is specifically
/// "the state you thought you were writing against has moved."
PreconditionFailed,
}
impl ErrorKind {
@@ -58,6 +64,7 @@ impl ErrorKind {
ErrorKind::DatabaseError => "Database Error",
ErrorKind::QuotaExceeded => "Quota Exceeded",
ErrorKind::Conflict => "Conflict",
ErrorKind::PreconditionFailed => "Precondition Failed",
}
}
}
@@ -196,6 +203,17 @@ impl DomainError {
}
}
/// Creates a precondition-failed error (RFC 7232 / CAS mismatch)
pub fn precondition_failed<S: Into<String>>(entity_type: &'static str, message: S) -> Self {
Self {
kind: ErrorKind::PreconditionFailed,
entity_type,
entity_id: None,
message: message.into(),
source: None,
}
}
/// Creates a validation error
pub fn validation_error<S: Into<String>>(message: S) -> Self {
Self {
@@ -153,6 +153,15 @@ impl FileBlobWriteRepository {
/// row — not the row's owner. D2 shared drives let non-owners
/// overwrite content; the previous `updated_by = f.user_id` would
/// have silently recorded the wrong principal.
/// `expected_hash`, when `Some`, turns this into a real
/// compare-and-swap: the SET clause only takes effect if the row's
/// `blob_hash` still matches at the moment the `FOR UPDATE` lock is
/// held (same statement, same transaction — no gap a concurrent
/// writer can land in). A mismatch leaves the row untouched and is
/// reported back via the `matched` flag rather than silently
/// overwriting a sibling PATCH's content. `None` preserves the old
/// blind-overwrite behaviour for PUT/WOPI/chunked-upload finalize,
/// where last-write-wins is the intended HTTP semantics.
async fn swap_blob_hash(
&self,
file_id: &str,
@@ -160,57 +169,83 @@ impl FileBlobWriteRepository {
new_size: i64,
modified_at: Option<i64>,
caller_id: Uuid,
expected_hash: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(String, i64), DomainError> {
// Atomic CTE: capture old hash then update in one round-trip, no TOCTOU.
// Atomic CTE: capture old hash then conditionally update in one
// round-trip, no TOCTOU. The CASE arms make the SET a no-op when
// `expected_hash` is given and doesn't match `old.blob_hash` —
// the row is still returned (with its unchanged values) so the
// caller can tell "mismatch" apart from "file not found".
// Deadlock victims (40P01) retry before the compensation below runs —
// a successful retry must keep the new blob reference alive.
let (old_hash, updated_at) = match retry_on_deadlock("files.swap_blob_hash", || {
sqlx::query_as::<_, (String, i64)>(
r#"
let (old_hash, updated_at, matched) =
match retry_on_deadlock("files.swap_blob_hash", || {
sqlx::query_as::<_, (String, i64, bool)>(
r#"
WITH old AS (
SELECT id, blob_hash FROM storage.files WHERE id = $3::uuid FOR UPDATE
)
UPDATE storage.files f
SET blob_hash = $1, size = $2,
updated_at = COALESCE(to_timestamp($4), NOW()),
updated_by = $5
SET blob_hash = CASE WHEN $6::text IS NULL OR old.blob_hash = $6
THEN $1 ELSE f.blob_hash END,
size = CASE WHEN $6::text IS NULL OR old.blob_hash = $6
THEN $2 ELSE f.size END,
updated_at = CASE WHEN $6::text IS NULL OR old.blob_hash = $6
THEN COALESCE(to_timestamp($4), NOW()) ELSE f.updated_at END,
updated_by = CASE WHEN $6::text IS NULL OR old.blob_hash = $6
THEN $5 ELSE f.updated_by END
FROM old
WHERE f.id = old.id
RETURNING old.blob_hash, EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM f.updated_at)::bigint
RETURNING old.blob_hash, EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM f.updated_at)::bigint,
($6::text IS NULL OR old.blob_hash = $6)
"#,
)
.bind(new_hash)
.bind(new_size)
.bind(file_id)
.bind(modified_at.map(|t| t as f64))
.bind(caller_id)
.fetch_optional(self.pool.as_ref())
})
.await
{
Ok(Some(row)) => row,
Ok(None) => {
// File not found — compensate: remove the new blob ref
if let Err(e) = self.dedup.remove_reference(new_hash).await {
tracing::error!("Blob orphaned after missing file: {}", e);
)
.bind(new_hash)
.bind(new_size)
.bind(file_id)
.bind(modified_at.map(|t| t as f64))
.bind(caller_id)
.bind(expected_hash)
.fetch_optional(self.pool.as_ref())
})
.await
{
Ok(Some(row)) => row,
Ok(None) => {
// File not found — compensate: remove the new blob ref
if let Err(e) = self.dedup.remove_reference(new_hash).await {
tracing::error!("Blob orphaned after missing file: {}", e);
}
return Err(DomainError::not_found("File", file_id));
}
return Err(DomainError::not_found("File", file_id));
}
Err(e) => {
// UPDATE failed — compensate: remove the new blob ref
if let Err(rollback_err) = self.dedup.remove_reference(new_hash).await {
tracing::error!(
"Blob orphaned after failed UPDATE — hash: {}, err: {}",
&new_hash[..12],
rollback_err
);
Err(e) => {
// UPDATE failed — compensate: remove the new blob ref
if let Err(rollback_err) = self.dedup.remove_reference(new_hash).await {
tracing::error!(
"Blob orphaned after failed UPDATE — hash: {}, err: {}",
&new_hash[..12],
rollback_err
);
}
return Err(DomainError::internal_error(
"FileBlobWrite",
format!("update: {e}"),
));
}
return Err(DomainError::internal_error(
"FileBlobWrite",
format!("update: {e}"),
));
};
if !matched {
// CAS lost the race — some other writer's content is now the
// row's truth. Release the blob we ingested for nothing;
// nothing was written.
if let Err(e) = self.dedup.remove_reference(new_hash).await {
tracing::error!("Blob orphaned after CAS mismatch: {}", e);
}
};
return Err(DomainError::precondition_failed(
"File",
"content was modified concurrently",
));
}
// Decrement old blob ref (only if hash changed, best-effort)
if old_hash != new_hash
@@ -790,12 +825,20 @@ impl FileWritePort for FileBlobWriteRepository {
size: u64,
modified_at: Option<i64>,
caller_id: Uuid,
expected_hash: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(String, i64), DomainError> {
// The content was already ingested into the chunk store by the
// upload-ingest layer; swap_blob_hash consumes its reference and
// releases it on failure.
let swapped = self
.swap_blob_hash(file_id, blob_hash, size as i64, modified_at, caller_id)
.swap_blob_hash(
file_id,
blob_hash,
size as i64,
modified_at,
caller_id,
expected_hash,
)
.await?;
// The file now maps to a different blob — drop the read-side cache
// entry so streaming downloads cannot serve the previous content
+521 -35
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@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ use axum::{
};
use bytes::{Buf, Bytes};
use chrono::Utc;
use futures::stream::{self, Stream};
use quick_xml::Writer;
use std::pin::Pin;
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::application::adapters::webdav_adapter::{
@@ -29,6 +31,7 @@ use crate::application::ports::file_ports::{FileManagementUseCase, FileUploadUse
use crate::application::ports::folder_ports::FolderUseCase;
use crate::application::ports::storage_ports::StorageUsagePort;
use crate::application::services::file_retrieval_service::FileRetrievalService;
use crate::application::services::file_upload_service::FileUploadService;
use crate::application::services::folder_service::FolderService;
use crate::common::di::AppState;
use crate::domain::repositories::drive_repository::DriveRepository;
@@ -38,6 +41,7 @@ use crate::infrastructure::services::webdav_dead_property_store::{DeadPropertySt
use crate::interfaces::errors::AppError;
use crate::interfaces::middleware::auth::{AuthUser, CurrentUser};
use crate::interfaces::range_requests::{not_modified_response, range_response};
use crate::interfaces::upload_ingest::{IngestedBlob, RangeSegment, discard_ingested};
use percent_encoding::{AsciiSet, NON_ALPHANUMERIC, percent_decode_str, utf8_percent_encode};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -408,6 +412,7 @@ async fn handle_webdav_dispatch(
"GET" => handle_get(state, req, path).await,
"HEAD" => handle_head(state, req, path).await,
"PUT" => handle_put(state, req, path).await,
"PATCH" => handle_patch(state, req, path).await,
"MKCOL" => handle_mkcol(state, req, path).await,
"DELETE" => handle_delete(state, req, path).await,
"MOVE" => handle_move(state, req, path).await,
@@ -439,7 +444,7 @@ async fn handle_options(_path: String) -> Result<Response<Body>, AppError> {
.header(HEADER_DAV, "1, 2") // Class 1 and 2 WebDAV support
.header(
header::ALLOW,
"OPTIONS, GET, HEAD, PUT, DELETE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, MKCOL, COPY, MOVE, LOCK, UNLOCK",
"OPTIONS, GET, HEAD, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, MKCOL, COPY, MOVE, LOCK, UNLOCK",
)
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap())
@@ -1655,7 +1660,7 @@ fn evaluate_if_header(
///
/// Shared by `handle_put`, `handle_delete`, `handle_move`,
/// `handle_copy`, and `handle_proppatch`.
fn enforce_native_lock(
pub(crate) fn enforce_native_lock(
lock_store: &crate::infrastructure::services::webdav_lock_service::WebDavLockStore,
if_header: Option<&str>,
path: &str,
@@ -1891,39 +1896,20 @@ async fn handle_put(
// ── RFC 7232 conditional preconditions ────────────────────────────
// Evaluated before ingesting the body to save bandwidth on doomed requests.
if let Some(ref inm) = if_none_match {
// If-None-Match: * → fail if resource exists (prevent overwrite)
if inm == "*" && file_existed {
return Err(AppError::precondition_failed(
"If-None-Match: * — resource already exists",
));
}
// Shared with `handle_patch` (both surfaces) — handles comma-separated
// multi-value lists and the weak/strong distinction the previous
// hand-rolled single-tag comparison here didn't.
if let Some(ref value) = if_none_match
&& if_none_match_precondition_fails(value, current_etag.as_deref())
{
return Err(AppError::precondition_failed(
"If-None-Match — resource already exists with that ETag",
));
}
if let Some(ref im) = if_match {
if im == "*" {
// If-Match: * → fail if resource does not exist
if !file_existed {
return Err(AppError::precondition_failed(
"If-Match: * — resource does not exist",
));
}
} else {
// If-Match: <etag> → strong comparison against current ETag
match &current_etag {
None => {
return Err(AppError::precondition_failed(
"If-Match — resource does not exist",
));
}
Some(etag) => {
let client_tag = im.trim_matches('"');
let server_tag = etag.trim_matches('"');
if client_tag != server_tag {
return Err(AppError::precondition_failed("If-Match — ETag mismatch"));
}
}
}
}
if let Some(ref value) = if_match
&& if_match_precondition_fails(value, current_etag.as_deref())
{
return Err(AppError::precondition_failed("If-Match — ETag mismatch"));
}
// ── Streaming ingest ──────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -1971,6 +1957,7 @@ async fn handle_put(
&content_type,
None,
user.id,
None,
)
.await;
@@ -1986,7 +1973,7 @@ async fn handle_put(
};
Ok(Response::builder()
.status(status)
.header(header::ETAG, &file_dto.etag)
.header(header::ETAG, format!("\"{}\"", file_dto.etag))
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap())
}
@@ -1998,6 +1985,412 @@ async fn handle_put(
}
}
/// Parses the `X-Update-Range` header used by [`handle_patch`] (RFC 5789
/// partial content updates): either `append`, or `bytes=<start>-<end>`
/// (inclusive, 0-based). For the explicit-range form both bounds must fall
/// strictly within the current file size — growing the file via a byte
/// range isn't supported, use `append` or PUT for that.
///
/// Returns `(start, end)`; `end` is `None` for `append`.
///
/// `pub(crate)` so the NextCloud-surface PATCH handler
/// (`nextcloud/webdav_handler.rs::handle_patch`) can reuse it instead of
/// duplicating the parsing logic.
pub(crate) fn parse_update_range(header: &str, size: u64) -> Result<(u64, Option<u64>), AppError> {
let header = header.trim();
if header.eq_ignore_ascii_case("append") {
return Ok((size, None));
}
let spec = header.strip_prefix("bytes=").ok_or_else(|| {
AppError::bad_request("X-Update-Range must be 'append' or 'bytes=<start>-<end>'")
})?;
let (start_str, end_str) = spec
.split_once('-')
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::bad_request("X-Update-Range must be 'bytes=<start>-<end>'"))?;
let start: u64 = start_str
.parse()
.map_err(|_| AppError::bad_request("X-Update-Range: invalid start offset"))?;
let end: u64 = end_str
.parse()
.map_err(|_| AppError::bad_request("X-Update-Range: invalid end offset"))?;
if start > end {
return Err(AppError::bad_request(
"X-Update-Range: start must be <= end",
));
}
if end >= size {
return Err(AppError::new(
StatusCode::RANGE_NOT_SATISFIABLE,
format!("X-Update-Range end {end} is out of bounds for a {size}-byte file"),
"RangeNotSatisfiable",
));
}
Ok((start, Some(end)))
}
/// Strip the optional `W/` weak prefix and surrounding double-quotes
/// from one ETag value in an `If-Match` / `If-None-Match` list. Returns
/// `(is_weak, inner)`.
fn parse_etag_value(raw: &str) -> (bool, &str) {
let trimmed = raw.trim();
if let Some(rest) = trimmed.strip_prefix("W/") {
(true, rest.trim().trim_matches('"'))
} else {
(false, trimmed.trim_matches('"'))
}
}
/// RFC 7232 §3.2 — `If-None-Match` fails when:
/// - the header value is `*` and a current representation exists, OR
/// - any listed ETag matches the current representation (weak comparison
/// — weak validators in the request are equivalent to strong for the
/// match itself, only If-Match is required to be strong).
///
/// `pub(crate)` so both the plain and NextCloud-surface WebDAV handlers
/// share one RFC 7232-conformant implementation instead of each
/// reimplementing ETag comparison (multi-value lists, `W/` weak prefix).
pub(crate) fn if_none_match_precondition_fails(header: &str, current_etag: Option<&str>) -> bool {
let v = header.trim();
if v == "*" {
return current_etag.is_some();
}
let Some(current) = current_etag else {
return false;
};
v.split(',').any(|tag| {
let (_, parsed) = parse_etag_value(tag);
!parsed.is_empty() && parsed == current
})
}
/// RFC 7232 §3.1 — `If-Match` fails when:
/// - the resource doesn't currently exist (no strong validator to match), OR
/// - the header isn't `*` and no listed ETag strong-matches the current one
/// (weak validators in the request never satisfy a strong-match).
pub(crate) fn if_match_precondition_fails(header: &str, current_etag: Option<&str>) -> bool {
let v = header.trim();
let Some(current) = current_etag else {
return true;
};
if v == "*" {
return false;
}
!v.split(',').any(|tag| {
let (is_weak, parsed) = parse_etag_value(tag);
!is_weak && !parsed.is_empty() && parsed == current
})
}
/// Build the untouched prefix/suffix byte-range streams either side of a
/// PATCH edit, paired with their known lengths (`upload_ingest::RangeSegment`)
/// ready to hand to `ingest_range_patch_to_cas`.
///
/// `pub(crate)` so both the plain and NextCloud-surface PATCH handlers share
/// one implementation instead of each re-deriving the same offsets — this was
/// byte-identical duplicated code before the DRY pass that added this fn.
pub(crate) async fn splice_patch_streams(
file_retrieval: &FileRetrievalService,
file_id: &str,
caller_id: Uuid,
start: u64,
end: Option<u64>,
file_size: u64,
) -> Result<(RangeSegment, RangeSegment), AppError> {
let prefix_stream: Pin<Box<dyn Stream<Item = Result<Bytes, std::io::Error>> + Send>> =
if start == 0 {
Box::pin(stream::empty())
} else {
Box::into_pin(
file_retrieval
.get_file_range_stream_with_perms(file_id, caller_id, 0, Some(start))
.await
.map_err(AppError::from)?,
)
};
let suffix_len = match end {
Some(end) if end + 1 < file_size => file_size - (end + 1),
_ => 0,
};
let suffix_stream: Pin<Box<dyn Stream<Item = Result<Bytes, std::io::Error>> + Send>> = match end
{
Some(end) if end + 1 < file_size => Box::into_pin(
file_retrieval
.get_file_range_stream_with_perms(file_id, caller_id, end + 1, None)
.await
.map_err(AppError::from)?,
),
_ => Box::pin(stream::empty()),
};
Ok(((prefix_stream, start), (suffix_stream, suffix_len)))
}
/// Quota-check + compare-and-swap write for a PATCH edit already spliced and
/// ingested into the chunk store (`ingested`). On quota rejection the blob
/// reference just taken by ingest is released and `QuotaExceeded` (507) is
/// returned; on success this is the CAS write keyed on `expected_hash` (the
/// file's pre-splice content hash) that closes the race between two
/// concurrent PATCHes to disjoint ranges of the same file (see
/// `FileBlobWritePort::swap_blob_hash`).
///
/// `pub(crate)` — shared by the plain and NextCloud-surface PATCH handlers;
/// `log_prefix` lets each surface keep its own log-line tag (`"WEBDAV PATCH"`
/// vs `"NC WEBDAV PATCH"`) for grep-ability.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub(crate) async fn cas_write_patch(
state: &AppState,
upload_service: &FileUploadService,
path: &str,
drive_id: Uuid,
ingested: &IngestedBlob,
caller_id: Uuid,
expected_hash: &str,
log_prefix: &str,
) -> Result<FileDto, AppError> {
if let Some(storage_svc) = state.storage_usage_service.as_ref()
&& let Err(err) = storage_svc
.check_storage_quota(caller_id, ingested.size)
.await
{
discard_ingested(&state.core.dedup_service, ingested).await;
tracing::warn!(
"⛔ {} REJECTED (quota): user={}, file={}, size={}",
log_prefix,
caller_id,
path,
ingested.size
);
return Err(AppError::new(
StatusCode::INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE,
err.message,
"QuotaExceeded",
));
}
let content_type = ingested.content_type.clone();
upload_service
.update_file_streaming_with_perms(
path,
drive_id,
ingested.stored(),
&content_type,
None,
caller_id,
Some(expected_hash),
)
.await
.map_err(AppError::from)
}
/**
* Handles PATCH requests (RFC 5789) for partial byte-range content updates.
*
* RFC 4918 §9.7.1 forbids partial content updates on PUT (see the explicit
* `Content-Range` rejection in [`handle_put`]); PATCH is the mechanism this
* server offers instead, via the `X-Update-Range` header (see
* [`parse_update_range`]).
*
* The new content is assembled by splicing the request body between the
* file's untouched prefix/suffix byte ranges and re-ingesting the result as
* one continuous stream through the same content-addressable pipeline PUT
* uses ([`upload_ingest::ingest_range_patch_to_cas`]) — unedited chunks on
* either side of the edit typically dedup for free.
*
* @param state The application state containing service dependencies
* @param req The HTTP request containing the partial content and
* `X-Update-Range` header
* @param path The requested resource path
* @return HTTP response: 204 with `Content-Range`/`ETag` on success
*/
async fn handle_patch(
state: Arc<AppState>,
req: Request<Body>,
path: String,
) -> Result<Response<Body>, AppError> {
use crate::interfaces::upload_ingest;
let user = extract_user(&req)?;
let file_upload_service = &state.applications.file_upload_service;
let file_retrieval_service = &state.applications.file_retrieval_service;
if path.is_empty() || path == "/" {
return Err(AppError::bad_request("Cannot PATCH the root folder"));
}
// RFC 5789 doesn't define Content-Range semantics; this server uses a
// dedicated `X-Update-Range` header instead (see `parse_update_range`)
// to avoid ambiguity with HTTP Range-Request semantics.
if req.headers().contains_key(header::CONTENT_RANGE) {
return Err(AppError::bad_request(
"PATCH must not use Content-Range; use the X-Update-Range header instead",
));
}
let update_range_header = req
.headers()
.get("X-Update-Range")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|s| s.to_string())
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::bad_request("PATCH requires an X-Update-Range header"))?;
// Extract all headers before consuming `req` into the body stream.
let if_header_owned = req
.headers()
.get("If")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|s| s.to_string());
let if_none_match = req
.headers()
.get(header::IF_NONE_MATCH)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|s| s.trim().to_string());
let if_match = req
.headers()
.get(header::IF_MATCH)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|s| s.trim().to_string());
let content_length = req
.headers()
.get(header::CONTENT_LENGTH)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| s.parse::<u64>().ok());
let content_type = req
.headers()
.get(header::CONTENT_TYPE)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.unwrap_or("application/octet-stream")
.to_string();
let max_upload = state.core.config.storage.direct_put_max_bytes;
let scope = resolve_webdav_scope_or_405(&state, user.id, &path).await?;
let drive_id = scope.drive_id;
let path = scope.db_path;
// ── Existence check ───────────────────────────────────────────────
// Unlike PUT, PATCH requires an existing file — a partial update of
// nothing isn't meaningful. Resolver is drive-scoped, not
// owner-scoped (see `handle_put`'s identical comment), so the
// explicit `authz.require(Read, …)` below is the defence-in-depth
// existence-proof before any field of `file` is trusted.
let resolver = state.path_resolver.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| {
AppError::method_not_allowed("PATCH requires WebDAV path resolver support")
})?;
let file = match resolver.resolve_path_in_drive(&path, drive_id).await {
Ok(ResolvedResource::File(f)) => f,
Ok(ResolvedResource::Folder(_)) => {
return Err(AppError::conflict("Cannot PATCH a directory"));
}
Err(_) => return Err(AppError::not_found(format!("File not found: {}", path))),
};
let file_uuid = Uuid::parse_str(&file.id)
.map_err(|_| AppError::not_found(format!("File not found: {}", path)))?;
state
.authorization
.require(
Subject::User(user.id),
Permission::Read,
Resource::File(file_uuid),
)
.await?;
// ── Active-lock guard + RFC 4918 §10.4 If: evaluation ─────────────
if let Some(resp) = enforce_native_lock(
&state.webdav_lock_store,
if_header_owned.as_deref(),
&path,
Some(&file.etag),
) {
return Ok(resp);
}
// ── RFC 7232 conditional preconditions ────────────────────────────
let current_etag = Some(file.etag.as_str());
if let Some(ref value) = if_none_match
&& if_none_match_precondition_fails(value, current_etag)
{
return Err(AppError::precondition_failed(
"If-None-Match — resource already exists with that ETag",
));
}
if let Some(ref value) = if_match
&& if_match_precondition_fails(value, current_etag)
{
return Err(AppError::precondition_failed("If-Match — ETag mismatch"));
}
// ── Range parsing + validation ─────────────────────────────────────
let (start, end) = parse_update_range(&update_range_header, file.size)?;
if let (Some(end), Some(len)) = (end, content_length) {
let expected = end - start + 1;
if len != expected {
return Err(AppError::bad_request(format!(
"Content-Length {len} does not match X-Update-Range span {expected}"
)));
}
}
// ── Splice prefix/suffix around the patched span ───────────────────
let (prefix_segment, suffix_segment) = splice_patch_streams(
file_retrieval_service,
&file.id,
user.id,
start,
end,
file.size,
)
.await?;
let filename = crate::common::mime_detect::filename_from_path(&path).to_string();
let ingested = upload_ingest::ingest_range_patch_to_cas(
prefix_segment,
req.into_body(),
suffix_segment,
&state.core.dedup_service,
&filename,
&content_type,
upload_ingest::PatchIngestBudget {
max_bytes: max_upload,
expected_body_len: end.map(|end| end - start + 1),
},
)
.await?;
// ── Quota enforcement + atomic store, compare-and-swap on the
// pre-splice content hash ─────────────────────────────────────────
// `file.content_hash` was snapshotted before the (potentially slow)
// splice + CAS-ingest above. Passing it as `expected_hash` makes the
// write itself a compare-and-swap: the repository checks and applies
// under the same row lock, so nothing else can write to this file
// between the check and the write. This is what actually closes the
// race two concurrent PATCHes to disjoint ranges could otherwise hit
// — each individually passing its own If-Match check against the
// same stale snapshot, then blindly overwriting each other.
let new_size = ingested.size;
let file_dto = cas_write_patch(
&state,
file_upload_service,
&path,
drive_id,
&ingested,
user.id,
&file.content_hash,
"WEBDAV PATCH",
)
.await?;
// Everything from `start` to the new EOF reflects the patch
// (the untouched suffix, if any, may have shifted when the
// body's length differs from the replaced span).
let range_end = new_size.saturating_sub(1);
Ok(Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
.header(header::ETAG, format!("\"{}\"", file_dto.etag))
.header(
header::CONTENT_RANGE,
format!("bytes {}-{}/{}", start, range_end, new_size),
)
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap())
}
/**
* Handles MKCOL requests to create folders.
*
@@ -3385,4 +3778,97 @@ mod tests {
"/webdav/My%20Photos/2024/"
);
}
// ── RFC 5789 PATCH: `X-Update-Range` parsing ────────────────────
#[test]
fn parse_update_range_append() {
assert_eq!(parse_update_range("append", 100).unwrap(), (100, None));
assert_eq!(parse_update_range("APPEND", 0).unwrap(), (0, None));
}
#[test]
fn parse_update_range_explicit_span() {
assert_eq!(parse_update_range("bytes=5-9", 100).unwrap(), (5, Some(9)));
// Single-byte span at offset 0.
assert_eq!(parse_update_range("bytes=0-0", 1).unwrap(), (0, Some(0)));
}
#[test]
fn parse_update_range_rejects_missing_prefix() {
assert!(parse_update_range("5-9", 100).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn parse_update_range_rejects_malformed_bounds() {
assert!(parse_update_range("bytes=abc-9", 100).is_err());
assert!(parse_update_range("bytes=5-abc", 100).is_err());
assert!(parse_update_range("bytes=9", 100).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn parse_update_range_rejects_start_after_end() {
assert!(parse_update_range("bytes=9-5", 100).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn parse_update_range_rejects_end_at_or_past_size() {
// `end` must be strictly within the current file — growing the
// file via a byte-range PATCH isn't supported (use `append`).
let err = parse_update_range("bytes=5-9", 9).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err.status_code, StatusCode::RANGE_NOT_SATISFIABLE);
assert!(parse_update_range("bytes=0-0", 0).is_err());
}
// ── RFC 7232 If-Match / If-None-Match — multi-value lists ───────
//
// Regression coverage for `handle_put`'s hand-rolled precondition
// check, which only ever compared the header as a single tag and
// never split on commas — a client sending the standard
// comma-separated multi-value form would silently mismatch even
// when one of the listed ETags matched. Both handlers now share
// `if_none_match_precondition_fails`/`if_match_precondition_fails`,
// which already handled this correctly for `handle_patch`.
#[test]
fn if_none_match_multi_value_list_matches_second_tag() {
assert!(if_none_match_precondition_fails(
r#""aaa", "bbb", "ccc""#,
Some("bbb")
));
}
#[test]
fn if_none_match_multi_value_list_no_match_passes() {
assert!(!if_none_match_precondition_fails(
r#""aaa", "bbb", "ccc""#,
Some("zzz")
));
}
#[test]
fn if_match_multi_value_list_matches_last_tag() {
assert!(!if_match_precondition_fails(
r#""aaa", "bbb", "ccc""#,
Some("ccc")
));
}
#[test]
fn if_match_multi_value_list_no_match_fails() {
assert!(if_match_precondition_fails(
r#""aaa", "bbb", "ccc""#,
Some("zzz")
));
}
#[test]
fn if_match_weak_tag_in_list_never_satisfies() {
// If-Match requires a strong comparison — a weak validator in the
// list must not satisfy it even if the underlying tag matches.
assert!(if_match_precondition_fails(
r#"W/"aaa", "bbb""#,
Some("aaa")
));
}
}
@@ -413,6 +413,7 @@ async fn put_file(
&content_type,
None,
claims_sub_uuid,
None,
)
.await;
+1
View File
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ impl From<DomainError> for AppError {
ErrorKind::DatabaseError => StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
ErrorKind::QuotaExceeded => StatusCode::INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE,
ErrorKind::Conflict => StatusCode::CONFLICT,
ErrorKind::PreconditionFailed => StatusCode::PRECONDITION_FAILED,
};
Self {
@@ -466,6 +466,10 @@ async fn handle_assemble(
// AuthZ audit #2 (2026-07-12): route DomainError through
// `AppError::from` so authz denials keep the graduated 403/404
// shape instead of collapsing into 500.
//
// No client-supplied ETag to enforce here (NC chunked MOVE has no
// If-Match semantics) — `expected_hash: None`, same as every other
// plain-write callsite; only PATCH's CAS passes `Some(&hash)`.
let dto = match upload_service
.update_file_streaming_with_perms(
&internal_path,
@@ -474,6 +478,7 @@ async fn handle_assemble(
&content_type,
oc_mtime,
user.id,
None,
)
.await
{
+329 -56
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ use crate::application::ports::file_ports::{
FileManagementUseCase, FileRetrievalUseCase, FileUploadUseCase,
};
use crate::application::ports::folder_ports::FolderUseCase;
use crate::application::ports::storage_ports::StorageUsagePort;
use crate::application::ports::trash_ports::TrashUseCase;
use crate::common::di::AppState;
use crate::common::mime_detect::filename_from_path;
@@ -29,12 +30,15 @@ use crate::domain::services::authorization::{Permission, Resource, Subject};
use crate::infrastructure::services::path_resolver_service::ResolvedResource;
use crate::infrastructure::services::webdav_dead_property_store::ResourceRef;
use crate::interfaces::api::handlers::webdav_handler::{
PROPFIND_BATCH_SIZE, dead_props_for, file_dead_props, files_dead_props_map, folder_dead_props,
folders_dead_props_map,
PROPFIND_BATCH_SIZE, cas_write_patch, dead_props_for, enforce_native_lock, file_dead_props,
files_dead_props_map, folder_dead_props, folders_dead_props_map, if_match_precondition_fails,
if_none_match_precondition_fails, parse_update_range, splice_patch_streams,
};
use crate::interfaces::errors::AppError;
use crate::interfaces::range_requests::{not_modified_response, range_response};
use crate::interfaces::upload_ingest::ingest_body_to_cas;
use crate::interfaces::upload_ingest::{
PatchIngestBudget, discard_ingested, ingest_body_to_cas, ingest_range_patch_to_cas,
};
/// Extension trait to map XML write errors to `String` concisely.
trait XmlResultExt<T> {
@@ -74,15 +78,24 @@ const HEADER_DAV: HeaderName = HeaderName::from_static("dav");
/// Replaces the pre-D0 hardcoded `"My Folder - {username}/"` prefix.
pub fn nc_to_internal_path(chroot: &FolderDto, subpath: &str) -> Result<String, AppError> {
let subpath = subpath.trim_matches('/');
// `chroot.path` comes from `Folder::path_string()` /
// `StoragePath::to_string()`, which prepends a leading `/` (e.g.
// `"/Personal"`) — trim it so the result matches the leading-
// slash-free convention `storage.folders.path` (and the plain
// WebDAV surface's `db_path`) actually use. Without this, exact-
// string comparisons against a plain-surface path (e.g. the
// in-memory WebDAV lock store's key) silently mismatch even
// though DB-backed lookups tolerate the discrepancy.
let chroot_path = chroot.path.trim_start_matches('/');
if subpath.is_empty() {
return Ok(chroot.path.clone());
return Ok(chroot_path.to_string());
}
// Reject path traversal attempts.
if subpath.split('/').any(|seg| seg == ".." || seg == ".") {
return Err(AppError::bad_request("Invalid path: traversal not allowed"));
}
Ok(format!("{}/{}", chroot.path, subpath))
Ok(format!("{}/{}", chroot_path, subpath))
}
/// Strip the caller's chroot prefix from an internal
@@ -263,6 +276,7 @@ pub async fn handle_nc_webdav(
"PROPFIND" => handle_propfind(state, req, &session, &subpath).await,
"GET" => handle_get(state, &session, &subpath, req.headers()).await,
"PUT" => handle_put(state, req, &session, &subpath).await,
"PATCH" => handle_patch(state, req, &session, &subpath).await,
"MKCOL" => handle_mkcol(state, &session, &subpath).await,
"DELETE" => handle_delete(state, &session, &subpath).await,
"MOVE" => handle_move(state, req, &session, &subpath).await,
@@ -298,7 +312,7 @@ fn handle_options() -> Result<Response<Body>, AppError> {
.header(HEADER_DAV, "1, 3")
.header(
header::ALLOW,
"OPTIONS, GET, HEAD, PUT, DELETE, MKCOL, MOVE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, REPORT, SEARCH",
"OPTIONS, GET, HEAD, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, MKCOL, MOVE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, REPORT, SEARCH",
)
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap())
@@ -821,55 +835,6 @@ async fn handle_proppatch(
// ──────────────────── PUT ────────────────────
/// Strip the optional `W/` weak prefix and surrounding double-quotes
/// from one ETag value in an `If-Match` / `If-None-Match` list. Returns
/// `(is_weak, inner)`.
fn parse_etag_value(raw: &str) -> (bool, &str) {
let trimmed = raw.trim();
if let Some(rest) = trimmed.strip_prefix("W/") {
(true, rest.trim().trim_matches('"'))
} else {
(false, trimmed.trim_matches('"'))
}
}
/// RFC 7232 §3.2 — `If-None-Match` fails for PUT when:
/// - the header value is `*` and a current representation exists, OR
/// - any listed ETag matches the current representation (weak comparison
/// — weak validators in the request are equivalent to strong for the
/// match itself, only If-Match is required to be strong).
fn if_none_match_precondition_fails(header: &str, current_etag: Option<&str>) -> bool {
let v = header.trim();
if v == "*" {
return current_etag.is_some();
}
let Some(current) = current_etag else {
return false;
};
v.split(',').any(|tag| {
let (_, parsed) = parse_etag_value(tag);
!parsed.is_empty() && parsed == current
})
}
/// RFC 7232 §3.1 — `If-Match` fails for PUT when:
/// - the resource doesn't currently exist (no strong validator to match), OR
/// - the header isn't `*` and no listed ETag strong-matches the current one
/// (weak validators in the request never satisfy a strong-match).
fn if_match_precondition_fails(header: &str, current_etag: Option<&str>) -> bool {
let v = header.trim();
let Some(current) = current_etag else {
return true;
};
if v == "*" {
return false;
}
!v.split(',').any(|tag| {
let (is_weak, parsed) = parse_etag_value(tag);
!is_weak && !parsed.is_empty() && parsed == current
})
}
fn precondition_failed_response() -> Response<Body> {
Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::PRECONDITION_FAILED)
@@ -901,6 +866,13 @@ async fn handle_put(
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|v| v.parse::<i64>().ok());
// Extract before consuming `req` into the body stream further down.
let if_header = req
.headers()
.get("If")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|s| s.to_string());
// ── Conditional preconditions (RFC 7232 §3.1 / §3.2) ─────────────
// Evaluated BEFORE body ingestion so a rejected PUT doesn't waste
// bandwidth or disk I/O on a body the server is going to throw away.
@@ -929,6 +901,49 @@ async fn handle_put(
return Ok(precondition_failed_response());
}
// ── Existence-check depth (RFC 4918 §9.7.1) ───────────────────────
// Mirrors the plain WebDAV surface's `handle_put`: PUT to an existing
// directory is 400, PUT under a missing parent is 409 (not the generic
// 500 a downstream `NotFound` would otherwise surface as).
if existing.is_none() {
if state
.applications
.folder_service
.get_folder_by_path(&internal_path, chroot.drive_id)
.await
.is_ok()
{
return Err(AppError::bad_request("Cannot PUT to a directory"));
}
let parent_path = internal_path
.rfind('/')
.map(|i| &internal_path[..i])
.unwrap_or("");
if !parent_path.is_empty() {
state
.applications
.folder_service
.get_folder_by_path(parent_path, chroot.drive_id)
.await
.map_err(|_| {
AppError::conflict(format!("Parent folder not found: {}", parent_path))
})?;
}
}
// ── Active-lock guard (RFC 4918 §10.4 If: evaluation) ─────────────
// Shared with the plain WebDAV surface and with this surface's own
// `handle_patch`, so a LOCK taken via /webdav/ also protects the same
// file reached through /remote.php/dav/.
if let Some(resp) = enforce_native_lock(
&state.webdav_lock_store,
if_header.as_deref(),
&internal_path,
current_etag,
) {
return Ok(resp);
}
// ── Direct PUT cap ───────────────────────────────────────────────
// We use `direct_put_max_bytes` (default 1 GiB), not `max_upload_size`
// (default 10 GB). Larger files must come through the chunked upload
@@ -961,13 +976,35 @@ async fn handle_put(
// using the lookup already done above for the precondition check.
let existed = existing.is_some();
// ── Quota enforcement ─────────────────────────────────────────────
if let Some(storage_svc) = state.storage_usage_service.as_ref()
&& let Err(err) = storage_svc
.check_storage_quota(session.user.id, ingested.size)
.await
{
discard_ingested(&state.core.dedup_service, &ingested).await;
tracing::warn!(
"⛔ NC WEBDAV PUT REJECTED (quota): user={}, file={}, size={}",
session.user.id,
internal_path,
ingested.size
);
return Err(AppError::new(
StatusCode::INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE,
err.message,
"QuotaExceeded",
));
}
// Single streaming path — handles both update and create internally,
// swapping the file row onto the already-ingested blob.
// AuthZ audit #6 (2026-07-12): route `_with_perms` errors through
// `AppError::from` so authz denials surface as 404 (the anti-enum
// shape) instead of a `map_err → internal_error` 500 that gives a
// probing caller an "exists-but-denied" oracle. Also preserves
// `QuotaExceeded → 507`, `AlreadyExists → 409`, `InvalidInput → 400`.
// `QuotaExceeded → 507`, `AlreadyExists → 409`, `InvalidInput → 400` —
// matching this surface's own `handle_patch` and the plain WebDAV
// `handle_put`.
let stored = upload_service
.update_file_streaming_with_perms(
&internal_path,
@@ -976,6 +1013,7 @@ async fn handle_put(
&content_type,
oc_mtime,
session.user.id,
None,
)
.await
.map_err(AppError::from)?;
@@ -994,6 +1032,224 @@ async fn handle_put(
.unwrap())
}
// ──────────────────── PATCH ────────────────────
/// Handles PATCH requests (RFC 5789) for partial byte-range content
/// updates on the NextCloud file surface — extends the plain WebDAV
/// surface's `X-Update-Range` mechanism (see
/// `api/handlers/webdav_handler.rs::handle_patch` / `parse_update_range`)
/// here. New content is assembled by splicing the request body between
/// the file's untouched prefix/suffix byte ranges and re-ingesting the
/// result as one continuous stream through the same content-addressable
/// pipeline `handle_put` uses ([`ingest_range_patch_to_cas`]) — unedited
/// chunks on either side of the edit typically dedup for free.
///
/// Shares an active-lock guard with the plain WebDAV surface (see below) so
/// a LOCK taken via `/webdav/` also protects the same file reached through
/// `/remote.php/dav/`.
async fn handle_patch(
state: Arc<AppState>,
req: Request<Body>,
session: &crate::interfaces::nextcloud::session::NcSession,
subpath: &str,
) -> Result<Response<Body>, AppError> {
let chroot = session.require_chroot()?;
let internal_path = nc_to_internal_path(chroot, subpath)?;
let file_service = &state.applications.file_retrieval_service;
let upload_service = &state.applications.file_upload_service;
if subpath.is_empty() || subpath == "/" {
return Err(AppError::bad_request("Cannot PATCH the root folder"));
}
// RFC 5789 doesn't define Content-Range semantics; this server uses a
// dedicated `X-Update-Range` header instead (see `parse_update_range`)
// to avoid ambiguity with HTTP Range-Request semantics.
if req.headers().contains_key(header::CONTENT_RANGE) {
return Err(AppError::bad_request(
"PATCH must not use Content-Range; use the X-Update-Range header instead",
));
}
let update_range_header = req
.headers()
.get("X-Update-Range")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|s| s.to_string())
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::bad_request("PATCH requires an X-Update-Range header"))?;
// Extract all headers before consuming `req` into the body stream.
let if_none_match = req
.headers()
.get(header::IF_NONE_MATCH)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|s| s.to_string());
let if_match = req
.headers()
.get(header::IF_MATCH)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|s| s.to_string());
let content_length = req
.headers()
.get(header::CONTENT_LENGTH)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| s.parse::<u64>().ok());
let claimed_type = req
.headers()
.get(header::CONTENT_TYPE)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.unwrap_or("application/octet-stream")
.to_string();
let if_header = req
.headers()
.get("If")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|s| s.to_string());
let max_upload = state.core.config.storage.direct_put_max_bytes;
// ── Existence check ───────────────────────────────────────────────
// Unlike PUT, PATCH requires an existing file — a partial update of
// nothing isn't meaningful. On lookup failure, distinguish "it's a
// directory" (409, matching the plain WebDAV surface) from "it
// doesn't exist at all" (404) instead of collapsing both to 404.
let file = match file_service
.get_file_by_path(&internal_path, chroot.drive_id)
.await
{
Ok(file) => file,
Err(_) => {
if state
.applications
.folder_service
.get_folder_by_path(&internal_path, chroot.drive_id)
.await
.is_ok()
{
return Err(AppError::conflict("Cannot PATCH a directory"));
}
return Err(AppError::not_found(format!(
"File not found: {}",
internal_path
)));
}
};
// `get_file_by_path` performs no authorization check (see its own
// doc comment) — mirrors the plain WebDAV surface's explicit
// defense-in-depth Read check right after resolving the file, so a
// caller without Read on this specific file can't learn its size or
// ETag via the precondition/range-bounds responses below.
let file_uuid = Uuid::parse_str(&file.id)
.map_err(|_| AppError::not_found(format!("File not found: {}", internal_path)))?;
state
.authorization
.require(
Subject::User(session.user.id),
Permission::Read,
Resource::File(file_uuid),
)
.await?;
// ── Active-lock guard (RFC 4918 §10.4 If: evaluation) ─────────────
// Shared with the plain WebDAV surface so a LOCK taken via /webdav/
// also protects the same file reached through /remote.php/dav/.
if let Some(resp) = enforce_native_lock(
&state.webdav_lock_store,
if_header.as_deref(),
&internal_path,
Some(&file.etag),
) {
return Ok(resp);
}
// ── RFC 7232 conditional preconditions ────────────────────────────
let current_etag = Some(file.etag.as_str());
if let Some(ref value) = if_none_match
&& if_none_match_precondition_fails(value, current_etag)
{
return Ok(precondition_failed_response());
}
if let Some(ref value) = if_match
&& if_match_precondition_fails(value, current_etag)
{
return Ok(precondition_failed_response());
}
// ── Range parsing + validation ─────────────────────────────────────
let (start, end) = parse_update_range(&update_range_header, file.size)?;
if let (Some(end), Some(len)) = (end, content_length) {
let expected = end - start + 1;
if len != expected {
return Err(AppError::bad_request(format!(
"Content-Length {len} does not match X-Update-Range span {expected}"
)));
}
}
// ── Splice prefix/suffix around the patched span ───────────────────
let (prefix_segment, suffix_segment) = splice_patch_streams(
file_service,
&file.id,
session.user.id,
start,
end,
file.size,
)
.await?;
let filename = filename_from_path(subpath).to_string();
let ingested = ingest_range_patch_to_cas(
prefix_segment,
req.into_body(),
suffix_segment,
&state.core.dedup_service,
&filename,
&claimed_type,
PatchIngestBudget {
max_bytes: max_upload,
expected_body_len: end.map(|end| end - start + 1),
},
)
.await?;
// ── Quota enforcement + atomic store, compare-and-swap on the
// pre-splice content hash ─────────────────────────────────────────
// `file.content_hash` was snapshotted before the (potentially slow)
// splice + CAS-ingest above. Passing it as `expected_hash` makes the
// write itself a compare-and-swap: the repository checks and applies
// under the same row lock, so nothing else can write to this file
// between the check and the write. This is what actually closes the
// race two concurrent PATCHes to disjoint ranges could otherwise hit
// — each individually passing its own If-Match check against the
// same stale snapshot, then blindly overwriting each other.
let new_size = ingested.size;
let stored = cas_write_patch(
&state,
upload_service,
&internal_path,
chroot.drive_id,
&ingested,
session.user.id,
&file.content_hash,
"NC WEBDAV PATCH",
)
.await?;
// Everything from `start` to the new EOF reflects the patch (the
// untouched suffix, if any, may have shifted when the body's length
// differs from the replaced span).
let range_end = new_size.saturating_sub(1);
Ok(Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
.header(header::ETAG, format!("\"{}\"", stored.etag))
.header("oc-etag", format!("\"{}\"", stored.etag))
.header(
header::CONTENT_RANGE,
format!("bytes {}-{}/{}", start, range_end, new_size),
)
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap())
}
// ──────────────────── MKCOL ────────────────────
async fn handle_mkcol(
@@ -2172,6 +2428,23 @@ mod tests {
);
}
/// Regression: `chroot.path` as returned by `folder_service.get_folder`
/// in production carries a leading `/` (from `StoragePath::to_string()`
/// — see `Folder::path_string`), unlike this module's `stub_folder`
/// test helper which builds the path directly. A real chroot must
/// still map to the leading-slash-free convention the plain WebDAV
/// surface's `db_path` uses, or exact-string comparisons against it
/// (e.g. the WebDAV lock store's key) silently mismatch.
#[test]
fn test_strips_leading_slash_from_chroot_path() {
let home = stub_folder("/Personal");
assert_eq!(
nc_to_internal_path(&home, "report.pdf").unwrap(),
"Personal/report.pdf"
);
assert_eq!(nc_to_internal_path(&home, "").unwrap(), "Personal");
}
#[test]
fn test_rejects_dot_dot_traversal() {
let home = stub_folder("My Folder - alice");
+109 -1
View File
@@ -13,9 +13,10 @@
//! detection before being forwarded unchanged.
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::pin::Pin;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::Mutex as StdMutex;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU64, Ordering};
use axum::body::Body;
use bytes::Bytes;
@@ -80,6 +81,24 @@ pub async fn discard_ingested(dedup: &DedupService, blob: &IngestedBlob) {
/// ingest pass (REST chunked uploads) — no post-store re-read needed.
pub type ChecksumTee = Arc<StdMutex<Option<IncrementalHasher>>>;
/// A byte-range stream paired with its known length, used by
/// [`ingest_range_patch_to_cas`] for the untouched prefix/suffix either
/// side of a PATCH edit.
pub type RangeSegment = (
Pin<Box<dyn Stream<Item = Result<Bytes, std::io::Error>> + Send>>,
u64,
);
/// Size cap and expected-length validation for [`ingest_range_patch_to_cas`].
pub struct PatchIngestBudget {
/// Caps the size of the *edit* (the request body), not the whole
/// spliced file — see the field's use in [`ingest_range_patch_to_cas`].
pub max_bytes: usize,
/// Declared `X-Update-Range` span, `None` for `append`. Validated
/// against the actual streamed body length, not `Content-Length`.
pub expected_body_len: Option<u64>,
}
/// Create a checksum tee for [`ingest_stream_to_cas`].
pub fn checksum_tee(alg: ChecksumAlg) -> ChecksumTee {
Arc::new(StdMutex::new(Some(IncrementalHasher::new(alg))))
@@ -249,6 +268,95 @@ pub async fn ingest_body_to_cas(
ingest_stream_to_cas(source, dedup, filename, claimed_type, max_bytes, None).await
}
/// Splice a PATCH request body ([RFC 5789]) between the file's untouched
/// `prefix`/`suffix` byte ranges and ingest the result as one continuous
/// stream into the CDC chunk store.
///
/// `prefix`/`suffix` are `stream::empty()`-backed when the edit starts at
/// byte 0 or reaches EOF respectively — callers build the real ranges from
/// [`FileRetrievalUseCase::get_file_range_stream_with_perms`](crate::application::ports::file_ports::FileRetrievalUseCase::get_file_range_stream_with_perms).
/// Because FastCDC chunking is content-defined rather than offset-defined,
/// unedited chunks on either side of the edit typically dedup for free.
///
/// Each of `prefix`/`suffix` is paired with its known byte length (from the
/// file's size and the requested range — callers compute it, not this
/// function). `budget.max_bytes` bounds the size of the *edit* (the request
/// body) — it is widened by the prefix/suffix lengths before being applied
/// to the combined stream, so that already-stored, untouched bytes being
/// re-ingested unchanged don't count against the cap. Without this, any
/// PATCH against a file at or above `max_bytes` would be rejected
/// regardless of how small the edit itself is.
///
/// `budget.expected_body_len`, when `Some`, is validated against the
/// *actual* number of body bytes streamed — not the client-supplied
/// `Content-Length` header, which chunked-transfer-encoded requests may
/// omit entirely. Counting the real bytes means a request that declares
/// `X-Update-Range: bytes=5-9` (a 5-byte span) but streams a
/// differently-sized body is caught regardless of whether `Content-Length`
/// was present. On mismatch the already-ingested blob is discarded and
/// never reaches the atomic store, so a rejected PATCH can't leave stray
/// unreferenced content.
///
/// [RFC 5789]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5789
pub async fn ingest_range_patch_to_cas(
prefix: RangeSegment,
body: Body,
suffix: RangeSegment,
dedup: &Arc<DedupService>,
filename: &str,
claimed_type: &str,
budget: PatchIngestBudget,
) -> Result<IngestedBlob, AppError> {
let PatchIngestBudget {
max_bytes,
expected_body_len,
} = budget;
let (prefix_stream, prefix_len) = prefix;
let (suffix_stream, suffix_len) = suffix;
let body_len = Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0));
let counter = body_len.clone();
let body_stream = BodyStream::new(body).filter_map(move |item| {
let counter = counter.clone();
async move {
match item {
Ok(frame) => {
let bytes = frame.into_data().ok()?;
counter.fetch_add(bytes.len() as u64, Ordering::Relaxed);
Some(Ok(bytes))
}
Err(e) => Some(Err(std::io::Error::other(e.to_string()))),
}
}
});
let effective_max = max_bytes.saturating_add((prefix_len + suffix_len) as usize);
let combined = prefix_stream.chain(body_stream).chain(suffix_stream);
let ingested =
ingest_stream_to_cas(combined, dedup, filename, claimed_type, effective_max, None)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
if e.error_type == "PayloadTooLarge" {
AppError::payload_too_large(format!(
"PATCH body exceeds the direct-PATCH edit-size cap ({max_bytes} bytes). \
Use the chunked-upload protocol for edits larger than this."
))
} else {
e
}
})?;
if let Some(expected) = expected_body_len {
let actual = body_len.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
if actual != expected {
discard_ingested(dedup, &ingested).await;
return Err(AppError::bad_request(format!(
"PATCH body ({actual} bytes) does not match the X-Update-Range span ({expected} bytes)"
)));
}
}
Ok(ingested)
}
/// Adapt a multipart field into a byte stream for [`ingest_stream_to_cas`].
///
/// Terminates after the first error — multipart fields are not resumable.
+197
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
# =============================================================
# OxiCloud — NextCloud HTTP PATCH partial content updates (RFC 5789)
# =============================================================
# The NextCloud-compatible WebDAV surface (/remote.php/dav/…) had no
# PATCH dispatch arm at all (fell through to 405), unlike the plain-file
# surface (see api/handlers/webdav_handler.rs::handle_patch). See
# nextcloud/webdav_handler.rs::handle_patch, which reuses the plain
# surface's `parse_update_range` and `upload_ingest::
# ingest_range_patch_to_cas` — both surface-agnostic.
#
# Coverage:
# 1. PATCH an explicit byte range (`X-Update-Range: bytes=<start>-<end>`)
# → 204, Content-Range header, and the resulting content reflects
# the patched span with the untouched prefix/suffix intact.
# 2. PATCH with `X-Update-Range: append` → 204, content grows.
# 3. PATCH with a Content-Range header → 400 (must use X-Update-Range).
# 4. PATCH without X-Update-Range → 400.
# 5. PATCH on a nonexistent file → 404.
# 6. PATCH on a directory → 409 (not 404 — the NC surface previously
# had no folder-existence check and returned 404 for both a missing
# file AND an existing directory; the fix commit added an explicit
# check so the two cases are distinguishable again, matching the
# plain-surface behavior).
#
# Hurl gotcha: headers MUST come before section blocks like
# `[BasicAuth]` in a request — a header line placed after `[BasicAuth]`
# is parsed as the START OF A NEW REQUEST instead (see
# `nc_multidrive_move_regression.hurl`'s note on the same gotcha).
# =============================================================
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Setup 1 — JWT login (to mint the app password used for NC Basic Auth).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
Content-Type: application/json
{ "username": "{{username}}", "password": "{{password}}" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
jwt: jsonpath "$.access_token"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Setup 2 — Mint an app password for NC Basic Auth.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords
Authorization: Bearer {{jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{ "label": "nc_webdav_patch hurl test" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
nc_username: jsonpath "$.username"
nc_password: jsonpath "$.password"
ap_id: jsonpath "$.id"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 1 — Seed a 10-byte probe file: "0123456789".
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-patch-probe.txt
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
`0123456789`
HTTP 201
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 2 — PATCH bytes 3-5 ("345") with "XYZ".
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-patch-probe.txt
X-Update-Range: bytes=3-5
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
`XYZ`
HTTP 204
[Asserts]
header "Content-Range" == "bytes 3-9/10"
GET {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-patch-probe.txt
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
body == "012XYZ6789"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 3 — PATCH append.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-patch-probe.txt
X-Update-Range: append
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
`END`
HTTP 204
[Asserts]
header "Content-Range" == "bytes 10-12/13"
GET {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-patch-probe.txt
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
body == "012XYZ6789END"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 4 — Content-Range header on PATCH is rejected.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-patch-probe.txt
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-2
Content-Range: bytes 0-2/13
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
`abc`
HTTP 400
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 5 — Missing X-Update-Range header.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-patch-probe.txt
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
`abc`
HTTP 400
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 6 — PATCH on a nonexistent file → 404.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-patch-does-not-exist.txt
X-Update-Range: append
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
`abc`
HTTP 404
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 7 — PATCH on a directory → 409 Conflict (not 404).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
MKCOL {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-patch-probe-dir/
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
HTTP 201
PATCH {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-patch-probe-dir/
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-2
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
`NOP`
HTTP 409
DELETE {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-patch-probe-dir/
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
HTTP 204
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Cleanup
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
DELETE {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-patch-probe.txt
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
HTTP 204
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords/{{ap_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{jwt}}
HTTP 200
+545
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,545 @@
# =============================================================
# OxiCloud — NextCloud PATCH data-consistency + authz/lock gaps
# =============================================================
# `nc_webdav_patch.hurl` covers the PATCH contract on the NC surface.
# This file targets the specific gaps closed by the review-fix commit
# (see nextcloud/webdav_handler.rs::handle_patch):
#
# 1. AuthZ: the NC surface previously called `get_file_by_path`
# (which performs NO authorization check) with no follow-up
# `authz.require` at all — any caller with a valid app password
# could learn a file's size/ETag via PATCH's precondition/range
# responses regardless of their actual permission on that file.
# The fix added the same `Permission::Read` check the plain
# surface already had. That Read check is only an early
# existence-proof gate, though — the actual write a few lines
# later goes through `update_file_streaming_with_perms`, which
# independently requires `Permission::Update`. So the full
# permission chain for PATCH is: EDITOR (has Update) can PATCH;
# VIEWER (Read only, no Update) gets past the early gate but is
# still denied — anti-enum 404 — at the write step; a caller
# with NO grant at all can't even establish the composite-marker
# chroot. Tested via the multi-drive composite `{user}~{folder_id}`
# credential shape (see `nc_multidrive_move_regression.hurl` for
# the mechanism).
# 2. Cross-surface lock interop: a LOCK taken via the plain
# `/webdav/` surface now also blocks PATCH via `/remote.php/dav/`
# for the same file — proves the two surfaces share one lock
# store, not two independent ones.
# 3. Quota/507 via the NC surface (previously missing entirely —
# the fix added the same per-user quota check the plain surface
# already enforced), and the failed PATCH leaves the file intact.
#
# Self-contained: provisions its own throwaway users/drive so it can
# run alongside the rest of the suite.
# =============================================================
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Setup — Admin JWT login.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
Content-Type: application/json
{ "username": "{{username}}", "password": "{{password}}" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
admin_jwt: jsonpath "$.access_token"
admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Part A — AuthZ: Editor can PATCH; Viewer (Read only) and a
# no-grant outsider both can't
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A1 — Provision `ncpatch_editor` (will get EDITOR),
# `ncpatch_viewer` (will get VIEWER), and
# `ncpatch_outsider` (gets NO grant at all).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"username": "ncpatch_editor",
"password": "NcPatchEditorPwd1!",
"email": "ncpatch_editor@example.com",
"role": "user"
}
HTTP 201
[Captures]
editor_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"username": "ncpatch_viewer",
"password": "NcPatchViewerPwd1!",
"email": "ncpatch_viewer@example.com",
"role": "user"
}
HTTP 201
[Captures]
viewer_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"username": "ncpatch_outsider",
"password": "NcPatchOutsiderPwd1!",
"email": "ncpatch_outsider@example.com",
"role": "user"
}
HTTP 201
[Captures]
outsider_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A2 — Log all three in, mint an NC app password for each.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
Content-Type: application/json
{ "username": "ncpatch_editor", "password": "NcPatchEditorPwd1!" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
editor_jwt: jsonpath "$.access_token"
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords
Authorization: Bearer {{editor_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{ "label": "nc_webdav_patch_consistency (editor)" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
editor_nc_username: jsonpath "$.username"
editor_nc_password: jsonpath "$.password"
editor_ap_id: jsonpath "$.id"
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
Content-Type: application/json
{ "username": "ncpatch_viewer", "password": "NcPatchViewerPwd1!" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
viewer_jwt: jsonpath "$.access_token"
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords
Authorization: Bearer {{viewer_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{ "label": "nc_webdav_patch_consistency (viewer)" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
viewer_nc_username: jsonpath "$.username"
viewer_nc_password: jsonpath "$.password"
viewer_ap_id: jsonpath "$.id"
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
Content-Type: application/json
{ "username": "ncpatch_outsider", "password": "NcPatchOutsiderPwd1!" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
outsider_jwt: jsonpath "$.access_token"
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords
Authorization: Bearer {{outsider_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{ "label": "nc_webdav_patch_consistency (outsider)" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
outsider_nc_username: jsonpath "$.username"
outsider_nc_password: jsonpath "$.password"
outsider_ap_id: jsonpath "$.id"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A3 — Admin creates a shared drive, grants `ncpatch_editor`
# EDITOR (Read + Update) and `ncpatch_viewer` VIEWER
# (Read only). `ncpatch_outsider` gets no grant at all.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/drives
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"kind": "shared",
"name": "ncpatch-shared",
"owner": { "type": "user", "id": "{{admin_user_id}}" }
}
HTTP 201
[Captures]
shared_drive_id: jsonpath "$.id"
shared_root_id: jsonpath "$.root_folder_id"
POST {{base_url}}/api/grants
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"subject": { "type": "user", "id": "{{editor_user_id}}" },
"resource": { "type": "drive", "id": "{{shared_drive_id}}" },
"role": "editor"
}
HTTP 201
POST {{base_url}}/api/grants
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"subject": { "type": "user", "id": "{{viewer_user_id}}" },
"resource": { "type": "drive", "id": "{{shared_drive_id}}" },
"role": "viewer"
}
HTTP 201
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A4 — Admin seeds a file in the shared drive via the plain
# WebDAV surface (`@drive/<id>/` scheme).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/webdav/@drive/{{shared_drive_id}}/ncpatch-file.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: text/plain
`0123456789`
HTTP 201
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A5 — Bootstrap the composite BasicAuth usernames (Hurl's
# [BasicAuth] parser chokes on a literal `~` split across
# two templates — alias it via [Options] variable: first,
# same workaround as nc_multidrive_move_regression.hurl).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
GET {{base_url}}/ready
[Options]
variable: nc_basic_editor={{editor_nc_username}}~{{shared_root_id}}
HTTP 200
GET {{base_url}}/ready
[Options]
variable: nc_basic_viewer={{viewer_nc_username}}~{{shared_root_id}}
HTTP 200
GET {{base_url}}/ready
[Options]
variable: nc_basic_outsider={{outsider_nc_username}}~{{shared_root_id}}
HTTP 200
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A6 — EDITOR (has Update via the drive grant) CAN PATCH.
# This is the positive check: the fix's authz.require(Read)
# gate plus the write step's Update requirement must not
# accidentally lock out a legitimate Update-holder.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_editor}}/ncpatch-file.txt
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-2
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_basic_editor}}: {{editor_nc_password}}
`XYZ`
HTTP 204
GET {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_editor}}/ncpatch-file.txt
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_basic_editor}}: {{editor_nc_password}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
body == "XYZ3456789"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A7 — VIEWER (has Read via the grant, but not Update) is
# denied. The early authz.require(Read) the fix added is
# only an existence-proof gate; the actual write goes
# through `update_file_streaming_with_perms`, which
# independently requires Update. Since the Viewer CAN
# read the file, `require`'s graduated-denial policy
# (authorization_ports.rs::require) surfaces this as 403,
# not the anti-enum 404 — the caller can already see the
# resource, so hiding its existence leaks nothing new.
# Before fixing the NC surface's error-mapping bug found
# via this test (see nextcloud/webdav_handler.rs's PATCH
# write-step error mapping), this denial leaked as a raw
# 500 instead of the correct 403.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_viewer}}/ncpatch-file.txt
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-2
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_basic_viewer}}: {{viewer_nc_password}}
`NOP`
HTTP 403
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A8 — OUTSIDER (no grant at all on this drive) cannot reach
# the file — denied before PATCH's own logic ever runs.
# Accept the broader 4xx-non-2xx shape here since the
# denial may surface at the app-password/session boundary
# rather than the domain authz layer.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_outsider}}/ncpatch-file.txt
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-2
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_basic_outsider}}: {{outsider_nc_password}}
`NOP`
HTTP *
[Asserts]
status >= 400
status < 500
# Cleanup Part A.
DELETE {{base_url}}/webdav/@drive/{{shared_drive_id}}/ncpatch-file.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 204
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords/{{editor_ap_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{editor_jwt}}
HTTP 200
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords/{{viewer_ap_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{viewer_jwt}}
HTTP 200
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords/{{outsider_ap_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{outsider_jwt}}
HTTP 200
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Part B — Cross-surface lock interop
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step B1 — Mint admin's own NC app password (bare-username
# surface — admin's personal drive, same file tree as
# `/webdav/`).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{ "label": "nc_webdav_patch_consistency (lock interop)" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
nc_username: jsonpath "$.username"
nc_password: jsonpath "$.password"
lock_ap_id: jsonpath "$.id"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step B2 — Seed the file via the plain surface, LOCK it there.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/webdav/nc-lock-interop-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: text/plain
`0123456789`
HTTP 201
LOCK {{base_url}}/webdav/nc-lock-interop-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/xml; charset=utf-8
```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<D:lockinfo xmlns:D="DAV:">
<D:lockscope><D:exclusive/></D:lockscope>
<D:locktype><D:write/></D:locktype>
<D:owner>nc-lock-interop-test</D:owner>
</D:lockinfo>
```
HTTP 200
[Captures]
interop_lock_token: xpath "string(//*[local-name()='locktoken']/*[local-name()='href'])"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step B3 — PATCH the SAME file via the NC surface, no lock token
# → 423. Pre-fix, the NC surface didn't consult the
# plain surface's lock store at all.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-lock-interop-probe.txt
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-2
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
`NOP`
HTTP 423
# Release the lock via the plain surface so cleanup below works.
UNLOCK {{base_url}}/webdav/nc-lock-interop-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Lock-Token: <{{interop_lock_token}}>
HTTP 204
# Cleanup Part B.
DELETE {{base_url}}/webdav/nc-lock-interop-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 204
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Part C — Quota/507 via the NC surface leaves the file untouched
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step C1 — Provision `ncpatch_quota_owner` with a 50-byte quota.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"username": "ncpatch_quota_owner",
"password": "NcPatchQuotaOwnerPwd1!",
"email": "ncpatch_quota_owner@example.com",
"role": "user"
}
HTTP 201
[Captures]
quota_owner_id: jsonpath "$.id"
PUT {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{quota_owner_id}}/quota
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{ "quota_bytes": 50 }
HTTP 200
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
Content-Type: application/json
{ "username": "ncpatch_quota_owner", "password": "NcPatchQuotaOwnerPwd1!" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
quota_owner_jwt: jsonpath "$.access_token"
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords
Authorization: Bearer {{quota_owner_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{ "label": "nc_webdav_patch_consistency (quota)" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
quota_nc_username: jsonpath "$.username"
quota_nc_password: jsonpath "$.password"
quota_ap_id: jsonpath "$.id"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step C2 — Seed a 10-byte file (under quota), then append past
# it → 507. File must come back unchanged.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{quota_nc_username}}/nc-quota-probe.txt
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{quota_nc_username}}: {{quota_nc_password}}
`0123456789`
HTTP 201
[Captures]
quota_probe_etag: header "ETag"
PATCH {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{quota_nc_username}}/nc-quota-probe.txt
X-Update-Range: append
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{quota_nc_username}}: {{quota_nc_password}}
`this-is-a-100-byte-ish-payload-that-blows-past-the-fifty-byte-quota-set-for-this-throwaway-user-abc`
HTTP 507
GET {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{quota_nc_username}}/nc-quota-probe.txt
[BasicAuth]
{{quota_nc_username}}: {{quota_nc_password}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
body == "0123456789"
header "ETag" contains {{quota_probe_etag}}
# Cleanup Part C.
DELETE {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{quota_nc_username}}/nc-quota-probe.txt
[BasicAuth]
{{quota_nc_username}}: {{quota_nc_password}}
HTTP 204
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords/{{quota_ap_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{quota_owner_jwt}}
HTTP 200
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords/{{lock_ap_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 200
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Teardown
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{editor_user_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 200
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{viewer_user_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 200
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/drives/{{shared_drive_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 204
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{outsider_user_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 200
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{quota_owner_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 200
+505
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,505 @@
# =============================================================
# OxiCloud — NextCloud PUT gaps closed by bringing handle_put up to
# parity with handle_patch
# =============================================================
# `nc_webdav_patch_consistency.hurl` covers the same four gap classes
# for PATCH; this file targets the NC surface's `handle_put`
# (nextcloud/webdav_handler.rs), which had fallen behind PATCH's
# hardening across the RFC 5789 commits:
#
# 1. Error mapping: the write step mapped every `DomainError` to a
# raw 500 (`AppError::internal_error(format!("Failed to store
# file: {}", e))`) instead of `AppError::from(e)` — a VIEWER
# (Read only, no Update) overwriting a file got a 500 leak
# instead of the graduated-denial 403 the rest of the codebase
# relies on (Read granted → visible → 403; no Read at all →
# hidden → 404 anti-enum).
# 2. Cross-surface lock interop: PUT via `/remote.php/dav/` didn't
# consult the lock store a LOCK taken via the plain `/webdav/`
# surface writes to at all.
# 3. Quota/507: PUT via the NC surface bypassed
# `check_storage_quota` entirely (PATCH already enforced it).
# 4. Existence-check depth (RFC 4918 §9.7.1): PUT to an existing
# directory should be 400, and PUT under a missing parent folder
# should be 409 — neither check existed on the NC surface; both
# failure modes fell through to whatever `update_file_streaming_
# with_perms` did internally.
#
# Self-contained: provisions its own throwaway users/drive so it can
# run alongside the rest of the suite.
# =============================================================
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Setup — Admin JWT login.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
Content-Type: application/json
{ "username": "{{username}}", "password": "{{password}}" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
admin_jwt: jsonpath "$.access_token"
admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Part A — Error mapping: Editor can overwrite via PUT; Viewer
# (Read only) gets 404, not a raw 500
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A1 — Provision `ncput_editor` (EDITOR) and `ncput_viewer`
# (VIEWER, Read only).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"username": "ncput_editor",
"password": "NcPutEditorPwd1!",
"email": "ncput_editor@example.com",
"role": "user"
}
HTTP 201
[Captures]
editor_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"username": "ncput_viewer",
"password": "NcPutViewerPwd1!",
"email": "ncput_viewer@example.com",
"role": "user"
}
HTTP 201
[Captures]
viewer_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A2 — Log both in, mint an NC app password for each.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
Content-Type: application/json
{ "username": "ncput_editor", "password": "NcPutEditorPwd1!" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
editor_jwt: jsonpath "$.access_token"
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords
Authorization: Bearer {{editor_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{ "label": "nc_webdav_put_gaps (editor)" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
editor_nc_username: jsonpath "$.username"
editor_nc_password: jsonpath "$.password"
editor_ap_id: jsonpath "$.id"
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
Content-Type: application/json
{ "username": "ncput_viewer", "password": "NcPutViewerPwd1!" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
viewer_jwt: jsonpath "$.access_token"
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords
Authorization: Bearer {{viewer_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{ "label": "nc_webdav_put_gaps (viewer)" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
viewer_nc_username: jsonpath "$.username"
viewer_nc_password: jsonpath "$.password"
viewer_ap_id: jsonpath "$.id"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A3 — Admin creates a shared drive, grants `ncput_editor`
# EDITOR (Read + Update) and `ncput_viewer` VIEWER
# (Read only).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/drives
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"kind": "shared",
"name": "ncput-shared",
"owner": { "type": "user", "id": "{{admin_user_id}}" }
}
HTTP 201
[Captures]
shared_drive_id: jsonpath "$.id"
shared_root_id: jsonpath "$.root_folder_id"
POST {{base_url}}/api/grants
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"subject": { "type": "user", "id": "{{editor_user_id}}" },
"resource": { "type": "drive", "id": "{{shared_drive_id}}" },
"role": "editor"
}
HTTP 201
POST {{base_url}}/api/grants
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"subject": { "type": "user", "id": "{{viewer_user_id}}" },
"resource": { "type": "drive", "id": "{{shared_drive_id}}" },
"role": "viewer"
}
HTTP 201
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A4 — Admin seeds a file in the shared drive via the plain
# WebDAV surface (`@drive/<id>/` scheme).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/webdav/@drive/{{shared_drive_id}}/ncput-file.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: text/plain
`0123456789`
HTTP 201
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A5 — Bootstrap the composite BasicAuth usernames (see
# nc_multidrive_move_regression.hurl for the mechanism).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
GET {{base_url}}/ready
[Options]
variable: nc_basic_editor={{editor_nc_username}}~{{shared_root_id}}
HTTP 200
GET {{base_url}}/ready
[Options]
variable: nc_basic_viewer={{viewer_nc_username}}~{{shared_root_id}}
HTTP 200
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A6 — EDITOR (has Update via the drive grant) CAN overwrite
# via PUT.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_editor}}/ncput-file.txt
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_basic_editor}}: {{editor_nc_password}}
`XYZ`
HTTP 204
GET {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_editor}}/ncput-file.txt
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_basic_editor}}: {{editor_nc_password}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
body == "XYZ"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A7 — VIEWER (has Read via the grant, but not Update) is
# denied, not a raw 500. Viewer CAN read the file, so
# the graduated-denial policy (authorization_ports.rs::
# require) surfaces 403, not the anti-enum 404 — that
# shape is reserved for callers with no Read at all.
# Before the fix, `handle_put`'s write step mapped every
# `DomainError` (including this authz denial) to
# `AppError::internal_error(...)`, leaking a 500.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_viewer}}/ncput-file.txt
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_basic_viewer}}: {{viewer_nc_password}}
`NOP`
HTTP 403
# Cleanup Part A.
DELETE {{base_url}}/webdav/@drive/{{shared_drive_id}}/ncput-file.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 204
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords/{{editor_ap_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{editor_jwt}}
HTTP 200
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords/{{viewer_ap_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{viewer_jwt}}
HTTP 200
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Part B — Cross-surface lock interop
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step B1 — Mint admin's own NC app password (bare-username
# surface — admin's personal drive, same file tree as
# `/webdav/`).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{ "label": "nc_webdav_put_gaps (lock interop)" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
nc_username: jsonpath "$.username"
nc_password: jsonpath "$.password"
lock_ap_id: jsonpath "$.id"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step B2 — Seed the file via the plain surface, LOCK it there.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/webdav/nc-put-lock-interop-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: text/plain
`0123456789`
HTTP 201
LOCK {{base_url}}/webdav/nc-put-lock-interop-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/xml; charset=utf-8
```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<D:lockinfo xmlns:D="DAV:">
<D:lockscope><D:exclusive/></D:lockscope>
<D:locktype><D:write/></D:locktype>
<D:owner>nc-put-lock-interop-test</D:owner>
</D:lockinfo>
```
HTTP 200
[Captures]
interop_lock_token: xpath "string(//*[local-name()='locktoken']/*[local-name()='href'])"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step B3 — PUT the SAME file via the NC surface, no lock token
# → 423. Pre-fix, the NC surface's `handle_put` didn't
# consult the plain surface's lock store at all.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-put-lock-interop-probe.txt
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
`NOP`
HTTP 423
# Release the lock via the plain surface so cleanup below works.
UNLOCK {{base_url}}/webdav/nc-put-lock-interop-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Lock-Token: <{{interop_lock_token}}>
HTTP 204
# Cleanup Part B.
DELETE {{base_url}}/webdav/nc-put-lock-interop-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 204
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Part C — Quota/507 via the NC surface leaves the file untouched
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step C1 — Provision `ncput_quota_owner` with a 50-byte quota.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"username": "ncput_quota_owner",
"password": "NcPutQuotaOwnerPwd1!",
"email": "ncput_quota_owner@example.com",
"role": "user"
}
HTTP 201
[Captures]
quota_owner_id: jsonpath "$.id"
PUT {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{quota_owner_id}}/quota
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{ "quota_bytes": 50 }
HTTP 200
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
Content-Type: application/json
{ "username": "ncput_quota_owner", "password": "NcPutQuotaOwnerPwd1!" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
quota_owner_jwt: jsonpath "$.access_token"
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords
Authorization: Bearer {{quota_owner_jwt}}
Content-Type: application/json
{ "label": "nc_webdav_put_gaps (quota)" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
quota_nc_username: jsonpath "$.username"
quota_nc_password: jsonpath "$.password"
quota_ap_id: jsonpath "$.id"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step C2 — Seed a 10-byte file (under quota), then overwrite it
# with a payload that blows past the 50-byte quota → 507.
# File must come back unchanged.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{quota_nc_username}}/nc-put-quota-probe.txt
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{quota_nc_username}}: {{quota_nc_password}}
`0123456789`
HTTP 201
[Captures]
quota_probe_etag: header "ETag"
PUT {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{quota_nc_username}}/nc-put-quota-probe.txt
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{quota_nc_username}}: {{quota_nc_password}}
`this-is-a-100-byte-ish-payload-that-blows-past-the-fifty-byte-quota-set-for-this-throwaway-user-abc`
HTTP 507
GET {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{quota_nc_username}}/nc-put-quota-probe.txt
[BasicAuth]
{{quota_nc_username}}: {{quota_nc_password}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
body == "0123456789"
header "ETag" contains {{quota_probe_etag}}
# Cleanup Part C.
DELETE {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{quota_nc_username}}/nc-put-quota-probe.txt
[BasicAuth]
{{quota_nc_username}}: {{quota_nc_password}}
HTTP 204
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords/{{quota_ap_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{quota_owner_jwt}}
HTTP 200
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Part D — Existence-check depth (RFC 4918 §9.7.1): folder-collision
# and missing-parent, previously unchecked on the NC surface
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step D1 — PUT to an existing directory → 400 (not whatever the
# write step's internals happened to produce).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
MKCOL {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-put-probe-dir/
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
HTTP 201
PUT {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-put-probe-dir/
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
`NOP`
HTTP 400
DELETE {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-put-probe-dir/
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
HTTP 204
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step D2 — PUT under a nonexistent parent folder → 409 Conflict
# (RFC 4918 §9.7.1), not a generic error from further down
# the write path.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_username}}/nc-put-missing-parent/probe.txt
Content-Type: text/plain
[BasicAuth]
{{nc_username}}: {{nc_password}}
`NOP`
HTTP 409
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords/{{lock_ap_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 200
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Teardown
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{editor_user_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 200
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{viewer_user_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 200
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/drives/{{shared_drive_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 204
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{quota_owner_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
HTTP 200
+5
View File
@@ -205,6 +205,11 @@ hurl --variables-file "$API_DIR/test.env" --file-root "$REPO_ROOT/tests" --test
"$API_DIR/webdav_protected_properties.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/webdav_quota_properties.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/nc_webdav_quota_properties.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/webdav_patch.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/nc_webdav_patch.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/webdav_patch_consistency.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/nc_webdav_patch_consistency.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/nc_webdav_put_gaps.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/webdav_drive_root.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/webdav_permissions.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/webdav_nested_move_cascade.hurl" \
+253
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
# =============================================================
# OxiCloud — WebDAV PATCH (RFC 5789) partial content update
# =============================================================
# RFC 4918 §9.7.1 forbids partial updates on PUT (a `Content-Range`
# on PUT is rejected, see webdav_handler.rs::handle_put). PATCH is
# the mechanism this server offers instead, via a dedicated
# `X-Update-Range` header: `bytes=<start>-<end>` (inclusive) or
# `append`. See webdav_handler.rs::handle_patch /
# parse_update_range for the implementation.
#
# Coverage:
# 1. Mid-file byte-range overwrite → 204, GET reflects the splice.
# 2. Append → 204, GET reflects the appended tail.
# 3. Out-of-range span (end >= size) → 416.
# 4. If-Match precondition failure → 412.
# 5. Locked resource without a lock token → 423.
# 6. PATCH on a directory → 409.
# 7. PATCH on a missing resource → 404.
# 8. PATCH without X-Update-Range → 400.
# 9. If-None-Match precondition failure (tag matches current ETag) → 412.
# 10. If-Match with a WEAK (`W/`) form of the current ETag → 412 (RFC 7232
# §3.1: If-Match requires a STRONG match; a weak validator in the
# request never satisfies it, even if the underlying tag value is
# identical — see `if_match_precondition_fails`).
#
# Hurl gotcha: a triple-backtick ``` multiline body appends a trailing
# `\n` the server counts as part of Content-Length — that silently
# breaks the exact `end - start + 1` span check on a byte-range PATCH.
# Plain-text bodies below use the single-backtick ONELINE string form
# (`` `text` ``) instead, which sends exactly the bytes between the
# backticks with no injected newline.
# =============================================================
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 1 — Login, capture JWT
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
Content-Type: application/json
{ "username": "{{username}}", "password": "{{password}}" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 2 — PUT a 10-byte probe file: "0123456789"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
Content-Type: text/plain
`0123456789`
HTTP 201
[Captures]
probe_etag: header "ETag"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 3 — Mid-file overwrite: replace bytes 3-5 (inclusive,
# 0-based) with "XYZ".
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
X-Update-Range: bytes=3-5
Content-Type: text/plain
`XYZ`
HTTP 204
[Asserts]
header "Content-Range" matches "^bytes 3-\\d+/\\d+$"
GET {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
body startsWith "012XYZ"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 4 — Append to the end of the file.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
X-Update-Range: append
Content-Type: text/plain
`-APPENDED`
HTTP 204
[Captures]
current_etag: header "ETag"
GET {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
body endsWith "-APPENDED"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 5 — Out-of-range span: `end` must be strictly within the
# current file size (growing via a byte-range PATCH
# isn't supported — use `append` for that).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
X-Update-Range: bytes=1000-1005
Content-Type: text/plain
`oops`
HTTP 416
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 6 — If-Match precondition failure.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-2
If-Match: "not-the-real-etag"
Content-Type: text/plain
`NOP`
HTTP 412
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 7 — Locked resource without a matching lock token.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
LOCK {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
Content-Type: application/xml; charset=utf-8
```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<D:lockinfo xmlns:D="DAV:">
<D:lockscope><D:exclusive/></D:lockscope>
<D:locktype><D:write/></D:locktype>
<D:owner>patch-test</D:owner>
</D:lockinfo>
```
HTTP 200
[Captures]
lock_token: xpath "string(//*[local-name()='locktoken']/*[local-name()='href'])"
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-2
Content-Type: text/plain
`NOP`
HTTP 423
# Release the lock so cleanup below can proceed.
UNLOCK {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
Lock-Token: <{{lock_token}}>
HTTP 204
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 8 — PATCH on a directory → 409 Conflict.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
MKCOL {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe-dir/
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
HTTP 201
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe-dir/
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-2
Content-Type: text/plain
`NOP`
HTTP 409
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 9 — PATCH on a missing resource → 404.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe-does-not-exist.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-2
Content-Type: text/plain
`NOP`
HTTP 404
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 10 — PATCH without X-Update-Range → 400.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
Content-Type: text/plain
`NOP`
HTTP 400
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 11 — If-None-Match precondition failure: the header names the
# CURRENT ETag, so the "only if it does NOT match" condition
# is violated → 412.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-2
If-None-Match: {{current_etag}}
Content-Type: text/plain
`NOP`
HTTP 412
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 12 — If-Match with a WEAK form (`W/`) of the current ETag → 412.
# RFC 7232 §3.1 requires If-Match to STRONG-match; a request
# carrying a weak validator never satisfies it even when the
# underlying tag value is identical.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-2
If-Match: W/{{current_etag}}
Content-Type: text/plain
`NOP`
HTTP 412
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Cleanup
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
DELETE {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
HTTP 204
DELETE {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-probe-dir/
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
HTTP 204
+322
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@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
# =============================================================
# OxiCloud — WebDAV PATCH data-consistency chain (RFC 5789)
# =============================================================
# `webdav_patch.hurl` covers the PATCH contract itself (ranges, append,
# preconditions, locks). This file chains multiple PATCHes against the
# SAME resource and asserts the server stays consistent afterward —
# the concern behind the review-fix commit that added quota
# enforcement, an ETag re-check, and a `direct_put_max_bytes`
# prefix/suffix accounting bug (see webdav_handler.rs::handle_patch).
#
# Coverage:
# 1. Sequential overlapping-range PATCHes on one file: each step's
# GET reflects the splice, and the ETag changes every time (no
# stale-tag reuse across writes).
# 2. Cross-protocol consistency: HEAD and PROPFIND report the same
# size/ETag as the GET right after the last PATCH.
# 3. Quota rejection (507) leaves the file BYTE-FOR-BYTE unchanged —
# the ingested blob is discarded before it's ever attached
# (`upload_ingest::discard_ingested`).
# 4. `direct_put_max_bytes` bounds only the EDIT span, not the whole
# file: a small edit on a file already bigger than the cap still
# succeeds, but an edit whose OWN body exceeds the cap still 413s.
# =============================================================
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 1 — Login, capture JWT
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
Content-Type: application/json
{ "username": "{{username}}", "password": "{{password}}" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Part A — Sequential overlapping PATCHes + cross-protocol check
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 2 — PUT a 20-byte probe: "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJ"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-consist-chain.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
Content-Type: text/plain
`0123456789ABCDEFGHIJ`
HTTP 201
[Captures]
etag0: header "ETag"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 3 — Overwrite bytes 5-9 ("56789") with "XXXXX".
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-consist-chain.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
X-Update-Range: bytes=5-9
Content-Type: text/plain
`XXXXX`
HTTP 204
[Captures]
etag1: header "ETag"
[Asserts]
header "ETag" != {{etag0}}
GET {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-consist-chain.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
body == "01234XXXXXABCDEFGHIJ"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 4 — Overwrite bytes 10-14 ("ABCDE") with "YYYYY".
# Overlaps neither previous edit but chains off it —
# proves each PATCH sees the result of the last one, not
# a stale copy.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-consist-chain.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
X-Update-Range: bytes=10-14
Content-Type: text/plain
`YYYYY`
HTTP 204
[Captures]
etag2: header "ETag"
[Asserts]
header "ETag" != {{etag1}}
GET {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-consist-chain.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
body == "01234XXXXXYYYYYFGHIJ"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 5 — HEAD reports the same size/ETag as the last GET.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
HEAD {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-consist-chain.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
header "Content-Length" == "20"
# GET/HEAD/PROPFIND quote the ETag (`"<tag>"`) while PUT/PATCH return
# it raw/unquoted (compare webdav_handler.rs's `handle_head` vs
# `handle_patch` response builders) — `contains` tolerates that
# formatting difference instead of asserting byte-for-byte equality.
header "ETag" contains {{etag2}}
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 6 — PROPFIND (named getcontentlength/getetag) agrees with
# HEAD/GET — no drift between the WebDAV property layer
# and the plain-file read path.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PROPFIND {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-consist-chain.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
Depth: 0
Content-Type: application/xml; charset=utf-8
```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<D:propfind xmlns:D="DAV:">
<D:prop>
<D:getcontentlength/>
<D:getetag/>
</D:prop>
</D:propfind>
```
HTTP 207
[Asserts]
xpath "number(//*[local-name()='getcontentlength'])" == 20
xpath "string(//*[local-name()='getetag'])" contains {{etag2}}
# Cleanup Part A.
DELETE {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-consist-chain.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
HTTP 204
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Part B — Quota rejection leaves the file untouched
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Dedicated low-quota user so this doesn't cap the shared admin
# account used by the rest of the suite.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 7 — Provision `patch_quota_owner` with a 50-byte quota.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"username": "patch_quota_owner",
"password": "PatchQuotaOwnerPwd1!",
"email": "patch_quota_owner@example.com",
"role": "user"
}
HTTP 201
[Captures]
quota_owner_id: jsonpath "$.id"
PUT {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{quota_owner_id}}/quota
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
Content-Type: application/json
{ "quota_bytes": 50 }
HTTP 200
POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
Content-Type: application/json
{ "username": "patch_quota_owner", "password": "PatchQuotaOwnerPwd1!" }
HTTP 200
[Captures]
quota_owner_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 8 — Seed a 10-byte file (well under the 50-byte quota).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-quota-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{quota_owner_token}}
Content-Type: text/plain
`0123456789`
HTTP 201
[Captures]
quota_probe_etag: header "ETag"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 9 — Append enough bytes to push the file's new total size
# (110 bytes) well past the 50-byte quota → 507. The
# ingested blob is discarded before commit — the file
# must come back completely unchanged.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-quota-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{quota_owner_token}}
X-Update-Range: append
Content-Type: text/plain
`this-is-a-100-byte-ish-payload-that-blows-past-the-fifty-byte-quota-set-for-this-throwaway-user-abc`
HTTP 507
GET {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-quota-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{quota_owner_token}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
body == "0123456789"
header "ETag" contains {{quota_probe_etag}}
# Cleanup Part B.
DELETE {{base_url}}/webdav/patch-quota-probe.txt
Authorization: Bearer {{quota_owner_token}}
HTTP 204
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{quota_owner_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
HTTP 200
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Part C — direct_put_max_bytes bounds the EDIT, not the whole file
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# `OXICLOUD_DIRECT_PUT_MAX_BYTES` (4 MiB) can't be exceeded by a
# direct PUT, so a file bigger than the cap must be seeded through
# the chunk-agnostic multipart upload endpoint instead. Reuses the
# 5 MiB all-zero fixture `run.sh` already generates for the chunk/
# direct-PUT cap tests.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 10 — Resolve the home folder id, seed a 5 MiB file in it.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
GET {{base_url}}/api/folders
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
HTTP 200
[Captures]
home_folder_id: jsonpath "$[0].id"
POST {{base_url}}/api/files/upload
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
[MultipartFormData]
folder_id: {{home_folder_id}}
file: file,fixtures/chunk-over-cap-5mb.bin; application/octet-stream
HTTP 201
[Captures]
big_file_name: jsonpath "$.name"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 11 — A SMALL mid-file edit succeeds even though the file's
# total size (5 MiB) is already over the 4 MiB cap.
# Pre-fix, the cap comparison counted prefix+suffix+edit
# against the raw cap and would have wrongly 413'd any
# edit on a file this size; post-fix only the edit span
# itself is bounded.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/{{big_file_name}}
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
X-Update-Range: bytes=100-104
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
`PATCH`
HTTP 204
GET {{base_url}}/webdav/{{big_file_name}}
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
body contains "PATCH"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 12 — An edit whose OWN body meets/exceeds the cap still
# 413s — the cap still bites real over-cap edits, this
# isn't a blanket bypass. Replaces the ENTIRE file (no
# prefix/suffix at all) with a 5 MiB body.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/webdav/{{big_file_name}}
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-5242879
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
file,fixtures/chunk-over-cap-5mb.bin;
HTTP 413
# Cleanup Part C.
DELETE {{base_url}}/webdav/{{big_file_name}}
Authorization: Bearer {{token}}
HTTP 204