Files
Oxicloud/src/domain/entities/user.rs
T
Edouard Vanbelle 5fab0532dc feat(user): add given_name/family_name auth.users
reflect OIDC
  schema migration, User entity additions, and three defense-in-depth gaps closed, with all 280 unit tests and 13 Hurl files green
  infrastructure (lettre + EmailSender port).

  - Migration migrations/20260612000003_users_username_email_login.sql — adds nullable given_name/family_name columns to auth.users.
  - User entity (src/domain/entities/user.rs) — has_login_credential() placeholder-check encapsulation, set_username revalidating setter, given/family-name fields + getters/setters, validate_username widened 32→254 and now accepts email shape.
  from_data_full extended with two new params; all 7 callsites in user_pg_repository.rs updated.
  - Schema-side legacy guards (src/application/services/auth_application_service.rs) — bumped the duplicated 32-char check in setup_create_admin and admin_create_user to 254 to match.
  - Gap #1 (subject_group_service.rs) — add_member now rejects external candidates with an audit-logged AccessDenied. Service gained an Arc<UserPgRepository> field, wired through DI. New integration test test_external_user_cannot_be_added_as_member.
  - Gap #2 (user_repository.rs + auth_ports.rs + user_pg_repository.rs) — list_users/search_users gained an include_external: bool param defaulting effectively to false everywhere internal-user-facing. auth_application_service exposes a new
  list_users_including_external for the admin surface.
  - Gap #3 (pg_acl_engine.rs) — expand_user now SELECTs is_external and skips INTERNAL_GROUP_ID for externals; defaults to is_external=true on missing user to fail closed.
2026-06-03 00:31:59 +02:00

519 lines
17 KiB
Rust

use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use uuid::Uuid;
// Re-export entity errors from the centralized module
pub use super::entity_errors::{UserError, UserResult};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
// We'll handle conversion manually for now until the type is properly set up in the database
pub enum UserRole {
Admin,
User,
}
impl std::fmt::Display for UserRole {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> std::fmt::Result {
match self {
UserRole::Admin => write!(f, "admin"),
UserRole::User => write!(f, "user"),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct User {
id: Uuid,
username: String,
email: String,
password_hash: String,
role: UserRole,
storage_quota_bytes: i64,
storage_used_bytes: i64,
created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
active: bool,
oidc_provider: Option<String>,
oidc_subject: Option<String>,
image: Option<String>,
/// TRUE = grant-only external recipient (magic-link, OIDC-only, OCM
/// federated). FALSE = storage-owning internal user. Hooks that
/// provision per-user resources (home folder, default calendar, …)
/// must short-circuit when `is_external` is TRUE — see tip #2 in
/// `application/ports/user_lifecycle.rs`. The DB CHECK constraint
/// `users_external_no_storage` is the schema-level safety net.
is_external: bool,
/// Optional human-readable first/given name. Populated from OIDC
/// standard claim `given_name` at JIT provisioning, or via the
/// profile-edit endpoint. External users start with `None`.
given_name: Option<String>,
/// Optional human-readable last/family name. Populated from OIDC
/// standard claim `family_name` at JIT provisioning, or via the
/// profile-edit endpoint. External users start with `None`.
family_name: Option<String>,
}
impl User {
/// Create a new user with a pre-hashed password.
///
/// The password hashing should be done externally using PasswordHasherPort
/// to maintain clean architecture and keep cryptographic dependencies
/// out of the domain layer.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `username` - User's username (3-254 characters; may be an email)
/// * `email` - User's email address
/// * `password_hash` - Pre-hashed password (from PasswordHasherPort)
/// * `role` - User's role
/// * `storage_quota_bytes` - Storage quota in bytes
pub fn new(
username: String,
email: String,
password_hash: String,
role: UserRole,
storage_quota_bytes: i64,
) -> UserResult<Self> {
// Validations
Self::validate_username(&username)?;
Self::validate_email(&email)?;
if password_hash.is_empty() {
return Err(UserError::InvalidPassword(
"Password hash cannot be empty".to_string(),
));
}
let now = Utc::now();
Ok(Self {
id: Uuid::new_v4(),
username,
email,
password_hash,
role,
storage_quota_bytes,
storage_used_bytes: 0,
created_at: now,
updated_at: now,
last_login_at: None,
active: true,
oidc_provider: None,
oidc_subject: None,
image: None,
is_external: false,
given_name: None,
family_name: None,
})
}
/// Create a new OIDC-authenticated user (no password required).
pub fn new_oidc(
username: String,
email: String,
role: UserRole,
storage_quota_bytes: i64,
oidc_provider: String,
oidc_subject: String,
) -> UserResult<Self> {
Self::validate_username(&username)?;
Self::validate_email(&email)?;
let now = Utc::now();
Ok(Self {
id: Uuid::new_v4(),
username,
email,
password_hash: "__OIDC_NO_PASSWORD__".to_string(),
role,
storage_quota_bytes,
storage_used_bytes: 0,
created_at: now,
updated_at: now,
last_login_at: None,
active: true,
oidc_provider: Some(oidc_provider),
oidc_subject: Some(oidc_subject),
image: None,
is_external: false,
given_name: None,
family_name: None,
})
}
/// Create a new external user — magic-link / OIDC-only / OCM-federated
/// recipient who does NOT own storage. The `CHECK (NOT is_external OR
/// storage_used_bytes = 0)` DB constraint enforces the no-storage rule
/// at the schema level.
///
/// **External users are always `UserRole::User`** — there is no role
/// parameter because admin + external is an explicitly forbidden
/// combination enforced by the `users_external_not_admin` DB CHECK
/// constraint. Granting admin to a federated principal would let
/// external identity providers indirectly manage the local instance.
/// To make an external user an admin: first convert them to internal
/// (`UPDATE auth.users SET is_external = FALSE`), then update role.
/// The two-step process is intentional friction.
///
/// Quota is set to 0 because external users can't upload content
/// into any folder they own (they have no folder). They can only
/// act on grants the resource owner provides — which counts against
/// the owner's quota, not theirs.
pub fn new_external(username: String, email: String) -> UserResult<Self> {
Self::validate_username(&username)?;
Self::validate_email(&email)?;
let now = Utc::now();
Ok(Self {
id: Uuid::new_v4(),
username,
email,
password_hash: "__EXTERNAL_NO_PASSWORD__".to_string(),
role: UserRole::User,
storage_quota_bytes: 0,
storage_used_bytes: 0,
created_at: now,
updated_at: now,
last_login_at: None,
active: true,
oidc_provider: None,
oidc_subject: None,
image: None,
is_external: true,
given_name: None,
family_name: None,
})
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub fn from_data(
id: Uuid,
username: String,
email: String,
password_hash: String,
role: UserRole,
storage_quota_bytes: i64,
storage_used_bytes: i64,
created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
active: bool,
) -> Self {
Self {
id,
username,
email,
password_hash,
role,
storage_quota_bytes,
storage_used_bytes,
created_at,
updated_at,
last_login_at,
active,
oidc_provider: None,
oidc_subject: None,
image: None,
// `from_data` is the minimal-args reconstruction path used by
// tests and JWT-claim-based principal hydration (which doesn't
// carry `is_external`). Default to FALSE — JWT-validated
// principals are existing internal users; magic-link external
// sessions take a different path that hydrates from DB via
// `from_data_full`.
is_external: false,
given_name: None,
family_name: None,
}
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub fn from_data_full(
id: Uuid,
username: String,
email: String,
password_hash: String,
role: UserRole,
storage_quota_bytes: i64,
storage_used_bytes: i64,
created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
active: bool,
oidc_provider: Option<String>,
oidc_subject: Option<String>,
image: Option<String>,
is_external: bool,
given_name: Option<String>,
family_name: Option<String>,
) -> Self {
Self {
id,
username,
email,
password_hash,
role,
storage_quota_bytes,
storage_used_bytes,
created_at,
updated_at,
last_login_at,
active,
oidc_provider,
oidc_subject,
image,
is_external,
given_name,
family_name,
}
}
// Getters
pub fn id(&self) -> Uuid {
self.id
}
pub fn username(&self) -> &str {
&self.username
}
pub fn email(&self) -> &str {
&self.email
}
pub fn role(&self) -> UserRole {
self.role
}
pub fn storage_quota_bytes(&self) -> i64 {
self.storage_quota_bytes
}
pub fn storage_used_bytes(&self) -> i64 {
self.storage_used_bytes
}
pub fn created_at(&self) -> DateTime<Utc> {
self.created_at
}
pub fn updated_at(&self) -> DateTime<Utc> {
self.updated_at
}
pub fn last_login_at(&self) -> Option<DateTime<Utc>> {
self.last_login_at
}
pub fn is_active(&self) -> bool {
self.active
}
pub fn password_hash(&self) -> &str {
&self.password_hash
}
pub fn oidc_provider(&self) -> Option<&str> {
self.oidc_provider.as_deref()
}
pub fn oidc_subject(&self) -> Option<&str> {
self.oidc_subject.as_deref()
}
pub fn image(&self) -> Option<&str> {
self.image.as_deref()
}
/// `TRUE` for grant-only external recipients (magic-link, OIDC-only,
/// OCM federated). Hooks provisioning per-user resources must
/// short-circuit when this returns `true` — see tip #2 in
/// `application/ports/user_lifecycle.rs`.
pub fn is_external(&self) -> bool {
self.is_external
}
pub fn given_name(&self) -> Option<&str> {
self.given_name.as_deref()
}
pub fn family_name(&self) -> Option<&str> {
self.family_name.as_deref()
}
pub fn set_image(&mut self, image: Option<String>) {
self.image = image;
self.updated_at = Utc::now();
}
pub fn set_given_name(&mut self, given_name: Option<String>) {
self.given_name = given_name;
self.updated_at = Utc::now();
}
pub fn set_family_name(&mut self, family_name: Option<String>) {
self.family_name = family_name;
self.updated_at = Utc::now();
}
/// Mutate the username after creation. Runs the same validation as the
/// constructor — callers must still ensure uniqueness at the repo
/// level. Bumps `updated_at`. Used by the post-create profile-edit
/// endpoint so a user invited with `username = email` can switch to a
/// shorter handle later. The home folder name is NOT renamed: it was
/// display text at creation; the folder is owned by `user_id`.
pub fn set_username(&mut self, new_username: String) -> UserResult<()> {
Self::validate_username(&new_username)?;
self.username = new_username;
self.updated_at = Utc::now();
Ok(())
}
/// Returns true if this is an OIDC-only user (no password)
pub fn is_oidc_user(&self) -> bool {
self.oidc_provider.is_some()
}
/// Returns true iff this user has any non-magic-link authentication
/// method available — either a real (non-placeholder) password hash,
/// or a linked OIDC subject. Magic-link auto-authentication is only
/// offered for accounts without any of these.
///
/// The placeholder-string approach is a known smell; a future
/// `auth.user_auth_methods` side-table will replace it. Migrating that
/// refactor touches only this method's body — every magic-link
/// eligibility check goes through here.
pub fn has_login_credential(&self) -> bool {
let has_password = self.password_hash != "__EXTERNAL_NO_PASSWORD__"
&& self.password_hash != "__OIDC_NO_PASSWORD__";
has_password || self.oidc_subject.is_some()
}
/// Update the password hash.
///
/// The new password should be hashed externally using PasswordHasherPort
/// before calling this method.
pub fn update_password_hash(&mut self, new_hash: String) {
self.password_hash = new_hash;
self.updated_at = Utc::now();
}
// Update storage usage
pub fn update_storage_used(&mut self, storage_used_bytes: i64) {
self.storage_used_bytes = storage_used_bytes;
self.updated_at = Utc::now();
}
// Register login
pub fn register_login(&mut self) {
let now = Utc::now();
self.last_login_at = Some(now);
self.updated_at = now;
}
// Deactivate user
pub fn deactivate(&mut self) {
self.active = false;
self.updated_at = Utc::now();
}
// Activate user
pub fn activate(&mut self) {
self.active = true;
self.updated_at = Utc::now();
}
// ── Shared validation helpers ──────────────────────────────────────
/// Usernames must be 3-254 chars. Two accepted shapes:
///
/// - **Traditional**: ASCII alphanumerics, hyphens, underscores, and
/// dots. No leading/trailing dot or hyphen. Capped at 254 chars
/// (well above the historical 32-char limit, but still safe — the
/// real upper bound is RFC 5321's email cap for the email shape).
/// - **Email-as-username**: must contain `@` and pass `validate_email`.
/// External users created from invite-by-email get their normalized
/// email as username; internal users may opt into this if they
/// prefer their email as their handle.
///
/// Both shapes prevent XSS payloads like `<img/src=x>` from being
/// stored as usernames — the traditional shape via the explicit
/// character set, the email shape via `validate_email`'s rejection of
/// `<`, `>`, quotes, whitespace, etc.
fn validate_username(username: &str) -> UserResult<()> {
if username.len() < 3 || username.len() > 254 {
return Err(UserError::InvalidUsername(
"Username must be between 3 and 254 characters".to_string(),
));
}
if username.contains('@') {
// Email shape — defer to the email validator (which checks the
// forbidden-character set and the local-part / domain structure).
return Self::validate_email(username).map_err(|e| match e {
UserError::ValidationError(m) => {
UserError::InvalidUsername(format!("Invalid email-as-username: {}", m))
}
other => other,
});
}
if !username
.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_' || c == '.')
{
return Err(UserError::InvalidUsername(
"Username may only contain letters, digits, hyphens, underscores, and dots"
.to_string(),
));
}
// Disallow leading/trailing dots or hyphens
if username.starts_with('.')
|| username.starts_with('-')
|| username.ends_with('.')
|| username.ends_with('-')
{
return Err(UserError::InvalidUsername(
"Username must not start or end with a dot or hyphen".to_string(),
));
}
Ok(())
}
/// Basic but meaningful email validation:
/// - Must contain exactly one `@`
/// - Local part and domain must be non-empty
/// - Domain must contain at least one dot
/// - No angle brackets, spaces, or other characters used in XSS payloads
fn validate_email(email: &str) -> UserResult<()> {
let parts: Vec<&str> = email.splitn(2, '@').collect();
if parts.len() != 2 {
return Err(UserError::ValidationError(
"Invalid email: missing @".to_string(),
));
}
let (local, domain) = (parts[0], parts[1]);
if local.is_empty() || domain.is_empty() {
return Err(UserError::ValidationError(
"Invalid email: empty local part or domain".to_string(),
));
}
if !domain.contains('.') {
return Err(UserError::ValidationError(
"Invalid email: domain must contain a dot".to_string(),
));
}
// Reject characters commonly used in XSS / header injection
let forbidden = [
'<', '>', '"', '\'', '\\', ' ', '\t', '\n', '\r', '(', ')', ',', ';',
];
if email.chars().any(|c| forbidden.contains(&c)) {
return Err(UserError::ValidationError(
"Invalid email: contains forbidden characters".to_string(),
));
}
if email.len() > 254 {
return Err(UserError::ValidationError(
"Invalid email: too long (max 254 characters)".to_string(),
));
}
Ok(())
}
}