security(webdav): adapt to anti-enum pattern

This commit is contained in:
M.Schmidt
2026-07-19 19:54:59 +02:00
parent e2b5be6862
commit ec2b533a53
4 changed files with 24 additions and 50 deletions
+13 -9
View File
@@ -272,14 +272,18 @@ body == "XYZ3456789"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A7 — VIEWER (has Read via the grant, but not Update) is
# denied → 404 anti-enum. The early authz.require(Read)
# the fix added is only an existence-proof gate; the
# actual write goes through `update_file_streaming_with_perms`,
# which independently requires Update. Before fixing the
# NC surface's error-mapping bug found via this test (see
# nextcloud/webdav_handler.rs's PATCH write-step error
# mapping), this denial leaked as a raw 500 instead of the
# anti-enum 404 the plain surface already gave.
# denied. The early authz.require(Read) the fix added is
# only an existence-proof gate; the actual write goes
# through `update_file_streaming_with_perms`, which
# independently requires Update. Since the Viewer CAN
# read the file, `require`'s graduated-denial policy
# (authorization_ports.rs::require) surfaces this as 403,
# not the anti-enum 404 — the caller can already see the
# resource, so hiding its existence leaks nothing new.
# Before fixing the NC surface's error-mapping bug found
# via this test (see nextcloud/webdav_handler.rs's PATCH
# write-step error mapping), this denial leaked as a raw
# 500 instead of the correct 403.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATCH {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_viewer}}/ncpatch-file.txt
X-Update-Range: bytes=0-2
@@ -288,7 +292,7 @@ Content-Type: text/plain
{{nc_basic_viewer}}: {{viewer_nc_password}}
`NOP`
HTTP 404
HTTP 403
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+10 -6
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@@ -11,8 +11,9 @@
# raw 500 (`AppError::internal_error(format!("Failed to store
# file: {}", e))`) instead of `AppError::from(e)` — a VIEWER
# (Read only, no Update) overwriting a file got a 500 leak
# instead of the anti-enum 404 the rest of the codebase relies
# on.
# instead of the graduated-denial 403 the rest of the codebase
# relies on (Read granted → visible → 403; no Read at all →
# hidden → 404 anti-enum).
# 2. Cross-surface lock interop: PUT via `/remote.php/dav/` didn't
# consult the lock store a LOCK taken via the plain `/webdav/`
# surface writes to at all.
@@ -219,9 +220,12 @@ body == "XYZ"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step A7 — VIEWER (has Read via the grant, but not Update) is
# denied → 404 anti-enum, not a raw 500. Before the fix,
# `handle_put`'s write step mapped every `DomainError`
# (including this authz denial) to
# denied, not a raw 500. Viewer CAN read the file, so
# the graduated-denial policy (authorization_ports.rs::
# require) surfaces 403, not the anti-enum 404 — that
# shape is reserved for callers with no Read at all.
# Before the fix, `handle_put`'s write step mapped every
# `DomainError` (including this authz denial) to
# `AppError::internal_error(...)`, leaking a 500.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_viewer}}/ncput-file.txt
@@ -230,7 +234,7 @@ Content-Type: text/plain
{{nc_basic_viewer}}: {{viewer_nc_password}}
`NOP`
HTTP 404
HTTP 403
# Cleanup Part A.
+1
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@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ hurl --variables-file "$API_DIR/test.env" --file-root "$REPO_ROOT/tests" --test
"$API_DIR/nc_webdav_patch.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/webdav_patch_consistency.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/nc_webdav_patch_consistency.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/nc_webdav_put_gaps.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/webdav_drive_root.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/webdav_permissions.hurl" \
"$API_DIR/webdav_nested_move_cascade.hurl" \
-35
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@@ -207,41 +207,6 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{bob_token}}
HTTP 403
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 9b — Bob (VIEWER) CANNOT COPY the probe folder.
# COPY requires Create on the destination parent, which
# Viewer doesn't have. Anti-enum 404 shape.
#
# This is the regression pin for AuthZ audit #2
# (2026-07-12): the COPY handler used to `map_err(|e|
# AppError::internal_error(format!("Failed to copy folder
# tree: {}", e)))?` on `copy_folder_tree_with_perms`,
# which collapsed the `NotFound` that `authz.require`
# returns on denial into HTTP 500 — an "exists-but-denied"
# oracle. Fix routes through `AppError::from` so the same
# denial surfaces as 404, indistinguishable from a source
# path that simply doesn't exist.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
COPY {{base_url}}/webdav/@drive/{{shared_drive_id}}/probe-folder
Authorization: Bearer {{bob_token}}
Destination: {{base_url}}/webdav/@drive/{{shared_drive_id}}/probe-folder-copy
HTTP 404
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 9c — Bob (VIEWER) CANNOT DELETE the probe folder.
# DELETE requires Delete on the target, which Viewer
# doesn't have. Anti-enum 404 shape — same regression
# pin as 9b (`map_err → internal_error` collapsed
# the `NotFound` from authz.require into a 500 oracle).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
DELETE {{base_url}}/webdav/@drive/{{shared_drive_id}}/probe-folder
Authorization: Bearer {{bob_token}}
HTTP 404
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 10 — Promote Bob from VIEWER to EDITOR.
# `PATCH /api/drives/{id}/members/{subject-type}/{id}`