Files
Oxicloud/src/interfaces/web/mod.rs
T
Edouard Vanbelle 3fe6af25f1 fix(loading): fix issue with sveltekit and scripts
fix issues like:
```
Executing inline script violates the following Content Security Policy directive 'script-src 'self''.
Either the 'unsafe-inline' keyword, a hash ('sha256-Vv9My0PApDW3C+xGLu9cH98KLrOg/Qhc7hlT1lK5tyM='),
or a nonce ('nonce-...') is required to enable inline execution. The action has been blocked.
```
2026-07-14 02:26:36 +02:00

329 lines
13 KiB
Rust

use crate::common::config::AppConfig;
use crate::common::di::AppState;
use axum::Router;
use axum::http::header::{CACHE_CONTROL, HeaderValue};
use axum::routing::get_service;
use base64::Engine as _;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tower_http::compression::CompressionLayer;
use tower_http::services::{ServeDir, ServeFile};
use tower_http::set_header::SetResponseHeaderLayer;
/// Resolve the directory the SPA is actually served from.
///
/// Prefers the Vite build output (`static-dist/`) sitting next to the configured
/// static path, falling back to the configured path itself — the container ships
/// the built SPA straight to `OXICLOUD_STATIC_PATH` (default `./static`), so there
/// the fallback is what serves. Shared with the CSP layer in `main.rs` so the
/// inline-script hashes are computed from exactly the bytes that get served.
pub fn resolve_static_path(config: &AppConfig) -> PathBuf {
let dist = config
.static_path
.parent()
.unwrap_or(Path::new("."))
.join("static-dist");
if dist.exists() {
return dist;
}
config.static_path.clone()
}
/// Serves the SvelteKit single-page app.
///
/// The frontend is built by Vite into `static-dist/` (repo root). Real files are
/// served from disk; any unmatched client route (deep links such as
/// `/files/<id>`, `/s/<token>`, `/login`) falls back to the SPA shell
/// `index.html`, which boots the client router.
///
/// Caching: content-hashed assets under `/_app/immutable` are cached forever;
/// everything else — crucially the `index.html` shell — is `no-cache` so a deploy
/// can't leave a stale app pinned in browsers.
pub fn create_web_routes() -> Router<Arc<AppState>> {
let config = AppConfig::from_env();
let static_path = resolve_static_path(&config);
// SPA fallback: serve the file if it exists, else the app shell.
let spa = ServeDir::new(&static_path).fallback(ServeFile::new(static_path.join("index.html")));
// Hashed, immutable assets (SvelteKit emits these under /_app/immutable).
let app_immutable = ServeDir::new(static_path.join("_app").join("immutable"));
Router::new()
.nest_service(
"/_app/immutable",
get_service(app_immutable).layer(SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(
CACHE_CONTROL,
HeaderValue::from_static("public, max-age=31536000, immutable"),
)),
)
.fallback_service(spa)
.layer(CompressionLayer::new().br(true).gzip(true))
// `if_not_present` so the immutable assets above keep their long cache;
// the shell itself must always revalidate so a deploy can't pin a stale
// app in browsers.
.layer(SetResponseHeaderLayer::if_not_present(
CACHE_CONTROL,
HeaderValue::from_static("no-cache"),
))
}
/// Build the `content-security-policy` header value served on every response.
///
/// `script-src` stays strict — `'self'` with **no** `'unsafe-inline'` — and
/// additionally lists a `'sha256-…'` source for each inline `<script>` found in
/// the served HTML shells: the anti-FOUC theme init in `app.html` and
/// SvelteKit's hydration bootstrap. Without those hashes the browser blocks the
/// bootstrap and the SPA never mounts (a blank page behind the splash spinner).
/// Hashes are recomputed from the built assets on every startup, so a frontend
/// rebuild needs no edit here.
///
/// Other directives:
/// - `style-src` keeps `'unsafe-inline'` because the frontend sets inline styles
/// (`element.style.*`) for UI state — impractical to migrate to classes.
/// - `frame-src` lists `blob:` explicitly (`*` only matches network schemes) for
/// inline PDF/document viewers; `media-src` lists `blob:` for blob video/audio.
/// - `worker-src` lists `blob:` because MapLibre GL (the Places map) spawns its
/// web worker from a blob URL; `'self'` covers same-origin workers like the
/// delta-upload worker.
pub fn content_security_policy(config: &AppConfig) -> String {
let static_path = resolve_static_path(config);
let hashes = inline_script_csp_hashes(&static_path);
if hashes.is_empty() {
tracing::warn!(
static_path = %static_path.display(),
"CSP: no inline <script> hashes computed — if the SPA shell ships \
inline scripts they will be blocked by script-src 'self'. Check the \
static asset path (OXICLOUD_STATIC_PATH)."
);
}
// `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` is required for WebAssembly compilation/instantiation
// under a strict CSP (Chromium blocks `WebAssembly.instantiate` otherwise with
// "Wasm code generation disallowed by embedder"). The frontend instantiates the
// vendored BLAKE3/FastCDC WASM both on the main thread (instant by-hash uploads)
// and inside the delta-upload worker; without this they throw and every large
// file silently falls back to a plain byte upload. It is the WASM-only, safe
// variant — it does NOT permit `eval()`/`new Function()` (no `'unsafe-eval'`).
let mut script_src = String::from("script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'");
for hash in &hashes {
script_src.push(' ');
script_src.push_str(hash);
}
format!(
"default-src 'self'; \
{script_src}; \
worker-src 'self' blob:; \
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; \
img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; \
media-src 'self' blob:; \
connect-src 'self'; \
font-src 'self' data:; \
frame-src * blob:; \
frame-ancestors 'none'; \
base-uri 'self'; \
form-action 'self'"
)
}
/// SHA-256 CSP source expressions (`'sha256-…'`) for every inline `<script>` in
/// the root-level HTML shells under `static_path`.
///
/// The browser hashes the exact bytes between `<script …>` and `</script>`, so
/// each shell is read verbatim and that slice hashed. Scripts carrying a `src`
/// attribute are external (already allowed by `'self'`) and skipped. Only the
/// directory root is scanned — the SPA is client-rendered (SSR/prerender off),
/// so the only inline-script shell is `index.html`. Returns a deduplicated,
/// sorted list; empty when the dir is unreadable
/// (e.g. a Vite dev server serving HTML on its own port instead).
fn inline_script_csp_hashes(static_path: &Path) -> Vec<String> {
let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(static_path) else {
return Vec::new();
};
let mut hashes = BTreeSet::new();
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let path = entry.path();
if path.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()) != Some("html") {
continue;
}
let Ok(html) = std::fs::read_to_string(&path) else {
continue;
};
for script in inline_scripts(&html) {
hashes.insert(csp_hash(script));
}
}
hashes.into_iter().collect()
}
/// The CSP `'sha256-<base64>'` source expression for one inline script body.
fn csp_hash(script: &str) -> String {
let digest = Sha256::digest(script.as_bytes());
let encoded = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(digest);
format!("'sha256-{encoded}'")
}
/// Text content of every inline `<script>` (no `src`) in `html`, returned as
/// byte-exact slices suitable for CSP hashing.
///
/// Skips HTML comments (`<!-- ... -->`) before matching `<script`. Without this,
/// a comment containing the literal string `<script>` (e.g. the theme-init
/// explanatory block in the SvelteKit shell) causes the scanner to match the
/// comment first, consume through the real script's `</script>`, and emit the
/// wrong hash — the real inline script then fails CSP with `script-src 'self'`.
fn inline_scripts(html: &str) -> Vec<&str> {
let mut scripts = Vec::new();
let mut cursor = 0;
while cursor < html.len() {
let tail = &html[cursor..];
// Skip past HTML comments — they may contain the literal
// string `<script>` in prose and would otherwise poison the
// scanner. Comment-nesting is not a spec concern.
let next_comment = find_ci(tail, "<!--");
let next_script = find_ci(tail, "<script");
match (next_comment, next_script) {
(Some(c), Some(s)) if c < s => {
let end_rel = find_ci(&tail[c + 4..], "-->").map(|r| c + 4 + r + 3);
cursor = match end_rel {
Some(e) => cursor + e,
None => break, // unterminated comment; give up
};
continue;
}
(Some(c), None) => {
let end_rel = find_ci(&tail[c + 4..], "-->").map(|r| c + 4 + r + 3);
cursor = match end_rel {
Some(e) => cursor + e,
None => break,
};
continue;
}
(None, None) => break,
_ => {} // next thing is a real <script
}
let rel = next_script.unwrap();
let tag_start = cursor + rel;
// End of the opening tag.
let Some(gt) = html[tag_start..].find('>') else {
break;
};
let open_tag = &html[tag_start..tag_start + gt + 1];
let content_start = tag_start + gt + 1;
// Matching close tag.
let Some(close_rel) = find_ci(&html[content_start..], "</script>") else {
break;
};
let content_end = content_start + close_rel;
if !opening_tag_has_src(open_tag) {
scripts.push(&html[content_start..content_end]);
}
cursor = content_end + "</script>".len();
}
scripts
}
/// Whether a `<script …>` opening tag carries a `src` attribute (i.e. it loads
/// an external file rather than inlining code).
fn opening_tag_has_src(open_tag: &str) -> bool {
open_tag
.to_ascii_lowercase()
.split(|c: char| c.is_whitespace() || c == '/')
.any(|token| token == "src" || token.starts_with("src="))
}
/// ASCII-case-insensitive substring search. The returned byte offset is a valid
/// `str` boundary because `needle` (and therefore every matched byte) is ASCII.
fn find_ci(haystack: &str, needle: &str) -> Option<usize> {
let (hay, ndl) = (haystack.as_bytes(), needle.as_bytes());
if ndl.is_empty() || hay.len() < ndl.len() {
return None;
}
(0..=hay.len() - ndl.len())
.find(|&start| hay[start..start + ndl.len()].eq_ignore_ascii_case(ndl))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn extracts_inline_script_content_verbatim() {
// Leading/trailing whitespace inside the tag is part of what the browser
// hashes, so it must be preserved exactly.
let html = "<head><script>\n alert(1);\n</script></head>";
assert_eq!(inline_scripts(html), vec!["\n alert(1);\n"]);
}
#[test]
fn skips_external_src_scripts() {
let html = r#"<script src="/app.js"></script><script>boot();</script>"#;
assert_eq!(inline_scripts(html), vec!["boot();"]);
}
#[test]
fn keeps_inline_module_skips_module_with_src() {
let html =
r#"<script type="module" src="/x.js"></script><script type="module">go();</script>"#;
assert_eq!(inline_scripts(html), vec!["go();"]);
}
#[test]
fn case_insensitive_tag_matching() {
let html = "<SCRIPT>run();</SCRIPT>";
assert_eq!(inline_scripts(html), vec!["run();"]);
}
#[test]
fn empty_inline_script_hash_matches_known_sha256_vector() {
// SHA-256 of the empty string, base64 — the canonical empty digest.
assert_eq!(
csp_hash(""),
"'sha256-47DEQpj8HBSa+/TImW+5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU='"
);
}
#[test]
fn identical_scripts_produce_one_deduplicated_hash() {
let html = "<script>x()</script><script>x()</script>";
let mut set = BTreeSet::new();
for s in inline_scripts(html) {
set.insert(csp_hash(s));
}
assert_eq!(set.len(), 1);
}
#[test]
fn html_comment_mentioning_script_does_not_poison_scanner() {
// The SvelteKit shell has an explanatory comment referring to
// `<script>` in its prose (see static-dist/index.html theme-init
// block). Without comment skipping the scanner matches the
// comment's substring first, consumes through the real script's
// close tag, and emits the wrong hash — the real script then
// fails CSP with `script-src 'self'`.
let html = concat!(
"<!-- svelte.config.js finds this <script> by id and adds its hash -->\n",
"<script id=\"theme-init\">alert(1);</script>\n",
"<script>boot();</script>\n",
);
let scripts = inline_scripts(html);
assert_eq!(scripts, vec!["alert(1);", "boot();"]);
}
#[test]
fn unterminated_comment_bails_out_gracefully() {
// Malformed input: `<!--` never closed. Must not loop forever
// and must not falsely capture anything downstream.
let html = "<!-- unterminated <script>evil()</script>";
assert!(inline_scripts(html).is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn distinct_scripts_produce_distinct_hashes() {
assert_ne!(csp_hash("a()"), csp_hash("b()"));
}
}