Benchmark-gated (BEFORE/AFTER + equivalence/safety gate per change), same
discipline as rounds 2-12. Full write-up in benches/ROUND13.md.
Shipped:
- V1 Grouped views windowed (files route + ResourceList). The grid arm was
the last unwindowed path (trash is grouped-by-default in grid): each
swimlane now feeds its own VirtualList, outer container a flex stack.
vitest gate: 800-item grouped grid mounts <120 .file-item (was 800).
- Q1 get_users_by_ids drops the <=512 KiB avatar image + ui_preferences
JSONB (notification path never reads them). 30-member fan-out 8.60 ->
0.25 ms (34.3x), ~7.7 MB off the wire.
- Q2 Login provisioning is_empty() -> SELECT EXISTS for calendar + address
book (every login). 0.193 -> 0.170 ms, widens with owned-row count.
- Q3 Recent-access prunes only when the upsert inserted (RETURNING xmax=0)
— a re-access can't grow the set. 0.567 -> 0.324 ms (1.75x).
- L1 Locale supported-codes precomputed once vs rebuilt per anonymous
request. 616 -> 17.3 ns (35.7x), 18 -> 1 allocs.
- H1 Duplicate /api TraceLayer removed (global stack already wraps it).
1.86 -> 1.42 us/request, -6 allocs.
- H2 client_ip span field: borrow-only ClientIpDisplay vs owned String.
187 -> 173 ns, -1 alloc.
Not shipped (discipline): the "media hooks read the blob 3x" lead was a
correctness bug, not a perf dup — the raw-path metadata/faces readers
resolve only for local+unencrypted+single-chunk blobs and silently produce
nothing otherwise. Flagged for maintainers; routing through read_blob_bytes
is a correctness fix (perf-neutral-to-negative), not a benchmark-gated
perf change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BfidAJD5AHw23jtvBUNamB
Same whitespace-only reformat as branch claude/jolly-johnson-yso7z7:
PR #326 landed three files that fail cargo fmt --check and its CI run
skipped the Rustfmt job, breaking the check for every later Rust PR.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01GpprjxjtXFYLfXNkoKnHuL
Closes#323.
LoginLockoutService cached failed-attempt counters keyed only on
the username, so any caller that could reach the auth endpoint and
guess (or enumerate) a username could lock that account out for the
entire lockout window — the rate limiter happily lets each IP make
its share of bad-password attempts before clamping, which is enough
to trip the per-account threshold in seconds. The reporter
demonstrated a complete DOS by spoofing X-Forwarded-For with
OXICLOUD_TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true.
Fix: change the lockout cache key from `username` to `username|ip`.
A flood from one IP locks that IP out of that account, but a
legitimate user coming from a different IP is unaffected.
Changes:
- LoginLockoutService::{check, record_failure, record_success} take
client_ip as a second argument; cache key is built via Self::key
(`format!("{username}|{ip}")`).
- middleware/rate_limit.rs: factor out extract_client_ip_from_parts
(HeaderMap + Option<&SocketAddr>) so handlers that don't take a
full Request<B> can still derive the same client identifier
extract_client_ip uses. extract_client_ip now delegates to it.
- auth_handler.rs login: derive client_ip from headers (the only
signal available without ConnectInfo) and pass it through to all
three lockout calls.
- nextcloud/basic_auth_middleware.rs: do the same with the full
Request via extract_client_ip.
Tests:
- Updated existing 4 unit tests to thread an IP arg.
- New does_not_lock_out_other_ips_for_same_account: lock from IP1,
assert IP2 still allowed (the #323 regression).
- New success_resets_only_the_acting_ip: a successful login from
IP2 must NOT clear an attacker's lockout from IP1.
Verification:
- `cargo build` ✅
- `cargo test login_lockout` → 6 passed (4 existing thread an IP
arg without behaviour change, 2 new pin the per-IP scoping).
Signed-off-by: SAY-5 <say.apm35@gmail.com>
Claude