Files
Oxicloud/src/interfaces/middleware/rate_limit.rs
T
Claude 221c1f31b0 perf: round 11 — StoragePath joined-only, classifier fusion, memoized bodies, query-shape pack, SPA fine-grained stars
Backend (each change benchmark-gated with BEFORE replicas + equivalence
gates; see examples/bench_round11_micro.rs, bench_round11_queries.rs,
bench_log_writer.rs and benches/ROUND11.md — final numbers land in the
follow-up doc commit):

- StoragePath re-representation: single canonical joined String, segments
  derived on demand; File/Folder drop the duplicated path_string field
  (4000→1000 allocs per 500-row listing page)
- Display classifier fusion: classify_display shares one stack-lowered
  extension across the three decision trees; call sites in FileDto,
  folder/favorites/recent handlers, trash, path-resolver (+ interning
  where Arc::from was still used)
- /status.php and /openapi.json memoized into OnceLock<Bytes> (openapi
  rebuilt a 171 KiB spec per request: 2.8 ms → 18 ns)
- NC upload-session PROPFIND: write! + pre-sized body + stack RFC2822
  dates (2.3-2.6x, 2582→772 allocs at 256 chunks)
- REST download: dead FileDto clone removed (capture mime/size + move)
- CalendarEventDto/TrashedItem into_parts moves (11 KiB ical_data memcpy
  gone per CalDAV row); CardDAV getlastmodified stack render
- 4xx path: borrowed ErrorResponse serialize, ErrorKind::as_str,
  not_found/already_exists clone kill
- vCard emit via write!; search page moved out with into_iter skip/take;
  content-hit UUIDs parsed once; group last-user check via HashSet
- RateLimiter: lock-free get + insert (and_upsert_with variant REJECTED
  by benchmark); CSRF token borrow-compare + borrowed cookie extraction
- Thumbnail/preview ETags built from as_str (Debug-identical bytes)
- Encrypted backend: encrypt_in_place_detached single-buffer write path,
  chunk-sized reserve in collect_stream; retry labels made lazy
- PG: deferred upload registration 3→1 round-trips (persist_file CTE
  template); direct_grant_cache for Calendar/AddressBook/Playlist authz
  (single-flight + set_role/clear_role invalidation); expand_user
  tokio::join!; geo clusters min(uuid)::text; recluster face assignment
  batched into one UNNEST update
- People recluster cosine: norms precomputed once (bit-identical gate)
- NC capabilities poll logs demoted to debug; tracing-appender dep added
  for the log-writer benchmark

Frontend:
- ResourceList.selectedEntries O(N)-per-toggle → id-index projection
  O(k log k); favorites/recent consume the batchToolbar snippet param and
  drop their duplicate filter + dead selectedIds mirror
- Recent: star state via new favoriteIds prop — a star click no longer
  rebuilds all N entries
- admin timeAgo >30d fallback uses the cached Intl.DateTimeFormat
- vitest gates in src/lib/components/round11.bench.test.ts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ABhTEHuGujvwoodh67Kga7
2026-07-18 22:02:00 +00:00

176 lines
6.1 KiB
Rust

//! IP-based rate limiting middleware for authentication endpoints.
//!
//! Uses `moka` TTL caches (already a project dependency) to track request
//! counts per client IP. Each protected endpoint group gets its own
//! [`RateLimiter`] instance with independently tuneable limits.
//!
//! Client IP resolution is delegated to [`super::trusted_proxy::client_ip`],
//! which honours `OXICLOUD_TRUST_PROXY_CIDR` for proxy-header forwarding.
//!
//! When the limit is exceeded a `429 Too Many Requests` response is returned
//! with a `Retry-After` header indicating how many seconds to wait.
use axum::{
http::{HeaderValue, Request, StatusCode},
middleware::Next,
response::{IntoResponse, Response},
};
use moka::sync::Cache;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
/// A simple sliding-window counter keyed by IP address.
///
/// Each key lives for `window` seconds; every request increments the counter.
/// Once the counter reaches `max_requests` the request is rejected.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct RateLimiter {
/// Maps `IP -> request_count` with automatic TTL expiration.
cache: Cache<String, u32>,
/// Maximum requests allowed within the window.
max_requests: u32,
/// Window duration in seconds (also used for `Retry-After`).
window_secs: u64,
}
impl RateLimiter {
/// Create a new rate limiter.
///
/// * `max_requests`, ceiling per IP within the window
/// * `window_secs` , sliding window duration
/// * `max_entries` , upper bound on tracked IPs (evicts LRU when exceeded)
pub fn new(max_requests: u32, window_secs: u64, max_entries: u64) -> Self {
let cache = Cache::builder()
.time_to_live(Duration::from_secs(window_secs))
.max_capacity(max_entries)
.build();
Self {
cache,
max_requests,
window_secs,
}
}
/// Check whether the IP is allowed. Returns `Ok(current_count)` or
/// `Err(StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS)`.
#[allow(clippy::result_unit_err)]
pub fn check_and_increment(&self, ip: &str) -> Result<u32, ()> {
// Lock-free read (borrows the key — no allocation), then one
// write-back. The previous shape allocated the key TWICE and paid
// a locking `entry()` op on top of the insert; moka's
// `and_upsert_with` alternative benchmarked slower still
// (benches/ROUND11.md §20). Read-then-write is not atomic, but it
// never was — under a concurrent burst both shapes can undercount
// the same way, which only makes the limiter marginally lenient,
// never wrongly strict.
let count = self.cache.get(ip).unwrap_or(0) + 1;
// On re-insert moka resets the TTL; for rate limiting this is fine
// because it means the window "slides" forward on activity.
self.cache.insert(ip.to_string(), count);
if count > self.max_requests {
Err(())
} else {
Ok(count)
}
}
/// Seconds the client should wait before retrying.
pub fn retry_after(&self) -> u64 {
self.window_secs
}
}
// ─── Axum middleware factories ──────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Extract the most-likely real client IP from headers / connection info.
///
/// Proxy headers (`X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-Ip`) are only trusted when the
/// TCP peer address falls within `OXICLOUD_TRUST_PROXY_CIDR`. Without a
/// configured CIDR list an attacker could spoof headers to bypass rate limiting.
pub fn extract_client_ip<B>(req: &Request<B>) -> String {
super::trusted_proxy::client_ip(req, false)
}
/// Build a rate-limit response with the standard `Retry-After` header.
///
/// Public so handlers that do their own (non-middleware) rate checks —
/// e.g. the email-invite branch of `POST /api/grants`, where the limit
/// only applies to one subject variant — can return the same shape.
pub fn too_many_requests(retry_after: u64) -> Response {
let body = serde_json::json!({
"error": "Too many requests",
"retry_after_secs": retry_after,
});
let mut resp = (StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, axum::Json(body)).into_response();
if let Ok(val) = HeaderValue::from_str(&retry_after.to_string()) {
resp.headers_mut().insert("retry-after", val);
}
resp
}
/// Axum middleware: rate-limit login attempts.
///
/// Inject via:
/// ```ignore
/// .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(limiter, rate_limit_login))
/// ```
pub async fn rate_limit_login(
State(limiter): axum::extract::State<Arc<RateLimiter>>,
req: Request<axum::body::Body>,
next: Next,
) -> Response {
let ip = extract_client_ip(&req);
match limiter.check_and_increment(&ip) {
Ok(_) => next.run(req).await,
Err(()) => {
tracing::warn!(
ip = %ip,
"Rate limit exceeded on login endpoint"
);
too_many_requests(limiter.retry_after())
}
}
}
/// Axum middleware: rate-limit registration attempts.
pub async fn rate_limit_register(
State(limiter): axum::extract::State<Arc<RateLimiter>>,
req: Request<axum::body::Body>,
next: Next,
) -> Response {
let ip = extract_client_ip(&req);
match limiter.check_and_increment(&ip) {
Ok(_) => next.run(req).await,
Err(()) => {
tracing::warn!(
ip = %ip,
"Rate limit exceeded on register endpoint"
);
too_many_requests(limiter.retry_after())
}
}
}
/// Axum middleware: rate-limit token refresh attempts.
pub async fn rate_limit_refresh(
State(limiter): axum::extract::State<Arc<RateLimiter>>,
req: Request<axum::body::Body>,
next: Next,
) -> Response {
let ip = extract_client_ip(&req);
match limiter.check_and_increment(&ip) {
Ok(_) => next.run(req).await,
Err(()) => {
tracing::warn!(
ip = %ip,
"Rate limit exceeded on refresh endpoint"
);
too_many_requests(limiter.retry_after())
}
}
}
use axum::extract::State;