Step 7 of docs/plan/derived-blobs.md, write path first — the plan is
explicit that fixing it before the import means transcode_import only
has to handle history, not a moving target.
ImageTranscodeService now reads and writes storage.content_derived_blobs
under kind='transcode', keyed by the BLAKE3 of the SOURCE content. The
hash is threaded in from file_retrieval_service, which already holds it
as dto.content_hash; hashing here would be a BLAKE3 over the whole file
on every request. Callers without one (external mounts) keep the local
cache untouched, which is what the service did before this tier existed.
Negative verdicts become rows rather than zero-byte .skip files. A
transcode that came out larger is deterministic in the content, so it is
worth remembering; the row survives moka eviction, a restart, and the
deletion of .transcoded/, none of which the marker does. Only that
verdict is persisted — a timeout or a read error returns Err and is
recorded nowhere, because a momentary failure written here would mark a
perfectly transcodable image hopeless with nothing to retry it.
Representation is a NULL blob_hash, per the plan: a sentinel hash would
stop blob_hash naming a real Blob and every consumer would need to learn
the exception. A CHECK keeps blob_hash and content_type NULL together —
a type without bytes describes nothing, bytes without a type cannot be
served.
Two consumers had to be corrected for NULLs first, both of which would
have broken on the first negative row ever written:
* satellites_consistency reported them as derived_dangling_blob at
data_loss severity. SQL comparison against NULL is NULL, so EXISTS was
false and a row correctly pointing at nothing read as an artifact that
had gone missing.
* blob_reference_sources::list_referenced_blobs decodes blob_hash into
String, so the first NULL would have failed the decode and taken the
whole enumeration down. It would also have been wrong if it decoded —
a negative row holds no reference, which is why the counting forms
(WHERE blob_hash = <hash>) already exclude it for free.
lookup_derived returns a three-way answer because Option collapses the
two cases a caller deciding whether to spend a decode most needs apart:
never attempted, versus attempted and known not worth it.
DedupService is attached after construction via a OnceLock. DI builds
the transcode service ~240 lines before DedupService exists, and the
retrieval path that needs it is wired earlier still, so a constructor
argument would mean reordering more than this is worth.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The admin panel had no repair toggle wired to anything but a hardcoded
name list naming the two refcount tenants, so `thumb_derived_import` and
`thumb_attached_import` could not be run in repair mode from the UI at
all despite supporting it. And nothing in the job list said what any
given job does or whether clicking Run on production writes anything.
Three defaulted methods on `JobHandler` and `RecoverableJobHandler`:
fn description(&self) -> &'static str
fn mutates(&self) -> Mutates // Never | Always | OnRepairOnly
fn repair_description(&self) -> Option<&'static str>
`RecoverableAdapter` forwards them — the registry only holds
`dyn JobHandler`, so a tenant's metadata is invisible otherwise, and
falling back to the defaults would report every recoverable job as
read-only, including the ones that delete files.
Three values rather than a boolean because a job can be read-only by
default and destructive under `?repair=true`; a boolean answers wrongly
for one of its two modes, and `false` on something that unlinks files is
the dangerous direction to be wrong in. `repair_description` returning
`Option` collapses "does it repair" and "what does repair do" into one
method: presence gates the toggle, content is the confirmation text —
which the frontend cannot invent, since correcting a counter and
deleting sidecars are not the same warning.
`OnRepairOnly` with no `repair_description` is rejected at registration:
it claims to mutate only under a flag it does not support.
All 17 registered jobs declare all three. The panel now renders the
description under each name, badges read-only jobs, confirms before a
plain run of a mutating one, and offers the repair variant off the
backend flag instead of the name list.
Descriptions are English in the trait, next to the behaviour: one in
`locales/*.json` rots invisibly the moment a job changes, and a
translator cannot know what `manifests_consistency` reconciles. i18n can
layer on later keyed by job name with these as the fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
link are checking that email matches, +email alias are normalize into email
if email is already used on another account, link is not possible
not usurpation risk as the IDP is choosen by the admin
this make OIDC compliant with the invariant binding (issuer and subject)
admin can now rename their provider without breaking
clarifing federation_kind: report the kind of federation wired not the allowed login method
hybryd login method are still allowed
- POST /api/auth/opaque/login/ke1 (public) — takes {userIdentifier, startLoginRequest}, resolves the identifier via the same @-dispatch as legacy login (AuthApplicationService::lookup_user_for_login, factored out), fetches envelope, runs ServerLogin::start (real branch for known users, dummy branch for anti-enum on unknown/unregistered), stashes state under a random exchange_id in the moka cache, returns {exchangeId, loginResponse}.
- POST /api/auth/opaque/login/ke3 (public) — atomic take from the cache FIRST (anti-enum + anti-replay), then decodes the payload, runs ServerLogin::finish, stamps opaque_migrated_at (Phase 3 signal), and mints a session via the new AuthApplicationService::mint_session_for_authenticated_user helper — returns the same AuthResponseDto shape as legacy login so the SPA has one downstream handler.
- Session mint factored: mint_session_for_authenticated_user(User) extracted from login() so both the legacy password path and OPAQUE KE3 converge through one implementation.
- OpaqueRepositoryPort::mark_migrated with COALESCE-preserving idempotent stamp of opaque_migrated_at.
- opaque-setup CLI + Dockerfile wiring already shipped (Step 0 hygiene).
- Routing fix: sub-prefix split (/api/auth/opaque/register vs /api/auth/opaque/login) — axum composes middleware between sibling nests at the same prefix, which was cross-applying auth+CSRF to my public login routes. Distinct prefixes side-step that cleanly. Documented in both main.rs and the router builder doc.
- Rate-limit sharing: login KE1/KE3 layered with the SAME login_limiter instance as legacy POST /api/auth/login, so an attacker can't halve the per-IP budget by spraying both endpoints.
Anti-enum + anti-replay hardening in KE3: take runs BEFORE payload parse so:
- Unknown / expired / already-consumed exchange_id → 401 InvalidCredentials (same shape as wrong-passphrase, no payload-shape leak)
- Consumed handle can't be re-used to spam parse attempts
add `auto_redirect_if_standalone_oidc` in `OXICLOUD_AUTH_POLICIES`
let admin decide to redirect immediately to IdP if OIDC is the only auth method enabled