link are checking that email matches, +email alias are normalize into email
if email is already used on another account, link is not possible
not usurpation risk as the IDP is choosen by the admin
this make OIDC compliant with the invariant binding (issuer and subject)
admin can now rename their provider without breaking
clarifing federation_kind: report the kind of federation wired not the allowed login method
hybryd login method are still allowed
- POST /api/auth/opaque/login/ke1 (public) — takes {userIdentifier, startLoginRequest}, resolves the identifier via the same @-dispatch as legacy login (AuthApplicationService::lookup_user_for_login, factored out), fetches envelope, runs ServerLogin::start (real branch for known users, dummy branch for anti-enum on unknown/unregistered), stashes state under a random exchange_id in the moka cache, returns {exchangeId, loginResponse}.
- POST /api/auth/opaque/login/ke3 (public) — atomic take from the cache FIRST (anti-enum + anti-replay), then decodes the payload, runs ServerLogin::finish, stamps opaque_migrated_at (Phase 3 signal), and mints a session via the new AuthApplicationService::mint_session_for_authenticated_user helper — returns the same AuthResponseDto shape as legacy login so the SPA has one downstream handler.
- Session mint factored: mint_session_for_authenticated_user(User) extracted from login() so both the legacy password path and OPAQUE KE3 converge through one implementation.
- OpaqueRepositoryPort::mark_migrated with COALESCE-preserving idempotent stamp of opaque_migrated_at.
- opaque-setup CLI + Dockerfile wiring already shipped (Step 0 hygiene).
- Routing fix: sub-prefix split (/api/auth/opaque/register vs /api/auth/opaque/login) — axum composes middleware between sibling nests at the same prefix, which was cross-applying auth+CSRF to my public login routes. Distinct prefixes side-step that cleanly. Documented in both main.rs and the router builder doc.
- Rate-limit sharing: login KE1/KE3 layered with the SAME login_limiter instance as legacy POST /api/auth/login, so an attacker can't halve the per-IP budget by spraying both endpoints.
Anti-enum + anti-replay hardening in KE3: take runs BEFORE payload parse so:
- Unknown / expired / already-consumed exchange_id → 401 InvalidCredentials (same shape as wrong-passphrase, no payload-shape leak)
- Consumed handle can't be re-used to spam parse attempts
OPAQUE (RFC 9807) implementation (using `opaque-ke` crate)
with opaque authentfication, server will never receive the password (in the auth=password mode)
this is a must have to create trust with users to permit end to end encryption in the future
(we cannot know if user use the same password/passphrase for his asymetric key or his oxicloud auth,
this is why server must never have the password)
pass1: prepare server
add `auto_redirect_if_standalone_oidc` in `OXICLOUD_AUTH_POLICIES`
let admin decide to redirect immediately to IdP if OIDC is the only auth method enabled
permit an admin to specify `oidc` only as the only method to login/register
note that if OIDC is enabled, the engine always append oidc in OXICLOUD_AUTH_METHODS
we could move to an explicit declaration in a major release
Prevent services accessing directly to localstorage and prefer using an astraction layer
to expose full blob. The abstraction layer (dedup services) will cover backend storage
election (local, s3, ...), encryption, etc
This change permit audio_metadata_service, media_metadaa_service, face_indexing_service to handle
blobs without worring of the backend.
note: prefered way to handle blob is the streamed way. Some services may not have this possibility
a job can be paused/resumed
a job as an exclusibity by it's name
if you want to run another job with same name:
either cancel the first one, or wait of it's terminaison
pause does not permit to run the other job, this can create
race conditions
if target blob already exists, migration will check the blob
if header is already with the targeted key (or no key if not ciphered) no need write
otherwise write the blob (that will convert any blob with no header into the correct version)
function read_dispatch:
the reader use th header to determined if file is encrypted
and which key (fingerprint) was used
if blob was recorded in legacy format (no header), it tries all attached keys on storage
last safety net: if none matched, do a blake3 on file, if it matches the file is
stored in clear (no cipher)
otherwise:
- blob is corrupted
- key is lost
Edouard Vanbelle