3fe6af25f1
fix issues like:
```
Executing inline script violates the following Content Security Policy directive 'script-src 'self''.
Either the 'unsafe-inline' keyword, a hash ('sha256-Vv9My0PApDW3C+xGLu9cH98KLrOg/Qhc7hlT1lK5tyM='),
or a nonce ('nonce-...') is required to enable inline execution. The action has been blocked.
```
329 lines
13 KiB
Rust
329 lines
13 KiB
Rust
use crate::common::config::AppConfig;
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use crate::common::di::AppState;
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use axum::Router;
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use axum::http::header::{CACHE_CONTROL, HeaderValue};
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use axum::routing::get_service;
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use base64::Engine as _;
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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use std::collections::BTreeSet;
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use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use tower_http::compression::CompressionLayer;
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use tower_http::services::{ServeDir, ServeFile};
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use tower_http::set_header::SetResponseHeaderLayer;
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/// Resolve the directory the SPA is actually served from.
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///
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/// Prefers the Vite build output (`static-dist/`) sitting next to the configured
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/// static path, falling back to the configured path itself — the container ships
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/// the built SPA straight to `OXICLOUD_STATIC_PATH` (default `./static`), so there
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/// the fallback is what serves. Shared with the CSP layer in `main.rs` so the
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/// inline-script hashes are computed from exactly the bytes that get served.
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pub fn resolve_static_path(config: &AppConfig) -> PathBuf {
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let dist = config
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.static_path
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.parent()
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.unwrap_or(Path::new("."))
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.join("static-dist");
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if dist.exists() {
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return dist;
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}
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config.static_path.clone()
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}
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/// Serves the SvelteKit single-page app.
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///
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/// The frontend is built by Vite into `static-dist/` (repo root). Real files are
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/// served from disk; any unmatched client route (deep links such as
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/// `/files/<id>`, `/s/<token>`, `/login`) falls back to the SPA shell
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/// `index.html`, which boots the client router.
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///
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/// Caching: content-hashed assets under `/_app/immutable` are cached forever;
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/// everything else — crucially the `index.html` shell — is `no-cache` so a deploy
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/// can't leave a stale app pinned in browsers.
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pub fn create_web_routes() -> Router<Arc<AppState>> {
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let config = AppConfig::from_env();
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let static_path = resolve_static_path(&config);
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// SPA fallback: serve the file if it exists, else the app shell.
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let spa = ServeDir::new(&static_path).fallback(ServeFile::new(static_path.join("index.html")));
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// Hashed, immutable assets (SvelteKit emits these under /_app/immutable).
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let app_immutable = ServeDir::new(static_path.join("_app").join("immutable"));
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Router::new()
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.nest_service(
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"/_app/immutable",
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get_service(app_immutable).layer(SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(
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CACHE_CONTROL,
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HeaderValue::from_static("public, max-age=31536000, immutable"),
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)),
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)
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.fallback_service(spa)
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.layer(CompressionLayer::new().br(true).gzip(true))
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// `if_not_present` so the immutable assets above keep their long cache;
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// the shell itself must always revalidate so a deploy can't pin a stale
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// app in browsers.
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.layer(SetResponseHeaderLayer::if_not_present(
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CACHE_CONTROL,
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HeaderValue::from_static("no-cache"),
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))
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}
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/// Build the `content-security-policy` header value served on every response.
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///
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/// `script-src` stays strict — `'self'` with **no** `'unsafe-inline'` — and
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/// additionally lists a `'sha256-…'` source for each inline `<script>` found in
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/// the served HTML shells: the anti-FOUC theme init in `app.html` and
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/// SvelteKit's hydration bootstrap. Without those hashes the browser blocks the
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/// bootstrap and the SPA never mounts (a blank page behind the splash spinner).
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/// Hashes are recomputed from the built assets on every startup, so a frontend
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/// rebuild needs no edit here.
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///
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/// Other directives:
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/// - `style-src` keeps `'unsafe-inline'` because the frontend sets inline styles
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/// (`element.style.*`) for UI state — impractical to migrate to classes.
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/// - `frame-src` lists `blob:` explicitly (`*` only matches network schemes) for
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/// inline PDF/document viewers; `media-src` lists `blob:` for blob video/audio.
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/// - `worker-src` lists `blob:` because MapLibre GL (the Places map) spawns its
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/// web worker from a blob URL; `'self'` covers same-origin workers like the
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/// delta-upload worker.
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pub fn content_security_policy(config: &AppConfig) -> String {
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let static_path = resolve_static_path(config);
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let hashes = inline_script_csp_hashes(&static_path);
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if hashes.is_empty() {
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tracing::warn!(
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static_path = %static_path.display(),
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"CSP: no inline <script> hashes computed — if the SPA shell ships \
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inline scripts they will be blocked by script-src 'self'. Check the \
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static asset path (OXICLOUD_STATIC_PATH)."
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);
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}
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// `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` is required for WebAssembly compilation/instantiation
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// under a strict CSP (Chromium blocks `WebAssembly.instantiate` otherwise with
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// "Wasm code generation disallowed by embedder"). The frontend instantiates the
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// vendored BLAKE3/FastCDC WASM both on the main thread (instant by-hash uploads)
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// and inside the delta-upload worker; without this they throw and every large
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// file silently falls back to a plain byte upload. It is the WASM-only, safe
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// variant — it does NOT permit `eval()`/`new Function()` (no `'unsafe-eval'`).
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let mut script_src = String::from("script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'");
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for hash in &hashes {
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script_src.push(' ');
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script_src.push_str(hash);
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}
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format!(
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"default-src 'self'; \
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{script_src}; \
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worker-src 'self' blob:; \
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style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; \
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img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; \
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media-src 'self' blob:; \
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connect-src 'self'; \
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font-src 'self' data:; \
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frame-src * blob:; \
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frame-ancestors 'none'; \
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base-uri 'self'; \
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form-action 'self'"
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)
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}
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/// SHA-256 CSP source expressions (`'sha256-…'`) for every inline `<script>` in
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/// the root-level HTML shells under `static_path`.
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///
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/// The browser hashes the exact bytes between `<script …>` and `</script>`, so
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/// each shell is read verbatim and that slice hashed. Scripts carrying a `src`
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/// attribute are external (already allowed by `'self'`) and skipped. Only the
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/// directory root is scanned — the SPA is client-rendered (SSR/prerender off),
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/// so the only inline-script shell is `index.html`. Returns a deduplicated,
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/// sorted list; empty when the dir is unreadable
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/// (e.g. a Vite dev server serving HTML on its own port instead).
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fn inline_script_csp_hashes(static_path: &Path) -> Vec<String> {
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let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(static_path) else {
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return Vec::new();
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};
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let mut hashes = BTreeSet::new();
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for entry in entries.flatten() {
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let path = entry.path();
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if path.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()) != Some("html") {
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continue;
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}
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let Ok(html) = std::fs::read_to_string(&path) else {
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continue;
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};
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for script in inline_scripts(&html) {
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hashes.insert(csp_hash(script));
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}
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}
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hashes.into_iter().collect()
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}
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/// The CSP `'sha256-<base64>'` source expression for one inline script body.
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fn csp_hash(script: &str) -> String {
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let digest = Sha256::digest(script.as_bytes());
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let encoded = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(digest);
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format!("'sha256-{encoded}'")
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}
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/// Text content of every inline `<script>` (no `src`) in `html`, returned as
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/// byte-exact slices suitable for CSP hashing.
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///
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/// Skips HTML comments (`<!-- ... -->`) before matching `<script`. Without this,
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/// a comment containing the literal string `<script>` (e.g. the theme-init
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/// explanatory block in the SvelteKit shell) causes the scanner to match the
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/// comment first, consume through the real script's `</script>`, and emit the
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/// wrong hash — the real inline script then fails CSP with `script-src 'self'`.
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fn inline_scripts(html: &str) -> Vec<&str> {
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let mut scripts = Vec::new();
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let mut cursor = 0;
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while cursor < html.len() {
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let tail = &html[cursor..];
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// Skip past HTML comments — they may contain the literal
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// string `<script>` in prose and would otherwise poison the
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// scanner. Comment-nesting is not a spec concern.
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let next_comment = find_ci(tail, "<!--");
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let next_script = find_ci(tail, "<script");
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match (next_comment, next_script) {
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(Some(c), Some(s)) if c < s => {
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let end_rel = find_ci(&tail[c + 4..], "-->").map(|r| c + 4 + r + 3);
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cursor = match end_rel {
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Some(e) => cursor + e,
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None => break, // unterminated comment; give up
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};
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continue;
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}
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(Some(c), None) => {
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let end_rel = find_ci(&tail[c + 4..], "-->").map(|r| c + 4 + r + 3);
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cursor = match end_rel {
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Some(e) => cursor + e,
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None => break,
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};
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continue;
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}
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(None, None) => break,
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_ => {} // next thing is a real <script
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}
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let rel = next_script.unwrap();
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let tag_start = cursor + rel;
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// End of the opening tag.
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let Some(gt) = html[tag_start..].find('>') else {
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break;
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};
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let open_tag = &html[tag_start..tag_start + gt + 1];
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let content_start = tag_start + gt + 1;
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// Matching close tag.
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let Some(close_rel) = find_ci(&html[content_start..], "</script>") else {
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break;
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};
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let content_end = content_start + close_rel;
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if !opening_tag_has_src(open_tag) {
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scripts.push(&html[content_start..content_end]);
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}
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cursor = content_end + "</script>".len();
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}
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scripts
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}
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/// Whether a `<script …>` opening tag carries a `src` attribute (i.e. it loads
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/// an external file rather than inlining code).
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fn opening_tag_has_src(open_tag: &str) -> bool {
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open_tag
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.to_ascii_lowercase()
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.split(|c: char| c.is_whitespace() || c == '/')
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.any(|token| token == "src" || token.starts_with("src="))
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}
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/// ASCII-case-insensitive substring search. The returned byte offset is a valid
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/// `str` boundary because `needle` (and therefore every matched byte) is ASCII.
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fn find_ci(haystack: &str, needle: &str) -> Option<usize> {
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let (hay, ndl) = (haystack.as_bytes(), needle.as_bytes());
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if ndl.is_empty() || hay.len() < ndl.len() {
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return None;
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}
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(0..=hay.len() - ndl.len())
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.find(|&start| hay[start..start + ndl.len()].eq_ignore_ascii_case(ndl))
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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#[test]
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fn extracts_inline_script_content_verbatim() {
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// Leading/trailing whitespace inside the tag is part of what the browser
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// hashes, so it must be preserved exactly.
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let html = "<head><script>\n alert(1);\n</script></head>";
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assert_eq!(inline_scripts(html), vec!["\n alert(1);\n"]);
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}
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#[test]
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fn skips_external_src_scripts() {
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let html = r#"<script src="/app.js"></script><script>boot();</script>"#;
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assert_eq!(inline_scripts(html), vec!["boot();"]);
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}
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#[test]
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fn keeps_inline_module_skips_module_with_src() {
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let html =
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r#"<script type="module" src="/x.js"></script><script type="module">go();</script>"#;
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assert_eq!(inline_scripts(html), vec!["go();"]);
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}
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#[test]
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fn case_insensitive_tag_matching() {
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let html = "<SCRIPT>run();</SCRIPT>";
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assert_eq!(inline_scripts(html), vec!["run();"]);
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}
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#[test]
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fn empty_inline_script_hash_matches_known_sha256_vector() {
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// SHA-256 of the empty string, base64 — the canonical empty digest.
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assert_eq!(
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csp_hash(""),
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"'sha256-47DEQpj8HBSa+/TImW+5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU='"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn identical_scripts_produce_one_deduplicated_hash() {
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let html = "<script>x()</script><script>x()</script>";
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let mut set = BTreeSet::new();
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for s in inline_scripts(html) {
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set.insert(csp_hash(s));
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}
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assert_eq!(set.len(), 1);
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}
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#[test]
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fn html_comment_mentioning_script_does_not_poison_scanner() {
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// The SvelteKit shell has an explanatory comment referring to
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// `<script>` in its prose (see static-dist/index.html theme-init
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// block). Without comment skipping the scanner matches the
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// comment's substring first, consumes through the real script's
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// close tag, and emits the wrong hash — the real script then
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// fails CSP with `script-src 'self'`.
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let html = concat!(
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"<!-- svelte.config.js finds this <script> by id and adds its hash -->\n",
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"<script id=\"theme-init\">alert(1);</script>\n",
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"<script>boot();</script>\n",
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);
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let scripts = inline_scripts(html);
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assert_eq!(scripts, vec!["alert(1);", "boot();"]);
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}
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#[test]
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fn unterminated_comment_bails_out_gracefully() {
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// Malformed input: `<!--` never closed. Must not loop forever
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// and must not falsely capture anything downstream.
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let html = "<!-- unterminated <script>evil()</script>";
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assert!(inline_scripts(html).is_empty());
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}
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#[test]
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fn distinct_scripts_produce_distinct_hashes() {
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assert_ne!(csp_hash("a()"), csp_hash("b()"));
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}
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}
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