Files
Oxicloud/src/interfaces/api/handlers/file_handler.rs
T
Edouard Vanbelle a3a93b90ec fix(thumbnails): key the ETag on content hash, not file id
The thumbnail ETag was "thumb-{file_id}-{size}-{format}", sent with
Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000, immutable. Replacing a file's
content preserves its id — file_upload_service rebuilds the entity with
parts.id and a new hash, then fires on_file_updated, which deletes and
regenerates the thumbnails — so the server produced a new thumbnail while
still advertising the old ETag. Because `immutable` tells a conforming
browser not to revalidate at all inside the freshness window, clients kept
rendering the previous image for up to a year, unfixably.

Keyed on the content hash the directive becomes honest: a thumbnail is a
pure function of (source bytes, size, format), so that triple identifies
the response. New content yields a new ETag.

The same change fixes the opposite direction. A copy, or any dedup twin,
had a different id and therefore a different ETag, so clients refetched
bytes they already held even though both are served from the same derived
blob. Now identical content agrees on an ETag and revalidates to 304
across files, users and copies.

Both thumbnail endpoints were affected: the REST handler and the
NextCloud preview handler.

Cost is one PK lookup ahead of the 304 decision, where the id-keyed
version needed none — paid for by no longer serving stale images. It is
partly recovered: both handlers already resolved the same hash further
down for the render path, and that second lookup is now gone, so the
cache-miss path is unchanged and only the 304 path pays. The resolved
hash is also handed to get_cached_thumbnail instead of None, saving the
service its own lookup.

No new disclosure: content_hash is already on FileDto and returned by
GET /api/files/{id}.

Tests: thumbnail_etag_content_keyed.hurl covers invalidation — overwrite
in place via WebDAV PUT, assert the ETag changed, assert a client holding
the stale one gets 200 rather than 304. derived_blob_copy.hurl gains the
sharing direction: a copy answers with the SAME ETag and revalidates to
304, which is the one externally observable consequence of content-keying
and was not previously testable.
2026-08-30 13:41:04 +02:00

1780 lines
74 KiB
Rust

use axum::{
Json,
body::Body,
extract::{Multipart, Path, Query, State},
http::{HeaderMap, Response, StatusCode, header},
response::IntoResponse,
};
use bytes::Bytes;
use http_range_header::parse_range_header;
use serde::Deserialize;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use utoipa::ToSchema;
use crate::application::ports::external_mount_ports::MountStat;
use crate::application::ports::file_ports::{
FileManagementUseCase, FileRetrievalUseCase, FileUploadUseCase, RangeContent,
};
use crate::application::ports::storage_ports::{FileReadPort, StorageUsagePort};
use crate::application::ports::thumbnail_ports::ThumbnailPort;
use crate::application::ports::{file_ports::OptimizedFileContent, folder_ports::FolderUseCase};
use crate::application::services::external_mount_router::ResolvedId;
use crate::application::services::mount_registry::MountConfig;
use crate::common::di::AppState;
use crate::domain::errors::DomainError;
use crate::domain::services::external_mount_id::{NodeId, virtual_file_etag};
use crate::interfaces::errors::AppError;
use crate::interfaces::middleware::auth::AuthUser;
use crate::interfaces::range_requests::not_modified_response;
use crate::interfaces::upload_ingest;
use crate::{application::dtos::file_dto::FileDto, domain::services::authorization::Permission};
use std::sync::Arc;
/**
* Type aliases for dependency injection state.
*/
/// Global application state for dependency injection
type GlobalState = Arc<AppState>;
/**
* API handler for file-related operations.
*
* Acts as a thin HTTP adapter in the hexagonal architecture: it parses requests,
* delegates business logic to application services, and maps results to HTTP
* responses. No infrastructure or strategy logic lives here.
*/
pub struct FileHandler;
impl FileHandler {
// ── Why no #[utoipa::path] here? ─────────────────────────────────────────────
// utoipa 5.4.0's proc macro generates helper structs / impls inside its expansion.
// Rust allows struct definitions at module scope but forbids them inside impl blocks,
// so `#[utoipa::path]` fails on every method in this impl block regardless of HTTP
// verb or annotation content. All route handlers are free functions below.
// TODO: collapse after utoipa upgrade.
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// UPLOAD
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
/// Streaming file upload — bounded RAM regardless of file size.
///
/// The multipart body is streamed straight into the CDC chunk store:
/// chunking, hashing and dedup checks happen while the bytes arrive.
/// No spool file, no re-read — chunks the store already has are never
/// written to disk at all.
pub async fn upload_file(
State(state): State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
multipart: Multipart,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
match Self::upload_file_inner(&state, &auth_user, multipart).await {
Ok((mut file, _blob_hash)) => {
crate::interfaces::api::handlers::caller_flags::enrich_file_flags(
&state,
&mut file,
auth_user.id,
)
.await;
Self::created_json_response(&file).into_response()
}
Err(response) => response.into_response(),
}
}
/// Instant upload: create a file from a blob the caller already owns.
///
/// Zero content bytes travel — the client proved possession of the
/// content by hash (it computed BLAKE3 locally and confirmed via
/// `GET /api/dedup/check/{hash}`), so the server only bumps the blob's
/// reference count and registers the metadata row.
///
/// All authorization (folder Create permission, hash ownership with
/// anti-enumeration, quota) lives in the application service.
pub(super) async fn create_file_by_hash_impl(
State(state): State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
Json(request): Json<CreateFileByHashRequest>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
// Hash shape check — same contract as /api/dedup/check/{hash}.
if request.hash.len() != 64 || !request.hash.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
return AppError::bad_request(
"Invalid hash format. Expected BLAKE3 (64 hex characters)",
)
.into_response();
}
// Basename only — same path-traversal guard as the multipart upload.
let filename = request
.name
.rsplit('/')
.next()
.unwrap_or(&request.name)
.rsplit('\\')
.next()
.unwrap_or(&request.name)
.to_string();
if filename.is_empty() {
return AppError::bad_request("File name must not be empty").into_response();
}
match state
.applications
.file_upload_service
.create_file_from_owned_blob_with_perms(
auth_user.id,
filename,
request.folder_id,
&request.hash,
)
.await
{
Ok(mut file) => {
crate::interfaces::api::handlers::caller_flags::enrich_file_flags(
&state,
&mut file,
auth_user.id,
)
.await;
Self::created_json_response(&file).into_response()
}
Err(err) => {
// Anti-enumeration shape: every "caller cannot reach this
// hash" outcome collapses into the same 404 with an
// `upload_path` hint, regardless of whether the hash exists
// globally, is owned by another tenant, or got GC'd in a
// race against trash-empty. Hides the cross-tenant content
// existence oracle and tells the client where to fall back.
//
// Three NotFound("Blob", _) paths in the service map here:
// 1. user_owns_blob_reference returned false
// 2. get_blob_metadata returned None (blob row vanished)
// 3. add_reference lost the race with GC (rows_affected==0)
use crate::common::errors::ErrorKind;
if err.kind == ErrorKind::NotFound && err.entity_type == "Blob" {
return Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND)
.header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
.body(Body::from(
r#"{"error":"blob_not_owned_by_caller","upload_path":"/api/files/upload"}"#,
))
.unwrap()
.into_response();
}
Self::domain_error_response(err).into_response()
}
}
}
/// Core upload logic shared by [`Self::upload_file`] and
/// [`Self::upload_file_with_thumbnails`].
///
/// Returns `(FileDto, blob_hash)` on success. The blob hash is the
/// BLAKE3 digest computed during the streaming ingest and is
/// propagated without an extra database round-trip so that callers
/// (e.g. thumbnail generation) can resolve the physical blob path
/// immediately.
async fn upload_file_inner(
state: &GlobalState,
auth_user: &AuthUser,
mut multipart: Multipart,
) -> Result<(crate::application::dtos::file_dto::FileDto, String), Response<Body>> {
let upload_service = &state.applications.file_upload_service;
let mut folder_id: Option<String> = None;
tracing::debug!("📤 Processing streaming file upload (hash-on-write)");
// caveat: if folder_id field is given after check can fails
while let Some(field) = multipart.next_field().await.unwrap_or(None) {
let name = field.name().unwrap_or("").to_string();
if name == "folder_id" {
let v = field.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
if !v.is_empty() {
folder_id = Some(v);
}
continue;
}
if name == "file" {
let raw_filename = field.file_name().unwrap_or("unnamed").to_string();
// Browsers send the full relative path (e.g. "Screenshots/file.png")
// as the filename for folder uploads via webkitRelativePath.
// Strip path components to get the basename only.
// This also prevents path-traversal attacks.
let filename = raw_filename
.rsplit('/')
.next()
.unwrap_or(&raw_filename)
.rsplit('\\')
.next()
.unwrap_or(&raw_filename)
.to_string();
let content_type = field
.content_type()
.unwrap_or("application/octet-stream")
.to_string();
// ── Fail-fast pre-check: verify the caller can Create inside
// the target folder BEFORE spooling the multipart body to disk.
// The upload service re-checks at write time — this is a
// UX/resource optimization, not the security boundary.
if let Some(ref fid) = folder_id
&& let Err(err) = state
.applications
.folder_service_concrete
.require_permission(auth_user.id, Permission::Create, fid)
.await
{
tracing::warn!(
"⛔ UPLOAD REJECTED: user='{}' folder='{}' err='{}'",
auth_user.username,
fid,
err
);
return Err(Self::domain_error_response(err));
}
// ── Early quota check (before spooling to disk) ──────
if let Some(storage_svc) = state.storage_usage_service.as_ref() {
let estimated_size = field
.headers()
.get(header::CONTENT_LENGTH)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| s.parse::<u64>().ok())
.unwrap_or(0);
if let Err(err) = storage_svc
.check_storage_quota(auth_user.id, estimated_size)
.await
{
tracing::warn!(
"⛔ UPLOAD REJECTED (early quota): user={}, file={}, est_size={}",
auth_user.username,
filename,
estimated_size
);
return Err(Self::quota_error_response(err));
}
}
// ── External mount destination? Stream to the provider ──
// Detected BEFORE the CAS ingest so the bytes never touch
// BLAKE3/dedup. Authorization happens inside the service.
if let Some(ref fid) = folder_id {
let (mount_cfg, parent_node) = match state.mount_router.classify(fid) {
ResolvedId::MountRoot { cfg } => (Some(cfg), NodeId::default()),
ResolvedId::MountChild { cfg, node_id } => (Some(cfg), node_id),
ResolvedId::Regular => (None, NodeId::default()),
};
if let Some(cfg) = mount_cfg {
use futures::StreamExt;
let body: crate::application::ports::external_mount_ports::MountByteStream<
'_,
> = Box::pin(
upload_ingest::multipart_field_stream(field)
.map(|r| r.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(e.to_string()))),
);
return match state
.applications
.external_upload_service
.write_file(&cfg, &parent_node, &filename, body, auth_user.id)
.await
{
Ok(file) => Ok((file, String::new())),
Err(err) => Err(Self::domain_error_response(err)),
};
}
}
// ── Stream the field into the CDC chunk store ────────
// Chunking (FastCDC) + hashing (BLAKE3) + dedup checks +
// MIME sniffing all happen while the bytes arrive; chunks
// the store already has never touch the disk. Size is
// capped globally by DefaultBodyLimit.
let dedup = &state.core.dedup_service;
let source = upload_ingest::multipart_field_stream(field);
let ingested = match upload_ingest::ingest_stream_to_cas(
source,
dedup,
&filename,
&content_type,
usize::MAX,
None,
)
.await
{
Ok(ingested) => ingested,
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!("❌ UPLOAD INGEST FAILED: {} - {}", filename, e.message);
return Err(e.into_response());
}
};
// ── Quota enforcement (exact size now known) ─────────
if let Some(storage_svc) = state.storage_usage_service.as_ref()
&& let Err(err) = storage_svc
.check_storage_quota(auth_user.id, ingested.size)
.await
{
upload_ingest::discard_ingested(dedup, &ingested).await;
tracing::warn!(
"⛔ UPLOAD REJECTED (user quota): user={}, file={}, size={}",
auth_user.username,
filename,
ingested.size
);
return Err(Self::quota_error_response(err));
}
// ── Per-drive quota enforcement (D4) ─────────────────
// Sibling to the per-user check above: same read-only
// SELECT shape, same discard-then-507 outcome. Skipped
// when there's no folder_id (root-level upload — no
// drive to charge; folder service refuses these
// independently). Unlimited-quota drives (`NULL`)
// short-circuit inside the service.
if let Some(storage_svc) = state.storage_usage_service.as_ref()
&& let Some(fid_str) = folder_id.as_deref()
&& let Ok(fid) = uuid::Uuid::parse_str(fid_str)
&& let Err(err) = storage_svc
.check_drive_quota_by_folder(fid, ingested.size)
.await
{
upload_ingest::discard_ingested(dedup, &ingested).await;
tracing::warn!(
"⛔ UPLOAD REJECTED (drive quota): user={}, folder={}, file={}, size={}",
auth_user.username,
fid,
filename,
ingested.size
);
return Err(Self::quota_error_response(err));
}
// ── Register the file row against the ingested blob ──
let hash = ingested.hash.clone();
let size = ingested.size;
match upload_service
.upload_file_streaming(
filename.clone(),
folder_id,
ingested.content_type.clone(),
ingested.stored(),
auth_user.id,
)
.await
{
Ok(file) => {
tracing::info!(
"✅ STREAMING UPLOAD: {} ({} bytes, ID: {})",
filename,
size,
file.id
);
return Ok((file, hash));
}
Err(err) => {
tracing::error!("❌ UPLOAD FAILED: {} - {}", filename, err);
return Err(Self::domain_error_response(err));
}
}
}
}
Err((
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
Json(serde_json::json!({
"error": "No file provided"
})),
)
.into_response())
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// THUMBNAILS
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
/// Get a thumbnail for a file (image or video).
///
/// **Cache-first**: once past the hash lookup below, a thumbnail already
/// in the moka in-memory cache or on disk is served without further DB
/// work. The ownership check was already performed when the thumbnail
/// was first generated (at upload) or uploaded (PUT by the owner).
/// UUIDv4 file IDs have 122 bits of entropy, making enumeration
/// infeasible.
///
/// **ETag / 304**: responses carry an immutable ETag keyed on the
/// **content hash**, so it identifies the bytes rather than the file.
/// Replacing a file's content changes it (correct invalidation), and two
/// files with identical content share it (a copy revalidates to 304
/// instead of refetching). Costs one PK lookup on the 304 path, which an
/// id-keyed ETag avoided at the price of never invalidating — see the
/// comment at the ETag construction.
///
/// Beyond that, the DB path is only taken on a **cache miss for images**
/// where the thumbnail hasn't been generated yet (first access after
/// upload if background generation hasn't finished).
pub(super) async fn get_thumbnail_impl(
State(state): State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
headers: &HeaderMap,
Path((id, size)): Path<(String, String)>,
) -> impl IntoResponse + use<> {
use crate::application::ports::thumbnail_ports::{ThumbnailFormat, ThumbnailSize};
// check first that user can access this resource
if let Err(err) = state
.applications
.file_management_service
.require_permission(auth_user.id, Permission::Read, &id)
.await
{
return AppError::from(err).into_response();
}
let thumbnail_service = &state.core.thumbnail_service;
let thumb_size = match size.as_str() {
"icon" => ThumbnailSize::Icon,
"preview" => ThumbnailSize::Preview,
"large" => ThumbnailSize::Large,
_ => {
return (
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
Json(serde_json::json!({
"error": "Invalid thumbnail size. Use: icon, preview, or large"
})),
)
.into_response();
}
};
// Content negotiation: WebP for clients that advertise it (~97%), JPEG
// otherwise. `Vary: Accept` keeps shared/browser caches from handing a
// WebP body to a JPEG-only client (or vice-versa).
let format =
ThumbnailFormat::from_accept(headers.get(header::ACCEPT).and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()));
// ── ETag short-circuit ───────────────────────────────────────
// Keyed on the CONTENT hash, not the file id. A thumbnail is a pure
// function of (source bytes, size, format), so that triple genuinely
// identifies the response — which is what makes the `immutable`
// directive below an honest claim.
//
// Keying on `file_id` was wrong in both directions. Replacing a
// file's content preserves its id (`file_upload_service` rebuilds the
// entity with `parts.id` and a new hash, then fires
// `on_file_updated`, which regenerates the thumbnails), so the ETag
// never changed — and since `immutable` tells a browser not to
// revalidate at all inside the freshness window, clients kept the old
// preview for up to a year. Conversely a copy, or any dedup twin, got
// a *different* id and so refetched bytes it already held, even
// though the server serves both from the same derived blob.
//
// Cost: one PK lookup, where the id-keyed version needed none. It
// buys correct invalidation plus 304s shared across every file with
// the same content. The lookup runs after the authz check above,
// which has already hit the database.
//
// No new disclosure: `content_hash` is already on `FileDto` and
// returned by `GET /api/files/{id}`, so any caller who reaches here
// could read it anyway.
let blob_hash = match state
.repositories
.file_read_repository
.get_blob_hash(&id)
.await
{
Ok(h) => h,
Err(err) => return AppError::from(err).into_response(),
};
let etag = {
let (s, f) = (thumb_size.as_str(), format.as_str());
let mut e = String::with_capacity(9 + blob_hash.len() + s.len() + f.len());
e.push_str("\"thumb-");
e.push_str(&blob_hash);
e.push('-');
e.push_str(s);
e.push('-');
e.push_str(f);
e.push('"');
e
};
if let Some(if_none_match) = headers.get(header::IF_NONE_MATCH)
&& let Ok(val) = if_none_match.to_str()
&& (val == etag || val == "*")
{
return Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::NOT_MODIFIED)
.header(header::ETAG, &etag)
.header(header::VARY, header::ACCEPT.as_str())
.header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "public, max-age=31536000, immutable")
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap()
.into_response();
}
// ── Cache-first path (Solution A) ────────────────────────────
// Try moka (RAM) → disk before touching the database.
// If the thumbnail exists it was authorized at creation time.
if let Some(data) = thumbnail_service
.get_cached_thumbnail(
&id,
// Already resolved for the ETag above — hand it over rather
// than let the service look it up a second time.
Some(&blob_hash),
thumb_size.into(),
format,
Some(&state.core.dedup_service),
)
.await
{
return Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::OK)
.header(
header::CONTENT_TYPE,
crate::common::mime_detect::thumbnail_content_type(&data),
)
.header(header::CONTENT_LENGTH, data.len())
.header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "public, max-age=31536000, immutable")
.header(header::ETAG, &etag)
.header(header::VARY, header::ACCEPT.as_str())
.body(Body::from(data))
.unwrap()
.into_response();
}
// ── Cache miss — need DB for ownership + blob resolution ─────
let file_retrieval_service = &state.applications.file_retrieval_service;
let file = match file_retrieval_service
.get_file_or_trashed_with_perms(&id, auth_user.id)
.await
{
Ok(f) => f,
Err(err) => {
return AppError::from(err).into_response();
}
};
// Images and videos both store blob-hash thumbnails (videos via an
// eagerly-extracted frame); anything else has nothing to thumbnail → 204.
let is_image = thumbnail_service.is_supported_image(&file.mime_type);
let is_video = file.mime_type.starts_with("video/");
if !is_image && !is_video {
return Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
.header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "no-store")
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap()
.into_response();
}
// `blob_hash` was resolved above to build the ETag — no second lookup.
if let Some(data) = thumbnail_service
.get_cached_thumbnail(
&id,
Some(&blob_hash),
thumb_size.into(),
format,
Some(&state.core.dedup_service),
)
.await
{
return Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::OK)
.header(
header::CONTENT_TYPE,
crate::common::mime_detect::thumbnail_content_type(&data),
)
.header(header::CONTENT_LENGTH, data.len())
.header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "public, max-age=31536000, immutable")
.header(header::ETAG, &etag)
.header(header::VARY, header::ACCEPT.as_str())
.body(Body::from(data))
.unwrap()
.into_response();
}
// Videos: thumbnails are produced eagerly server-side (ffmpeg) on upload,
// and persisted WebP-only. Serve that WebP regardless of the negotiated
// format — a JPEG/`*/*`/no-Accept client still gets it, correctly labelled
// via byte-sniffing — otherwise non-WebP clients would 204 forever despite
// a valid thumbnail on disk. We never image-decode a video, so a genuine
// miss (generation in flight or unavailable) returns 204.
if is_video {
if let Some(data) = thumbnail_service
.get_cached_thumbnail(
&id,
Some(&blob_hash),
thumb_size.into(),
ThumbnailFormat::Webp,
Some(&state.core.dedup_service),
)
.await
{
return Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::OK)
.header(
header::CONTENT_TYPE,
crate::common::mime_detect::thumbnail_content_type(&data),
)
.header(header::CONTENT_LENGTH, data.len())
.header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "public, max-age=31536000, immutable")
.header(header::ETAG, &etag)
.header(header::VARY, header::ACCEPT.as_str())
.body(Body::from(data))
.unwrap()
.into_response();
}
return Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
.header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "no-store")
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap()
.into_response();
}
match thumbnail_service
.get_thumbnail_from_blob(
&id,
&blob_hash,
thumb_size.into(),
format,
state.core.dedup_service.clone(),
)
.await
{
Ok(data) => Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::OK)
.header(
header::CONTENT_TYPE,
crate::common::mime_detect::thumbnail_content_type(&data),
)
.header(header::CONTENT_LENGTH, data.len())
.header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "public, max-age=31536000, immutable")
.header(header::ETAG, &etag)
.header(header::VARY, header::ACCEPT.as_str())
.body(Body::from(data))
.unwrap()
.into_response(),
Err(err) => AppError::internal_error(format!("Thumbnail generation failed: {}", err))
.into_response(),
}
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// UPLOAD THUMBNAIL (client-generated, e.g. video frames)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
/// Accept a client-generated thumbnail (e.g. video frame extracted via
/// `<video>` + `<canvas>` in the browser) and persist it in the server
/// cache. The image is validated, re-encoded to WebP, and stored so
/// subsequent `GET …/thumbnail/{size}` requests are served instantly.
///
/// **Max body: 512 KB** — thumbnails are small.
pub(super) async fn upload_thumbnail_impl(
State(state): State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
Path((id, size)): Path<(String, String)>,
body: Bytes,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
use crate::application::ports::thumbnail_ports::ThumbnailSize;
// check first that user can access this resource
if let Err(err) = state
.applications
.file_management_service
.require_permission(auth_user.id, Permission::Update, &id)
.await
{
return AppError::from(err).into_response();
}
let thumbnail_service = &state.core.thumbnail_service;
// Validate size
let thumb_size = match size.as_str() {
"icon" => ThumbnailSize::Icon,
"preview" => ThumbnailSize::Preview,
"large" => ThumbnailSize::Large,
_ => {
return (
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
Json(serde_json::json!({
"error": "Invalid thumbnail size. Use: icon, preview, or large"
})),
)
.into_response();
}
};
// Reject oversized payloads (512 KB)
if body.len() > 512 * 1024 {
return (
StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "Thumbnail exceeds 512 KB limit" })),
)
.into_response();
}
// Validate file ownership
let file_retrieval_service = &state.applications.file_retrieval_service;
if let Err(err) = file_retrieval_service
.get_file_with_perms(&id, auth_user.id)
.await
{
return AppError::from(err).into_response();
}
// Validate, re-encode to WebP, and store
match thumbnail_service
.store_external_thumbnail(&id, thumb_size.into(), body)
.await
{
Ok(_) => StatusCode::CREATED.into_response(),
Err(err) => AppError::internal_error(format!("Failed to store thumbnail: {}", err))
.into_response(),
}
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// DOWNLOAD
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
/// Downloads a file with optimized multi-tier strategy.
///
/// The tier selection (write-behind → hot cache → WebP transcode → mmap →
/// streaming) is fully handled by `FileRetrievalUseCase::get_file_optimized`.
/// This handler only deals with HTTP concerns: ETag, Range, Content-Disposition,
/// and optional compression.
pub(super) async fn download_file_impl(
State(state): State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
Path(id): Path<String>,
Query(params): Query<HashMap<String, String>>,
headers: &HeaderMap,
) -> impl IntoResponse + use<> {
// External mount: download a file living on the provider's backend.
// (A mount-root UUID is a folder and is not downloadable — it falls
// through and 404s as a non-file.)
if let ResolvedId::MountChild { cfg, node_id } = state.mount_router.classify(&id) {
return Self::download_mount_file(
&state,
&cfg,
&node_id,
&id,
auth_user.id,
&params,
headers,
)
.await;
}
let retrieval = &state.applications.file_retrieval_service;
// ── Get file metadata (ownership-scoped) ────────────────────────
let file_dto = match retrieval.get_file_with_perms(&id, auth_user.id).await {
Ok(f) => f,
Err(err) => {
return AppError::from(err).into_response();
}
};
// ── Metadata-only request ────────────────────────────────────
if params
.get("metadata")
.is_some_and(|v| v == "true" || v == "1")
{
return (
StatusCode::OK,
Json(serde_json::json!({
"id": file_dto.id,
"name": file_dto.name,
"path": file_dto.path,
"size": file_dto.size,
"mime_type": file_dto.mime_type,
"folder_id": file_dto.folder_id,
"created_at": file_dto.created_at,
"modified_at": file_dto.modified_at
})),
)
.into_response();
}
// Route through `FileDto::etag` so this REST download
// endpoint, WebDAV/NextCloud GET, HEAD, PROPFIND, and PUT all
// emit the same opaque token for the same file — see
// `File::etag` for the formula.
let etag = format!("\"{}\"", file_dto.etag);
// ── ETag (304 Not Modified) ──────────────────────────────────
if let Some(resp) = not_modified_response(headers, &etag) {
return resp.into_response();
}
// ── Range Requests ───────────────────────────────────────────
if let Some(range_header) = headers.get(header::RANGE)
&& let Ok(range_str) = range_header.to_str()
&& let Ok(ranges) = parse_range_header(range_str)
{
let validated = ranges.validate(file_dto.size);
if let Ok(valid_ranges) = validated {
if let Some(range) = valid_ranges.first() {
let start = *range.start();
let end = *range.end();
let range_length = end - start + 1;
let disposition =
Self::content_disposition(&file_dto.name, &file_dto.mime_type, &params);
// `file_dto` was already Read-authorized (and the access
// recorded) by `get_file_with_perms` above — every seek in
// a media/PDF scrub is a separate Range request, so
// re-authorizing + re-notifying per seek doubled that work
// for nothing. Use the non-perms range read, matching the
// share-landing and WebDAV range paths which authorize once
// then stream (benches/ROUND7.md).
match retrieval
.get_file_range_preloaded(&file_dto, start, Some(end + 1))
.await
{
Ok(content) => {
let body = match content {
RangeContent::Bytes(b) => Body::from(b),
RangeContent::Stream(s) => Body::from_stream(Box::into_pin(s)),
};
return Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::PARTIAL_CONTENT)
.header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, &*file_dto.mime_type)
.header(header::CONTENT_DISPOSITION, &disposition)
.header(header::CONTENT_LENGTH, range_length)
.header(
header::CONTENT_RANGE,
format!("bytes {}-{}/{}", start, end, file_dto.size),
)
.header(header::ACCEPT_RANGES, "bytes")
.header(header::ETAG, &etag)
.header(
header::CACHE_CONTROL,
"private, max-age=3600, must-revalidate",
)
.body(body)
.unwrap()
.into_response();
}
Err(err) => {
tracing::error!("Error creating range stream: {}", err);
// fall through to normal download
}
}
}
} else {
return Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::RANGE_NOT_SATISFIABLE)
.header(header::CONTENT_RANGE, format!("bytes */{}", file_dto.size))
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap()
.into_response();
}
}
// ── Normal download (delegated to service) ───────────────────
let disposition = Self::content_disposition(&file_dto.name, &file_dto.mime_type, &params);
let accept_webp = headers
.get(header::ACCEPT)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.is_some_and(|a| a.contains("image/webp"));
let prefer_original = params
.get("original")
.is_some_and(|v| v == "true" || v == "1");
// Use the ownership-scoped optimized download.
// Ownership was already verified by get_file_owned above,
// so we can safely use the preloaded variant. Capture the two
// fields the stream arm needs (one Arc bump + a u64 copy) and MOVE
// the DTO in — the old `file_dto.clone()` deep-copied all 7 owned
// Strings on every download, purely to read mime/size afterwards
// (benches/ROUND11.md §1).
let dto_mime = file_dto.mime_type.clone();
let dto_size = file_dto.size;
match retrieval
.get_file_optimized_preloaded(&id, file_dto, accept_webp, prefer_original)
.await
{
Ok((_file, content)) => match content {
OptimizedFileContent::Bytes {
data, mime_type, ..
} => Self::build_cached_response(data, &mime_type, &disposition, &etag)
.into_response(),
OptimizedFileContent::Stream(pinned_stream) => Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::OK)
.header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, &*dto_mime)
.header(header::CONTENT_DISPOSITION, &disposition)
.header(header::CONTENT_LENGTH, dto_size)
.header(header::ETAG, &etag)
.header(
header::CACHE_CONTROL,
"private, max-age=3600, must-revalidate",
)
.header(header::ACCEPT_RANGES, "bytes")
.body(Body::from_stream(pinned_stream))
.unwrap()
.into_response(),
},
Err(err) => AppError::from(err).into_response(),
}
}
/// Download a file living inside an external mount: stat via the provider
/// (authorized against the mount root), then serve metadata / 304 / Range /
/// full stream straight from the backend. No blob cache, dedup, or WebP
/// transcode — mount content is served as-is.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub(super) async fn download_mount_file(
state: &AppState,
cfg: &MountConfig,
node_id: &NodeId,
id: &str,
caller_id: uuid::Uuid,
params: &HashMap<String, String>,
headers: &HeaderMap,
) -> axum::response::Response {
let retrieval = &state.applications.file_retrieval_service;
let stat: MountStat = match retrieval
.stat_mount_file_with_perms(cfg, node_id, caller_id)
.await
{
Ok(s) => s,
Err(err) => return AppError::from(err).into_response(),
};
if stat.is_dir {
// Directories are not downloadable through this endpoint.
return AppError::from(DomainError::not_found("File", id)).into_response();
}
let name = node_id
.as_str()
.rsplit('/')
.next()
.unwrap_or_else(|| node_id.as_str());
// ── Metadata-only request ────────────────────────────────────
if params
.get("metadata")
.is_some_and(|v| v == "true" || v == "1")
{
return (
StatusCode::OK,
Json(serde_json::json!({
"id": id,
"name": name,
"size": stat.size,
"mime_type": stat.mime_type,
"modified_at": stat.modified_at,
})),
)
.into_response();
}
let etag = format!("\"{}\"", virtual_file_etag(stat.size, stat.modified_at));
if let Some(resp) = not_modified_response(headers, &etag) {
return resp.into_response();
}
// ── Range Requests ───────────────────────────────────────────
let range_header = headers.get(header::RANGE).and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
match plan_mount_range(stat.size, range_header) {
MountRangePlan::Full => {}
MountRangePlan::NotSatisfiable => {
return Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::RANGE_NOT_SATISFIABLE)
.header(header::CONTENT_RANGE, format!("bytes */{}", stat.size))
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap()
.into_response();
}
MountRangePlan::Range { start, end } => {
let range_length = end - start + 1;
let disposition = Self::content_disposition(name, &stat.mime_type, params);
match retrieval
.open_mount_file_with_perms(cfg, node_id, caller_id, Some((start, Some(end))))
.await
{
Ok(stream) => {
return Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::PARTIAL_CONTENT)
.header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, &stat.mime_type)
.header(header::CONTENT_DISPOSITION, &disposition)
.header(header::CONTENT_LENGTH, range_length)
.header(
header::CONTENT_RANGE,
format!("bytes {}-{}/{}", start, end, stat.size),
)
.header(header::ACCEPT_RANGES, "bytes")
.header(header::ETAG, &etag)
.header(
header::CACHE_CONTROL,
"private, max-age=3600, must-revalidate",
)
.body(Body::from_stream(stream))
.unwrap()
.into_response();
}
Err(err) => {
tracing::error!("Error creating mount range stream: {}", err);
// fall through to full download
}
}
}
}
// ── Normal download ──────────────────────────────────────────
let disposition = Self::content_disposition(name, &stat.mime_type, params);
match retrieval
.open_mount_file_with_perms(cfg, node_id, caller_id, None)
.await
{
Ok(stream) => Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::OK)
.header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, &stat.mime_type)
.header(header::CONTENT_DISPOSITION, &disposition)
.header(header::CONTENT_LENGTH, stat.size)
.header(header::ETAG, &etag)
.header(
header::CACHE_CONTROL,
"private, max-age=3600, must-revalidate",
)
.header(header::ACCEPT_RANGES, "bytes")
.body(Body::from_stream(stream))
.unwrap()
.into_response(),
Err(err) => AppError::from(err).into_response(),
}
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// LIST
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
/// Lists files in a folder, extracting `folder_id` from query parameters.
pub(super) async fn list_files_query_impl(
State(state): State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
headers: &HeaderMap,
Query(params): Query<HashMap<String, String>>,
) -> impl IntoResponse + use<> {
let folder_id = params.get("folder_id").map(|id| id.as_str());
tracing::info!("API: Listing files with folder_id: {:?}", folder_id);
let retrieval = &state.applications.file_retrieval_service;
match retrieval
.list_files_with_perms(folder_id, auth_user.id)
.await
{
Ok(files) => {
// Compute lightweight ETag from max modified_at + count
let max_mod = files.iter().map(|f| f.modified_at).max().unwrap_or(0);
let count = files.len();
let mut hasher = std::collections::hash_map::DefaultHasher::new();
std::hash::Hash::hash(&max_mod, &mut hasher);
std::hash::Hash::hash(&count, &mut hasher);
let etag = format!("\"{:x}\"", std::hash::Hasher::finish(&hasher));
// 304 Not Modified if client already has this version
if let Some(inm) = headers.get(header::IF_NONE_MATCH)
&& let Ok(client_etag) = inm.to_str()
&& client_etag == etag
{
return Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::NOT_MODIFIED)
.header(header::ETAG, &etag)
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap()
.into_response();
}
tracing::info!("Found {} files", files.len());
// Pre-sized serialization — this listing is unbounded (no
// page cap), the axum Json 128-byte seed reallocs ~11 times
// on a big folder (benches/ROUND12.md §M1).
let mut resp = crate::interfaces::api::sized_json::sized_json(
64 + files.len() * crate::interfaces::api::sized_json::EST_ROW_BYTES,
&files,
);
resp.headers_mut()
.insert(header::ETAG, header::HeaderValue::from_str(&etag).unwrap());
resp
}
Err(err) => AppError::from(err).into_response(),
}
}
/// Uploads a file and generates thumbnails in the background for images.
///
/// Delegates to [`Self::upload_file_inner`] and, on success, spawns
/// a background task to generate all thumbnail sizes before serialising
/// the `FileDto` once.
/// TODO: should move thumbnail generation to a generic hook ? (onfileUploaded, other services will beneficiate it)
pub(super) async fn upload_file_with_thumbnails_impl(
State(state): State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
multipart: Multipart,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let (mut file, _) = match Self::upload_file_inner(&state, &auth_user, multipart).await {
Ok(pair) => pair,
Err(response) => return response.into_response(),
};
crate::interfaces::api::handlers::caller_flags::enrich_file_flags(
&state,
&mut file,
auth_user.id,
)
.await;
Self::created_json_response(&file).into_response()
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// METADATA
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
/// Returns EXIF/media metadata for a file.
///
/// Used by the Photos lightbox and for testing EXIF extraction.
pub(super) async fn get_file_metadata_impl(
State(state): State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
Path(file_id): Path<String>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
// check first that user can access this resource
if let Err(err) = state
.applications
.file_management_service
.require_permission(auth_user.id, Permission::Read, &file_id)
.await
{
return AppError::from(err).into_response();
}
let metadata_repo = &state.repositories.file_metadata_repository;
match metadata_repo.get(&file_id).await {
Ok(Some(meta)) => (StatusCode::OK, Json(meta)).into_response(),
Ok(None) => (
StatusCode::OK,
Json(serde_json::json!({
"file_id": file_id,
"message": "No EXIF metadata available"
})),
)
.into_response(),
Err(e) => (
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
)
.into_response(),
}
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// DELETE
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
/// Deletes a file (trash-first with dedup cleanup).
///
/// All logic (trash fallback, dedup ref-count, hash computation) is handled
/// by `FileManagementUseCase::delete_with_cleanup`.
///
/// When auth is available, uses trash-first deletion; otherwise falls back
/// to permanent delete so the endpoint works with or without auth.
pub(super) async fn delete_file_impl(
State(state): State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
Path(id): Path<String>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let mgmt = &state.applications.file_management_service;
// Auth required: trash-first with dedup cleanup + ownership verification
let result = mgmt
.delete_and_cleanup_with_perms(&id, auth_user.id)
.await
.map(|was_trashed| {
if was_trashed {
tracing::info!("File moved to trash: {}", id);
} else {
tracing::info!("File permanently deleted: {}", id);
}
});
match result {
Ok(_) => StatusCode::NO_CONTENT.into_response(),
Err(err) => AppError::from(err).into_response(),
}
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// MOVE
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
/// Renames a file (ownership-verified)
pub(super) async fn rename_file_impl(
State(state): State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
Path(id): Path<String>,
Json(payload): Json<serde_json::Value>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let new_name = match payload.get("name").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
Some(name) if !name.trim().is_empty() => name.trim().to_string(),
_ => {
return (
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
Json(serde_json::json!({
"error": "Missing or empty 'name' field"
})),
)
.into_response();
}
};
tracing::info!("Renaming file {} to \"{}\"", id, new_name);
let mgmt = &state.applications.file_management_service;
match mgmt
.rename_file_with_perms(&id, auth_user.id, &new_name)
.await
{
Ok(file_dto) => (StatusCode::OK, Json(file_dto)).into_response(),
Err(err) => AppError::from(err).into_response(),
}
}
/// Moves a file to a different folder (ownership-verified)
/// TODO: dead function ?
pub async fn move_file(
State(state): State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
Path(id): Path<String>,
Json(payload): Json<MoveFilePayload>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
tracing::info!("Moving file {} to folder {:?}", id, payload.folder_id);
let mgmt = &state.applications.file_management_service;
match mgmt
.move_file_with_perms(&id, auth_user.id, payload.folder_id)
.await
{
Ok(mut file) => {
crate::interfaces::api::handlers::caller_flags::enrich_file_flags(
&state,
&mut file,
auth_user.id,
)
.await;
(StatusCode::OK, Json(file)).into_response()
}
Err(err) => AppError::from(err).into_response(),
}
}
/// Moves a file to a different folder (ownership-verified)
pub(super) async fn move_file_simple_impl(
State(state): State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
Path(id): Path<String>,
Json(payload): Json<serde_json::Value>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let folder_id = payload
.get("folder_id")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.map(|s| s.to_string());
let mgmt = &state.applications.file_management_service;
match mgmt
.move_file_with_perms(&id, auth_user.id, folder_id)
.await
{
Ok(file_dto) => (StatusCode::OK, Json(file_dto)).into_response(),
Err(err) => AppError::from(err).into_response(),
}
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// PRIVATE HELPERS
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
/// Build a Content-Disposition header value.
///
/// Build a `Content-Disposition` header value for an authenticated download,
/// honouring the `?inline=true|1` query param. Delegates to the shared
/// `build_content_disposition` so the share-link path produces identical
/// header values for the same `(name, mime)` pair.
fn content_disposition(name: &str, mime: &str, params: &HashMap<String, String>) -> String {
let force_inline = params
.get("inline")
.is_some_and(|v| v == "true" || v == "1");
build_content_disposition(name, mime, force_inline)
}
/// Build a 201 Created JSON response.
fn created_json_response(file: &crate::application::dtos::file_dto::FileDto) -> Response<Body> {
Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::CREATED)
.header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
.header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate")
.body(Body::from(serde_json::to_string(file).unwrap()))
.unwrap()
}
/// Build error response for DomainError.
fn domain_error_response(err: crate::common::errors::DomainError) -> Response<Body> {
AppError::from(err).into_response()
}
/// Build a quota-specific error response with 507 status and structured body.
fn quota_error_response(err: crate::common::errors::DomainError) -> Response<Body> {
AppError::from(err).into_response()
}
/// Build response for cached/small files.
///
/// Compression is handled uniformly by `CompressionLayer` (tower-http)
/// which negotiates `Accept-Encoding` and applies gzip/brotli in streaming
/// mode. No manual compression is done here to avoid double-encoding.
fn build_cached_response(
content: Bytes,
mime_type: &str,
disposition: &str,
etag: &str,
) -> Response<Body> {
Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::OK)
.header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, mime_type)
.header(header::CONTENT_DISPOSITION, disposition)
.header(header::ETAG, etag)
.header(
header::CACHE_CONTROL,
"private, max-age=3600, must-revalidate",
)
.header(header::VARY, "Accept-Encoding")
.header(header::CONTENT_LENGTH, content.len())
.body(Body::from(content))
.unwrap()
}
}
/// Payload for moving a file
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
pub struct MoveFilePayload {
/// Target folder ID (None means root)
pub folder_id: Option<String>,
}
/// RFC 5987-compliant `Content-Disposition` with both ASCII fallback and
/// `filename*=UTF-8''...` for non-ASCII filenames.
pub(super) fn build_content_disposition(name: &str, mime: &str, force_inline: bool) -> String {
let disposition = if force_inline
|| mime.starts_with("image/")
|| mime == "application/pdf"
|| mime.starts_with("video/")
|| mime.starts_with("audio/")
{
"inline"
} else {
"attachment"
};
use percent_encoding::{AsciiSet, NON_ALPHANUMERIC, utf8_percent_encode};
// RFC 5987 attr-char safe set (no encoding needed for these).
const RFC5987_SET: &AsciiSet = &NON_ALPHANUMERIC
.remove(b'!')
.remove(b'#')
.remove(b'$')
.remove(b'&')
.remove(b'+')
.remove(b'-')
.remove(b'.')
.remove(b'^')
.remove(b'_')
.remove(b'`')
.remove(b'|')
.remove(b'~');
// Fast path: a name whose every byte is an RFC 5987 attr-char needs neither
// percent-encoding nor ASCII-fallback filtering ('"' and '\\' are not
// attr-chars, so none is substituted), so `filename` and `filename*` are the
// name verbatim — one allocation (the header) instead of three.
let all_attr_char = name.bytes().all(|b| {
b.is_ascii_alphanumeric()
|| matches!(
b,
b'!' | b'#' | b'$' | b'&' | b'+' | b'-' | b'.' | b'^' | b'_' | b'`' | b'|' | b'~'
)
});
if all_attr_char {
return format!("{disposition}; filename=\"{name}\"; filename*=UTF-8''{name}");
}
// Slow path: assemble the header in one pre-sized buffer, writing the ASCII
// fallback and the percent-encoded form in place — no throwaway `ascii_safe`
// / `encoded` Strings. Sized for the worst case (every byte → %XX) so it
// never grows.
let mut out = String::with_capacity(disposition.len() + name.len() * 4 + 32);
out.push_str(disposition);
out.push_str("; filename=\"");
for c in name.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_graphic() || *c == ' ') {
out.push(match c {
'"' | '\\' => '_',
_ => c,
});
}
out.push_str("\"; filename*=UTF-8''");
for chunk in utf8_percent_encode(name, RFC5987_SET) {
out.push_str(chunk);
}
out
}
// ── Route handlers (free functions) ──────────────────────────────────────────
//
// All annotated route functions live here rather than as methods on FileHandler
// because utoipa 5.4.0's #[utoipa::path] macro generates helper structs inside
// its expansion. Rust allows struct definitions at module scope but forbids them
// inside impl blocks — so every #[utoipa::path] annotation on a FileHandler
// method fails to compile regardless of HTTP verb or annotation content.
//
// All logic lives in the FileHandler::*_impl methods above; these thin wrappers
// exist solely to carry the OpenAPI annotation at a scope where utoipa can
// generate its helper types.
//
// routes.rs calls these free functions directly.
// TODO: collapse back into the impl block after a utoipa upgrade resolves the issue.
#[utoipa::path(
get,
path = "/api/files",
params(("folder_id" = Option<String>, Query, description = "Filter by folder ID")),
responses(
(status = 200, description = "List of files", body = Vec<FileDto>),
(status = 304, description = "Not modified"),
),
security(("bearerAuth" = [])),
tag = "files"
)]
pub async fn list_files_query(
state: State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
query: Query<HashMap<String, String>>,
req: axum::extract::Request,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
// Read headers by borrow (`req.headers()`) instead of the `HeaderMap`
// extractor, which clones the whole request header table (~2 allocs) just to
// read one If-None-Match — the ROUND14 §A4 middleware pattern applied to the
// hot listing handler (benches/ROUND22.md §H1).
FileHandler::list_files_query_impl(state, auth_user, req.headers(), query).await
}
#[utoipa::path(
post,
path = "/api/files/upload",
request_body(content_type = "multipart/form-data", description = "File data + optional folder_id field"),
responses(
(status = 201, description = "File uploaded", body = FileDto),
(status = 400, description = "Invalid request"),
(status = 507, description = "Storage quota exceeded"),
),
security(("bearerAuth" = [])),
tag = "files"
)]
pub async fn upload_file_with_thumbnails(
state: State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
multipart: Multipart,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
FileHandler::upload_file_with_thumbnails_impl(state, auth_user, multipart).await
}
/// Request body for the instant-upload endpoint.
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
pub struct CreateFileByHashRequest {
/// File name to create (path components are stripped).
pub name: String,
/// Target folder ID (the caller needs Create permission on it).
pub folder_id: String,
/// BLAKE3 hash (64 hex chars) of content the caller already owns.
pub hash: String,
}
#[utoipa::path(
post,
path = "/api/files/by-hash",
request_body = CreateFileByHashRequest,
responses(
(status = 201, description = "File created from an already-owned blob — zero bytes transferred", body = FileDto),
(status = 400, description = "Invalid hash format or empty name"),
(status = 404, description = "No owned blob with this hash (anti-enumeration: same shape as unknown hash)"),
(status = 409, description = "A file with this name already exists in the folder"),
(status = 507, description = "Storage quota exceeded"),
),
security(("bearerAuth" = [])),
tag = "files"
)]
pub async fn create_file_by_hash(
state: State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
request: Json<CreateFileByHashRequest>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
FileHandler::create_file_by_hash_impl(state, auth_user, request).await
}
#[utoipa::path(
get,
path = "/api/files/{id}",
params(
("id" = String, Path, description = "File ID"),
("metadata" = Option<bool>, Query, description = "Return metadata JSON instead of file content"),
("original" = Option<bool>, Query, description = "Skip WebP transcoding"),
("inline" = Option<bool>, Query, description = "Content-Disposition: inline"),
),
responses(
(status = 200, description = "File content"),
(status = 206, description = "Partial content (Range request)"),
(status = 304, description = "Not modified"),
(status = 404, description = "File not found"),
),
security(("bearerAuth" = [])),
tag = "files"
)]
pub async fn download_file(
state: State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
path: Path<String>,
query: Query<HashMap<String, String>>,
req: axum::extract::Request,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
// Borrow the headers (`req.headers()`) instead of the `HeaderMap` extractor's
// full clone — every download AND every media Range seek hit this path
// (benches/ROUND22.md §H1).
FileHandler::download_file_impl(state, auth_user, path, query, req.headers()).await
}
#[utoipa::path(
get,
path = "/api/files/{id}/thumbnail/{size}",
params(
("id" = String, Path, description = "File ID"),
("size" = String, Path, description = "Thumbnail size: icon | preview | large"),
),
responses(
(status = 200, description = "Thumbnail image (image/jpeg or image/webp)"),
(status = 204, description = "No thumbnail available for this file type"),
(status = 304, description = "Not modified"),
(status = 404, description = "File not found"),
),
security(("bearerAuth" = [])),
tag = "files"
)]
pub async fn get_thumbnail(
state: State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
path: Path<(String, String)>,
req: axum::extract::Request,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
// Borrow the headers (`req.headers()`) instead of the `HeaderMap` extractor's
// full clone — thumbnails are the highest-frequency GET (one per grid tile),
// and this handler reads only Accept + If-None-Match (benches/ROUND22.md §H1).
FileHandler::get_thumbnail_impl(state, auth_user, req.headers(), path).await
}
#[utoipa::path(
put,
path = "/api/files/{id}/thumbnail/{size}",
params(
("id" = String, Path, description = "File ID"),
("size" = String, Path, description = "Thumbnail size: icon | preview | large"),
),
request_body(content_type = "application/octet-stream", description = "Raw image bytes (max 512 KB)"),
responses(
(status = 201, description = "Thumbnail stored"),
(status = 400, description = "Invalid image or size too large"),
(status = 404, description = "File not found"),
),
security(("bearerAuth" = [])),
tag = "files"
)]
pub async fn upload_thumbnail(
state: State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
path: Path<(String, String)>,
body: Bytes,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
FileHandler::upload_thumbnail_impl(state, auth_user, path, body).await
}
#[utoipa::path(
get,
path = "/api/files/{id}/metadata",
params(("id" = String, Path, description = "File ID")),
responses(
(status = 200, description = "File metadata (EXIF, dimensions, duration, etc.)"),
(status = 404, description = "File not found"),
),
security(("bearerAuth" = [])),
tag = "files"
)]
pub async fn get_file_metadata(
state: State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
path: Path<String>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
FileHandler::get_file_metadata_impl(state, auth_user, path).await
}
#[utoipa::path(
delete,
path = "/api/files/{id}",
params(("id" = String, Path, description = "File ID")),
responses(
(status = 204, description = "File deleted (moved to trash if enabled)"),
(status = 404, description = "File not found"),
),
security(("bearerAuth" = [])),
tag = "files"
)]
pub async fn delete_file(
state: State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
path: Path<String>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
FileHandler::delete_file_impl(state, auth_user, path).await
}
#[utoipa::path(
put,
path = "/api/files/{id}/rename",
params(("id" = String, Path, description = "File ID")),
request_body(content_type = "application/json", description = r#"{"name": "new-name.txt"}"#),
responses(
(status = 200, description = "Renamed file", body = FileDto),
(status = 404, description = "File not found"),
),
security(("bearerAuth" = [])),
tag = "files"
)]
pub async fn rename_file(
state: State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
path: Path<String>,
json: Json<serde_json::Value>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
FileHandler::rename_file_impl(state, auth_user, path, json).await
}
#[utoipa::path(
put,
path = "/api/files/{id}/move",
params(("id" = String, Path, description = "File ID")),
request_body(content = MoveFilePayload, content_type = "application/json", description = "MoveFilePayload"),
responses(
(status = 200, description = "Moved file", body = FileDto),
(status = 404, description = "File or destination not found"),
),
security(("bearerAuth" = [])),
tag = "files"
)]
pub async fn move_file_simple(
state: State<GlobalState>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
path: Path<String>,
json: Json<serde_json::Value>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
FileHandler::move_file_simple_impl(state, auth_user, path, json).await
}
/// The download decision for a mount file given a `Range` header — the gnarly
/// parse-and-validate logic, extracted so it is unit-testable without I/O.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(super) enum MountRangePlan {
/// Serve the whole file (no/invalid range header).
Full,
/// Serve `start..=end` (inclusive) as 206 Partial Content.
Range { start: u64, end: u64 },
/// The requested range is unsatisfiable for this size → 416.
NotSatisfiable,
}
/// Decide how to serve a mount file for a given size + optional `Range` header.
/// A missing or unparseable range → `Full`; a valid range → `Range`; an
/// out-of-bounds range → `NotSatisfiable`.
pub(super) fn plan_mount_range(size: u64, range_header: Option<&str>) -> MountRangePlan {
let Some(rh) = range_header else {
return MountRangePlan::Full;
};
let Ok(ranges) = parse_range_header(rh) else {
// Malformed range header: ignore it and serve the whole file (RFC 7233).
return MountRangePlan::Full;
};
match ranges.validate(size) {
Ok(valid) => match valid.first() {
Some(r) => MountRangePlan::Range {
start: *r.start(),
end: *r.end(),
},
None => MountRangePlan::Full,
},
Err(_) => MountRangePlan::NotSatisfiable,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod mount_range_tests {
use super::{MountRangePlan, plan_mount_range};
#[test]
fn no_range_header_is_full() {
assert_eq!(plan_mount_range(100, None), MountRangePlan::Full);
}
#[test]
fn malformed_range_falls_back_to_full() {
assert_eq!(
plan_mount_range(100, Some("not-a-range")),
MountRangePlan::Full
);
assert_eq!(
plan_mount_range(100, Some("bytes=abc")),
MountRangePlan::Full
);
}
#[test]
fn valid_range_is_parsed_inclusive() {
assert_eq!(
plan_mount_range(100, Some("bytes=10-19")),
MountRangePlan::Range { start: 10, end: 19 }
);
}
#[test]
fn open_ended_range_extends_to_eof() {
assert_eq!(
plan_mount_range(100, Some("bytes=90-")),
MountRangePlan::Range { start: 90, end: 99 }
);
}
#[test]
fn suffix_range_counts_from_end() {
// last 10 bytes of a 100-byte file => 90..=99
assert_eq!(
plan_mount_range(100, Some("bytes=-10")),
MountRangePlan::Range { start: 90, end: 99 }
);
}
#[test]
fn out_of_bounds_range_is_not_satisfiable() {
assert_eq!(
plan_mount_range(100, Some("bytes=200-300")),
MountRangePlan::NotSatisfiable
);
}
}