Completes step 1 of docs/plan/derived-blobs.md. The chunk-level
`actual_ref_count` recompute was two correlated subqueries written
inline; it now sums the registered reference sources instead, so
`blobs_consistency` and `dedup_gc` answer "what references this hash"
from one place. If they ever diverged the sweep would bless counts the
collector disagrees with — and the collector wins, destructively.
No behaviour change: the generated expression is the same legacy-files
term (guarded by NOT EXISTS) plus the same manifests-citing-this-chunk
term, and a golden test pins the whole statement byte-for-byte.
Built once at construction, like the reap statement, so the sweep runs
a fixed query per page rather than assembling SQL inside the loop. The
builder refuses an empty registry rather than emitting a query where
every blob looks unreferenced and the entire table reports
refcount_mismatch; there is a test.
DI now constructs one registry and hands the same instance to both
consumers — `DedupService::reference_registry()` is what
`BlobsConsistencyCheck` receives, so agreement is structural rather
than a convention someone has to maintain.
The long comment explaining the single-chunk double-count trap moved
from the query site to the builder's doc comment, where the NOT EXISTS
guard it describes actually lives.
fmt, clippy --all-features --all-targets and the 17 affected unit tests
all clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Prerequisite 0 of docs/plan/derived-blobs.md. The zero-ref manifest
sweep read:
WHERE m.ref_count <= 0
OR NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM storage.files f
WHERE f.blob_hash = m.file_hash)
That OR hardcodes "storage.files is the only thing that can reference a
manifest". A thumbnail manifest held by storage.content_derived_blobs
has ref_count = 1, so the first clause is false — but no files row names
a thumbnail's Blob hash, so NOT EXISTS is true, the OR fires, and the
manifest is deleted, its chunks dereferenced and the bytes reaped on the
next sweep. Landing content_derived_blobs before this fix would destroy
the derived tier on the first GC run.
The second clause is not merely defensive: it is the ONLY reap path for
bulk deletes (user cascade, empty_trash), where the PG trigger touches
storage.blobs but never decrements the manifest and the per-file
cleanup_if_orphaned call is skipped. So the fix has to preserve that
role, not just add tables to the NOT EXISTS. It is now the union of
every registered manifest-level source.
Assembled once, not per sweep. An earlier cut of this change put a
format! inside the DELETE, which made the most dangerous statement in
the file unreadable, un-pasteable into psql, and injection-shaped even
though every input is &'static str. The statement is now built at
construction and stored on DedupService, so:
* the reap loop runs a fixed statement with no string work,
* the SQL string is stable, so prepared-statement cache keys are too,
* a golden test pins it byte-for-byte — a reviewer reads the SQL in
the test rather than mentally evaluating the registry,
* initialize() logs it at debug with the contributing source names,
recovering the "paste it into psql" property the literal had.
The registry is mandatory rather than Option. An empty registry makes
"nothing references it" vacuously true for every row, so the builder
panics instead of emitting a statement that would delete every manifest
in the database; DedupService::new always registers the two built-in
sources, so that panic is unreachable by construction. There is a test
for it.
Adds ref_exists_sql to the port, defaulting to (count) > 0 and
overridden by FilesReferenceSource with a real EXISTS. Without it the
reap predicate would have traded today's short-circuiting NOT EXISTS
for a COUNT(*) = 0 that scans every referrer — a regression precisely
on heavily-deduplicated blobs, which is what GC walks most.
fmt, clippy --all-features --all-targets, and the 11 affected unit
tests all clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Step 1 of docs/plan/derived-blobs.md. Makes "who references this blob
hash" an extension point instead of SQL hardcoded in two places
(dedup_gc's reap predicate and blobs_consistency's refcount recompute,
both naming storage.files and storage.chunk_manifests directly). Adding
a blob-owning table without teaching those two risks silent orphaning:
GC sees ref_count = 0 and reaps live content.
Behaviour is unchanged — this commit only introduces the port and the
two sources that reproduce today's SQL. Wiring follows.
Two levels, not one. add_reference bumps chunk_manifests.ref_count first
and only falls back to storage.blobs.ref_count, so a reference lands on
whichever counter its hash names and the two must be recomputed
separately. RefLevel is a parameter rather than a property of a source,
because storage.files legitimately contributes at both: a manifest-less
legacy row references a chunk, a CDC row references a Blob. The
NOT EXISTS guard on the chunk-level files term is load-bearing — for a
single-chunk file the whole-file hash equals its lone chunk's hash, so
without it the row is counted at both levels.
SQL fragments rather than a per-hash count. blobs_consistency recomputes
with one query per page, the expected count inlined as correlated
subqueries; asking each source for a count per hash would turn that into
sources x rows round-trips. So sources emit a fragment the registry sums
into the existing page query, and count_references exists only for the
on-demand path where the candidate set is already filtered to
ref_count = 0.
Fragments use their own aliases (cnt_f, cnt_m) rather than the sweeps'
outer-row aliases (b, m). A fragment reusing `m` would shadow the outer
alias in the manifest sweep and silently correlate against itself;
there is a test for it.
The SQL builders are free functions so the shape can be asserted without
constructing a pool — sqlx's connect_lazy still needs a Tokio context,
and the fragments are pure string assembly anyway.
9 unit tests. fmt, clippy --all-features --all-targets, build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
link are checking that email matches, +email alias are normalize into email
if email is already used on another account, link is not possible
not usurpation risk as the IDP is choosen by the admin
this make OIDC compliant with the invariant binding (issuer and subject)
admin can now rename their provider without breaking
clarifing federation_kind: report the kind of federation wired not the allowed login method
hybryd login method are still allowed
- POST /api/auth/opaque/login/ke1 (public) — takes {userIdentifier, startLoginRequest}, resolves the identifier via the same @-dispatch as legacy login (AuthApplicationService::lookup_user_for_login, factored out), fetches envelope, runs ServerLogin::start (real branch for known users, dummy branch for anti-enum on unknown/unregistered), stashes state under a random exchange_id in the moka cache, returns {exchangeId, loginResponse}.
- POST /api/auth/opaque/login/ke3 (public) — atomic take from the cache FIRST (anti-enum + anti-replay), then decodes the payload, runs ServerLogin::finish, stamps opaque_migrated_at (Phase 3 signal), and mints a session via the new AuthApplicationService::mint_session_for_authenticated_user helper — returns the same AuthResponseDto shape as legacy login so the SPA has one downstream handler.
- Session mint factored: mint_session_for_authenticated_user(User) extracted from login() so both the legacy password path and OPAQUE KE3 converge through one implementation.
- OpaqueRepositoryPort::mark_migrated with COALESCE-preserving idempotent stamp of opaque_migrated_at.
- opaque-setup CLI + Dockerfile wiring already shipped (Step 0 hygiene).
- Routing fix: sub-prefix split (/api/auth/opaque/register vs /api/auth/opaque/login) — axum composes middleware between sibling nests at the same prefix, which was cross-applying auth+CSRF to my public login routes. Distinct prefixes side-step that cleanly. Documented in both main.rs and the router builder doc.
- Rate-limit sharing: login KE1/KE3 layered with the SAME login_limiter instance as legacy POST /api/auth/login, so an attacker can't halve the per-IP budget by spraying both endpoints.
Anti-enum + anti-replay hardening in KE3: take runs BEFORE payload parse so:
- Unknown / expired / already-consumed exchange_id → 401 InvalidCredentials (same shape as wrong-passphrase, no payload-shape leak)
- Consumed handle can't be re-used to spam parse attempts
OPAQUE (RFC 9807) implementation (using `opaque-ke` crate)
with opaque authentfication, server will never receive the password (in the auth=password mode)
this is a must have to create trust with users to permit end to end encryption in the future
(we cannot know if user use the same password/passphrase for his asymetric key or his oxicloud auth,
this is why server must never have the password)
pass1: prepare server
add `auto_redirect_if_standalone_oidc` in `OXICLOUD_AUTH_POLICIES`
let admin decide to redirect immediately to IdP if OIDC is the only auth method enabled
Prevent services accessing directly to localstorage and prefer using an astraction layer
to expose full blob. The abstraction layer (dedup services) will cover backend storage
election (local, s3, ...), encryption, etc
This change permit audio_metadata_service, media_metadaa_service, face_indexing_service to handle
blobs without worring of the backend.
note: prefered way to handle blob is the streamed way. Some services may not have this possibility
a job can be paused/resumed
a job as an exclusibity by it's name
if you want to run another job with same name:
either cancel the first one, or wait of it's terminaison
pause does not permit to run the other job, this can create
race conditions
if target blob already exists, migration will check the blob
if header is already with the targeted key (or no key if not ciphered) no need write
otherwise write the blob (that will convert any blob with no header into the correct version)
Edouard Vanbelle